Carter v. Castle Elec. Contracting Co.
| Decision Date | 13 June 1966 |
| Citation | 271 N.Y.S.2d 51,26 A.D.2d 83 |
| Parties | Lawrence CARTER, Appellant, v. CASTLE ELECTRIC CONTRACTING CO., Inc. et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Joshua J. Nasaw, Great Neck (Jay M. Landa, Great Neck, of counsel), for appellant.
O'Hagan & Reilly, Mineola (Henry J. O'Hagan, Mineola, of counsel), for respondents.
Before UGHETTA, Acting P.J., and CHRIST, BRENNAN, HILL and HOPKINS, JJ.
In this suit to recover damages arising out of the collision of the defendants' automobile with the rear end of the plaintiff's automobile, the complaint was dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case on the grounds that (1) he had failed to prove that the defendants' automobile had come in contact with his automobile and (2) there was no evidence of actionable negligence. On this appeal, the plaintiff of course is entitled to the aspect of the proof most favorable to him and the benefit of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the proof (African Metals Corp. v. Bullowa, 288 N.Y. 78, 81, 41 N.E.2d 466, 467; Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y. 389, 392, 34 N.E.2d 367, 369).
The plaintiff was driving his automobile on Northern Boulevard in Queens County between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The pavement was wet. He brought his automobile to rest at a red traffic light at the intersection of Northern Boulevard and Douglaston Parkway. His automobile was fourth in a line of cars awaiting the green signal. Thus stopped, his automobile was struck in the rear by the automobile driven by the defendant Reilly and owned by the defendant Castle Electric Contracting Co., Inc. (hereafter called 'Castle'). The plaintiff was rendered unconscious for a short time from the impact. The defendant Reilly drove the plaintiff's automobile to the side of the highway.
In addition to this proof, the plaintiff offered in evidence a report made by the defendant Reilly to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles concerning the accident. Though ruled inadmissible at the trial, the report was properly certified and was receivable in evidence (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 605; Public Officers Law, § 66--a; CPLR 4540; cf. Yeargans v. Yeargans, 24 A.D.2d 280, 282, 265 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564) as an admission by the defendant Reilly (Gangi v. Fradus, 227 N.Y. 452, 125 N.E. 677; Richardson on Evidence (9th ed.)), §§ 287, 288, 291). In his report Reilly stated that the defendants' automobile struck the plaintiff's automobile when the latter stopped short.
The complaint pleaded that Reilly was operating the automobile owned by Castle with its consent at the time of the occurrence. By failure to deny that allegation, the defendants admitted its truth. This admission, coupled with the accident report, sufficiently proved that the defendants' automobile came in contact with the plaintiff's vehicle.
The defendants do not seriously contest on this appeal the plaintiff's evidence of the ownership of the car involved in the collision with the plaintiff's automobile; their argument is directed toward the deficiency which they say existed in the plaintiff's case relating to a showing of actionable negligence on their part. We think that the plaintiff established a Prima facie case.
When an automobile is stopped before a red traffic light, there is a duty on the operators of vehicles travelling in the same direction behind it to obey the signal and likewise to stop. The operator of the automobile at a halt focuses his attention on the signal and is not obliged to observe the behavior of the vehicles behind him. A rear-end collision, in these circumstances, imposes a duty of explanation on the operator of the moving vehicle. The driver of the stopped vehicle, faced away from the point of impact, is at a disadvantage to establish the fault of the operator of...
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Bernier v. Torres
...or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a reasonable, non-negligent cause. Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr. Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85 (2nd Dept. 1966). If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the moving party ma......
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Calvert v. Katy Taxi, Inc.
...than plaintiff has done in order to establish a prima facie case against the single defendant. See Carter v. Castle Electric Contracting Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 271 N.Y.S.2d 51 (2d Dep't 1966). Though Pfaffenbach did not involve a suit by a passenger against his host, subsequent cases have held ......
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Turnbull v. Powell
...536 (2nd Dept.1990); Cohen v. Terranella 112 A.D.2d 264, 264, 491 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2nd Dept.1985); Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr. 26 A.D.2d 83, 84–85, 271 N.Y.S.2d 51 (2nd Dept., 1966). The occurrence of a rear end collision is sufficient to create a prima facie case of liability and even if de......
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Ortiz v. Rosner, 91 Civ. 3099 (PKL).
...that the preceding vehicle "stopped short," or that unforeseeable road conditions caused a skid. Carter v. Castle Electric Contracting Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85, 271 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (2d Dep't 1966); see also Bergman v. Kumm, 213 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Sup.Ct.1961) ("when there is a sudden stop with......