Carter v. City of Syracuse Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: 5:10-CV-690 (FJS/TWD)
• Parties: CORENE D. CARTER a/k/a CORENE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF SYRACUSE SCHOOL DISTRICT, DANIEL LOWENGARD, JOHN DITTMAN, JILL STEWART, and JOHN DOE(S) and JANE DOE(S), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

CORENE D. CARTER a/k/a CORENE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF SYRACUSE SCHOOL DISTRICT, DANIEL LOWENGARD, JOHN DITTMAN, JILL STEWART, and JOHN DOE(S) and JANE DOE(S), Defendants.

5:10-CV-690 (FJS/TWD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 3, 2020

APPEARANCES

BOSMAN LAW FIRM, LLC

3000 McConnellsville Road

Blossvale, New York 13308

Attorneys for Plaintiff

FERRARA FIORENZA P.C.

5010 Campuswood Drive

East Syracuse, New York 13057

Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL

A.J. BOSMAN, ESQ.

ERIC J. WILSON, ESQ.

MILES G. LAWLOR, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Corene Carter (Brown) ("Plaintiff"), a high school English teacher at Defendant City of Syracuse School District's Institute of Technology ("Tech"), brought this action based on race and gender discrimination against her employer, the City of Syracuse School District ("Defendant District"), its former superintendent ("Defendant Lowengard"), the former principal of Tech ("Defendant Dittmann"), the former Vice Principal of Tech and Coordinator of Defendant District's Health and Careers program ("Defendant Stewart"), and John Doe and Jane Doe as "individuals not yet known to the Plaintiff" seeking compensatory damages in an amount not less than two million dollars, punitive damages in an amount not less than three million dollars, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees, with interest on all amounts due. See generally Dkt. No. 47, Second Amended Compl.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural history

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on June 14, 2010, after many of the alleged incidents occurred. See Dkt. No. 1, Compl. In response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 17, Defs' Mot. Dismiss and Defs' Mot. Summ. J (2011). Plaintiff then cross-moved to amend her complaint to add various causes of action. See Dkt. No. 24, Pl.'s Cross Mot. to Amend Compl.

In its March 19, 2012 Order, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint and granted Defendants' motion in part, dismissing several causes of action, including the following:

(a) First cause of action for hostile work environment and racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII against Defendant District;

(b) Second cause of action for racial and gender discrimination pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law ("HRL") against Defendants District and Lowengard (not decided on the merits);

(c) Fourth cause of action for retaliation pursuant to Title VII against Defendant District;

(d) Seventh cause of action for hostile work environment and racial and gender discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Lowengard (without prejudice);(e) Eighth cause of action for custom, practice, or policy of a hostile work environment and discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant District (without prejudice);¹

See Dkt. No. 32, Memorandum-Decision and Order (2012), at 34-35.

The Court denied Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiff's third cause of action for discrimination pursuant to the HRL against Defendants Dittmann and Stewart and Plaintiff's seventh cause of action for race and gender discrimination and hostile work environment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dittmann and Stewart. See id. The Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants District and Lowengard.

Plaintiff then amended her complaint on May 3, 2012, following the Court's 2012 Order. See Dkt. No. 34, Amended Compl. Defendants immediately moved to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 36, Defs' Mot. Strike Amended Compl. After consideration, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint. See Dkt. No. 46, Memorandum-Decision and Order (2013), at 7.

In her Second Amended Complaint (the most recent complaint), Plaintiff asserts three causes of action. Plaintiff's first cause of action against Defendants Dittmann and Stewart alleges discrimination pursuant to the HRL. Her second cause of action alleges discrimination and a hostile work environment created by Defendants Lowengard, Dittmann, and Stewart, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Third, also pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges municipal liability against Defendant District. See Dkt. No. 47 at ¶¶ 56-62.

On May 23, 2014, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on those three remaining causes of action. See Dkt. No. 85, Defs' Mot. Summ. J. (2014). By Memorandum-Decision and Order dated June 25, 2015, the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims and entered judgment in Defendants' favor. See Dkt. No. 112, Memorandum-Decision and Order (2015), at 13. The Court also denied Plaintiff's outstanding motion to depose former Vice Principal Ben Frazier because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not have deposed Mr. Frazier during the discovery period. See id. at 12.

Plaintiff appealed the Court's judgment to the Second Circuit. See Dkt. No. 114, Notice of Appeal. The Second Circuit then issued a summary order (1) vacating the Court's 2012 dismissal of Plaintiff's HRL claim against Defendants District and Lowengard because a notice of claim was not required, (2) vacating and remanding the Court's 2012 dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims because they were adequately pled, and (3) vacating, as an abuse of discretion, the Court's 2015 denial of leave to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Frazier. See Dkt. No. 116, Summary Order (July 11, 2016), 19-20. The Second Circuit also urged the Court to reconsider its 2015 grant of summary judgment for Defendants, listing its concerns, including key facts it believed the Court had overlooked. See id. at 15-18.

Thereafter, Defendants petitioned the Second Circuit for a rehearing on the HRL claim against Defendants District and Lowengard because the New York Court of Appeals had recently decided a case on the notice of claim issue in Margerum v. City of Buffalo. See Dkt. No. 117, Summary Order II, at 2 (August 8, 2016). The Second Circuit granted the rehearing, vacated its own judgment on the issue, and remanded the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's HRL claim for reconsideration in light of the new caselaw. See id. at 3. It also instructed the Court to treat this issue as if it were brought in the first instance. See id.

On September 16, 2016, the Second Circuit issued its mandate with regard to its summary order and required the deposition of Mr. Frazier. See Dkt. No. 118, Mandate. Plaintiff deposed Mr. Frazier on June 22, 2017. See Dkt. No. 144, Status Report.

B. Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment

Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2017. See Dkt. No. 148, Defs' Mot. Summ. J. (2017). Based on the Second Circuit's mandate, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff may amend her complaint to add an HRL claim against Defendants District and Lowengard in light of new caselaw. Second, the Court must decide whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the following claims:

(1) Plaintiff's HRL discrimination claim against Defendants Dittmann and Stewart;

(2) Plaintiff's § 1983 discrimination and hostile work environment claims against Defendants Lowengard, Dittmann, and Stewart;

(3) Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination and hostile work environment claims against Defendant District;

(4) Plaintiff's § 1983 municipal liability claim against Defendant District; and

(5) Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim against Defendant District.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether dismissal of Plaintiff's HRL claim against Defendants District and Lowengard is warranted in light of Margerum v. City of Buffalo

In light of the recent New York Court of Appeals' decision in Margerum v. City of Buffalo, the Second Circuit asked the Court to consider Plaintiff's HRL claim against Defendants District and Lowengard "in the first instance." See Dkt. No. 117.

In Margerum, twelve white firefighter plaintiffs alleged that the City engaged in reverse disparate treatment and racial discrimination by permitting promotion eligibility lists to expirebefore their maximum legal duration, thus giving black firefighters with less tenure than white firefighters a better chance of being promoted. See Margerum v. City of Buffalo, 24 N.Y.3d 721, 728 (2015). The Margerum plaintiffs alleged that this violated the HRL, the Civil Service Law, and the New York State Constitution. See id.

The City argued on appeal that the case should be dismissed on the basis of the plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim prior to commencement of this action pursuant to General Municipal Law ("GML") §§ 50-e(1)(a) and 50-i.² See id. at 730. The Court of Appeals held, however, that "[h]uman rights claims are not tort actions under 50-e and are not personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property claims under 50-i." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded "that there is no notice of claim requirement here." Id.

The court also noted that the lower courts had determined that the GML "does not encompass a cause of action based on the Human Rights Law and '[s]ervice of a notice of claim is therefore not a condition precedent to commencement of an action based on the Human Rights Law in a jurisdiction where General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i provide the only notice of claim criteria.'" Id. (quoting Picciano v. Nassau Cnty. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 290 A.D.2d 164, 170 [(2d Dep't 2001)]) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, the Margerum court ultimately held that a plaintiff need not file a notice of claim for an HRL claim against a municipality under the GML, but it left open the possibility that a notice of claim may be required under another statutory scheme. Based on this, Defendants argue that New York's Education Law is a separate statutory scheme with its own notice of claim requirement that is much broader in scope than the GML requirement;...