Carter v. City of Philadelphia

• Citation: 181 F.3d 339
• Decision Date: 28 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1581,98-1581
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 1999) RAYMOND CARTER, APPELLANT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; THOMAS RYAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; JOHN DOE, AN UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICER(S) AND OR DETECTIVE(S) FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; LYNNE ABRAHAM, PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; RICHARD ROE, POLICE OFFICER REPRESENTING UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; WAYNE SETTLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; MICHAEL DUFFY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 339

181 F.3d 339 (3rd Cir. 1999)

RAYMOND CARTER, APPELLANT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; THOMAS RYAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; JOHN DOE, AN UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICER(S) AND OR DETECTIVE(S) FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; LYNNE ABRAHAM, PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; RICHARD ROE, POLICE OFFICER REPRESENTING UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; WAYNE SETTLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; MICHAEL DUFFY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

No. 98-1581

Argued March 10, 1999

Filed April 28, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-04499) Before: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Robert W. Small, Esquire (argued) Berlinger & Small 1494 Old York Road Suite 200 Abington, PA 19001 Of Counsel: Susan F. Burt, Esquire, North American Building, 11th Floor 121 South Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 Counsel For Appellant

Marcia Berman, Esquire City of Philadelphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street One Parkway Building, 17th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Counsel For Appellee City OF Philadelphia

R. David Walk, Jr., Esquire (argued) Bebe H. Kivitz, Esquire Kevin J. Kotch, Esquire Chonda Jordan Nwamu, Esquire Hoyle, Morris & Kerr 1650 Market Street 4900 One Liberty Place Philadelphia, PA 19103 Emily Zimmerman Chief, Civil Litigation Unit District Attorney's Office 1421 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19201 Counsel For Appellee

Richard Roe Calvin R. Koons, Esquire Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania Strawberry Square, 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Counsel For Commonwealth OF Pennsylvania Amicus Appellee

Stuard B. Suss Deputy District Attorney Ralph A. Germak President, Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association Pdaa/Pdai Headquarters 2929 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Counsel For Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association Amicus Curiae

Before: Mansmann, Scirica and Nygaard, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Mansmann, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we must first determine whether our requirement that a district court provide a brief statement of reasons -- explaining how it balanced the competing concerns that inform our interpretation of Rule 54(b) -- in certifying a judgment for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) precludes our exercise of jurisdiction to hear the appeal where we are otherwise able to ascertain the propriety of the certification from the record. Exercise of jurisdiction and consideration on the merits in turn require that we decide, as a matter of first impression, whether Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to Philadelphia District Attorneys for claims arising from administrative and policymaking - rather than prosecutorial - functions. We must also determine whether, if sovereign immunity does not apply, the official capacity claims are alternatively barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Finally, we must consider whether claims against unknown policymakers in the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office in their personal capacity have been adequately pled.

The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office contends that because the DA's Office acts in the name of the Commonwealth and carries out a sovereign function, it is entitled to share in the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity as an arm of the state. The District Court accepted this contention, holding that application of the factors by which we determine Eleventh Amendment immunity weighed "strongly in favor of finding that the District Attorney's Office, when performing its historic functions of investigating and prosecuting crimes on behalf of the Commonwealth, is an `arm of the state' not subject to suit in federal court without its consent." ¹ The District Court further dismissed claims against unknown policymakers in the DA's Office in their personal capacity for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because we find that the consequences of the District Court's failure to provide a statement of reasons need not be visited on the parties by delaying resolution of their case when the ripeness of the appeal is apparent, we will exercise jurisdiction. On the merits, we find that (1) the performance of an essential sovereign function does not of itself give rise to state surrogate status under Pennsylvania law; (2) a correct application of the factors we set forth in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), compels a finding that the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity does not encompass the DA's Office; and (3) even if the DA's Office were entitled to sovereign immunity as a state actor during the performance of its prosecutorial functions, such immunity would not extend to the local office administrative, investigative and management functions which underlie this action. We will, therefore, reverse the District Court's holding that the DA's Office is entitled to sovereign immunity for purposes of the claims at hand. We reject the alternative assertion of absolute prosecutorial immunity as lacking merit where the cause of action lies on administrative and investigative, rather than prosecutorial, conduct. Finally, because we find that the section 1983 claims against unknown policymakers in the DA's Office in their personal capacities have been adequately pled and Carter should be allowed to pursue discovery, we will also reverse the District Court's dismissal of those claims.²

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Raymond Carter had been convicted of murder and had served ten (10) years of a life sentence without possibility of parole before his conviction was overturned and the case against him nol prossed following disclosures of long-standing corruption within Philadelphia's 39th Police District.³ Carter then brought an action against the City of Philadelphia, named police officers,⁴ unknown employees of the Philadelphia Police Department, and unknown policymakers within the Philadelphia DA's Office.⁵

Carter's action against individuals in the DA's Office was premised on their failure as administrators to establish training, supervision and discipline policies which would have (a) prevented or discouraged Philadelphia police officers from procuring perjurious "eyewitnesses" and (b) alerted assistant district attorneys to the falsity of such information and prevented its introduction as evidence.⁶ The District Court dismissed all claims against the DA's Office, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) concluding that those defendants were "state officials" and therefore immune from suit for acts in their professional capacity by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.⁷ It further concluded that Carter had failed to state a cause of action against those defendants in their personal capacities. Finally, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Carter's state law claims. The District Court subsequently entered a revised order rendering the judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b),⁸ but neglected to set forth specific findings in support of its decision to grant 54(b) certification, despite our express direction in previous cases that district courts do so.

II. JURISDICTION

Ordinarily, an order which terminates fewer than all claims, or claims against fewer than all parties, does not constitute a "final" order for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), however, provides that such an order may be final and immediately appealable under § 1291 when the district court makes an express determination that there is no just cause for delay and expressly directs entry of final judgment.⁹ We consistently require that district courts provide a statement of reasons when entering final judgment under Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 610-11 (3d Cir. 1998); Anthius v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir. 1992); Metro Transportation Co. v. North Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 1990); Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 897 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1990).¹⁰ We have remanded cases in which a district court's failure to provide the reasons supporting its exercise of discretion renders us "unable to conclude that the granting of the Rule 54(b) certification was proper."¹¹ We have not had occasion to address the result when, notwithstanding the absence of the required explanation, the propriety of appeal under 54(b) is apparent to the reviewing court on the record.

Other courts of appeals have held that a district court's failure to state the reasons for its Rule 54(b) certification does not pose a jurisdictional barrier to appeal. The prevailing rule is perhaps best expressed in Bank of Lincolnwood v. Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1980):

"[Articulation of the considerations underlying the district court's discretionary certification] constitutes the "better practice," and the failure to provide a written statement of reasons may in an appropriate case lead to a remand for such a statement.

The statement is, however, primarily an aid to the appellate court to permit it to review the exercise of the trial court's discretion. The failure of the district court to make a written statement at the time it makes a 54(b) certification is not a jurisdictional defect, . . . and need not occasion even a remand if the basis for the district court's determination is otherwise apparent."

Id. at 948-49.¹²

Although we have not yet addressed whether an appeal may go forward when, notwithstanding the absence of the required explanation, the propriety of certification under Rule 54(b) is apparent on the record, we have previously indicated that we share the prevailing view. See supra note 11. In our recent decision in W...