Carter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-CV-8007 (JPO) |
| Parties | OSWIN A. CARTER, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Oswin Anthony Carter has challenged the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security partially denying his application for disability benefits, arguing that it was not supported by substantial evidence and contained legal error. Both Carter and the Commissioner have filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, Carter's motion is granted.
Plaintiff Oswin Carter is 58 years old. (Admin. Transcript "Tr." at 160.) He graduated from college in 1993 and began working as a stock trader in 1996. (Tr. at 166-67.) He held that job until 2001, when he was "laid off due to [his] health." (Tr. at 573.) Around that time, he was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis, a chronic bowel disease that causes inflammation in the rectum and large intestine. (See Tr. at 1616.)
Carter filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on January 18, 2013, alleging that he became disabled on February 1, 2003. (Tr. at 533.) In his application, he listed a number of conditions that were limiting his ability to work, including ulcerative colitis, proctitis, a heart murmur, failing vision, and earaches. (Tr. at 165.) The claim was denied on March 20, 2013, after which Carter filed a written request for a hearing. (Tr. at 30.) After a hearing in New York on October 16, 2014, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael Friedman found that Carter was not disabled. (See Tr. at 30-38.) In light of his ulcerative colitis, the ALJ found that Carter was "limited to work that involves no more than simple, repetitive, routine tasks requiring only occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public." (Tr. at 34.) Even so, the ALJ concluded that Carter was "capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy." (Tr. at 38.)
After the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision, Carter filed an appeal in the Southern District of New York. (Tr. at 533.) In 2017, the district court remanded the case to the Commissioner on the grounds that the ALJ had improperly discounted the view of a treating physician and failed to consider the combined effect of Carter's mental and physical impairments. (Id.) On remand, ALJ Friedman found that Carter was entitled to disability benefits, but only after November 22, 2017, when he turned fifty-five and his age category changed under Social Security regulations. (See Tr. at 554.) After that date, according to the ALJ, his "advanced age" and diminished functional capacity meant that he was no longer able to transfer his job skills to other occupations, qualifying him as disabled. (Tr. at 552, 554.) Before that date, however, the ALJ found that there were still a number of unskilled jobs that Carter could have performed (Tr. at 552.) Carter now appeals this part of the decision, alleging that it is "not supported by substantial evidence" and "contrary to the law." (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.)
Under the Social Security Act, and as relevant here, a disability is an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate an impairment "of such severity that heis not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In evaluating disability claims, the Commissioner considers (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" limiting his ability to work; (3) whether the claimant's impairment is listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work; and (5) if the claimant does not have that capacity, whether there is other work he could perform. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999). At the first four steps, the claimant bears the burden of proof; at the final step, the burden belongs to the Commissioner. Id.
"A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by 'substantial evidence' or if the decision is based on legal error." Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). A court must accept an ALJ's findings of fact unless "a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Legal decisions, on the other hand, "are reviewed de novo." Wood v. Colvin, 987 F. Supp 2d 180, 188 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A court "may not affirm a denial of benefits where there is a reasonable basis for doubting whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate legal standards, even if the ultimate decision may be arguably supported by substantial evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In evaluating Carter's claim, the ALJ undertook the required five-part analysis, finding that Carter had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 18, 2013; that Carter suffered from "ulcerative colitis, diabetes, small fiber neuropathy, plantar fasciitis, osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, obesity, a left heel spur, major depressive disorder, and mild neurocognitive disorder"; that none of his impairments were listed in the regulations; that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform "light work ... involving simple, routine, repetitive type tasks" and "only occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public"; and that he did not have any past relevant work. (Tr. at 536-552.) At step five, the ALJ undertook two separate analyses. Before November 22, 2017, when Carter turned fifty-five, the ALJ concluded that "there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed," including cleaner, photocopying machine operator, and advertising material distributor. (Tr. at 552-53.) After that date, pursuant to Social Security regulations recognizing that it is harder for older individuals to adapt to new work, the ALJ found that there were no jobs Carter could perform. (Tr. at 554.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that the claimant was disabled after November 22, 2017, but not before (Id.)
Carter challenges the ALJ's decision on two grounds: first, that the ALJ "failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence," and second, that the ALJ "failed to properly evaluate [Carter's] subjective allegations." (See Dkt. No. 14 at 22-35.) Because the Court concludes that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence in the record, it does not reach Carter's second argument.
The Court begins and ends with the ALJ's decision to discount the opinions of Dr. Elizabeth Fitelson, one of Carter's treating psychiatrists. Under the treating physician rule, "a treating physician's opinion is entitled to 'controlling weight' when it is 'well-supported bymedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record,'" Gualano v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 415 F. Supp. 3d 353, 358 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). The rule "is particularly important in the mental-health context." Rodriguez v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-534, 2009 WL 637154, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009). This is because mental health patients "may respond to different stressors that are not always active," making the "longitudinal relationship between a mental health patient and her treating physician" especially illuminating. Bodden v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-8731, 2015 WL 8757129, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2015).
An ALJ who does not give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight must give "good reasons" for discounting it. Rolon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 994 F. Supp. 3d 496, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In addition, the ALJ must explicitly "consider various factors to determine how much weight to give to the opinion." Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). These factors, known as the Burgess factors, are "(1) the frequency of examination and length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, (2) the evidence in support of the physician's opinion, (3) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (4) whether the opinion is from a specialist, and (5) whatever other factors tend to support or contradict the opinion." Gunter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 361 F. App'x 197, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). Usually, a failure to explicitly consider the Burgess factors is "a procedural error warranting remand." Guerra v. Saul, 778 F. App'x 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2019). But remand is not necessary if a "searching review of the record shows that the ALJ has provided good reasons for its weight assessment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carter argues that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule by affording only "limited weight" to a medical questionnaire that Dr. Fitelson filled out in October 2014. (See Dkt. No. 14at 23.) In that questionnaire, Dr. Fitelson noted that Carter was suffering...
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