Carter v. District of Columbia

Decision Date03 July 1986
Docket Number85-5673,Nos. 85-5672,s. 85-5672
Citation795 F.2d 116,254 U.S. App. D.C. 71
Parties, 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 139 Charles CARTER, et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellants, Maurice Turner, Chief, Metropolitan Police Department, et al. Charles CARTER, et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 83-00690).

William J. Murphy, with whom Jeremiah C. Collins, William Alden McDaniel, Jr., and Kevin J. Baldwin, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for cross-appellants in No. 85-5673 and appellees in No. 85-5672.

Charlotte Brookins-Pruitt, Asst. Corp. Counsel, District of Columbia, with whom John H. Suda, Acting Corp. Counsel, and Charles R. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for cross-appellees in No. 85-5673 and appellants in No. 85-5672.

Before GINSBURG, BORK and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judges GINSBURG and BORK.

GINSBURG and BORK, Circuit Judges:

This case involves an episode of alleged misconduct on the part of police officers. Plaintiffs asserted both constitutional and common law tort claims against five police officers, the police chief, and the municipality. The case was tried to a jury. Directed verdicts were entered for the police chief and two of the officers on all claims, and for the city on the constitutional tort claim asserted against it. The jury found liability and awarded damages on the remaining claims, and the district court, after reducing the damage awards, entered judgments for plaintiffs. Both sides appealed.

We hold that the district court properly disposed of the constitutional tort claim against the municipality by directed verdict. (Plaintiffs have not appealed the other directed verdicts.) We further conclude that the trial judge erred in failing to restrict the means by which plaintiffs--in their attempt to prove the city's constitutional tort liability--presented allegations of incidents of police misconduct other than the incident in suit. This error necessitates a new trial of the claims submitted to the jury. Specifically, the district court allowed plaintiffs' counsel, over repeated objection, to read at length from newspaper articles and unadjudicated complaints involving officers other than the individual defendants in this case, and from the personnel files of the individual defendants. This mode of proceeding exposed the individual police officers on trial to the danger of unfair prejudice. The exposure was avoidable. Instead of allowing counsel to read directly and at length from press accounts, unadjudicated complaints, and personnel files, the trial court should have restricted counsel to brief factual summaries of the allegations, and concise inquiries of the witness on the stand.

In addition to these main rulings, our opinion includes other directions, in response to issues raised on appeal, to guide the district court on remand.

I. THE EPISODE IN SUIT

The events that gave rise to this action commenced in the early hours of March 22, 1982. Each side describes the occurrences somewhat differently. We set out both accounts below.

A. Plaintiff's Version

Plaintiffs Charles Carter and Aleta Parker testified that, at the time the episode opened, they were seated in Carter's automobile, then parked in an alley outside Parker's residence at 1440 W Street, N.W., in Washington, D.C. An unmarked car, with its lights off, entered the alley and moved slowly toward them. As the unmarked car pulled alongside Carter's car, three men in blue jeans and army jackets jumped out brandishing shotguns and pistols. One of the men pointed his gun at plaintiffs and yelled: "Freeze. Don't move." Plaintiffs feared armed robbery or worse; Carter began backing his car out of the alley, while Parker dropped to the floor of the car screaming. As Carter backed onto 15th Street, three shots were fired in plaintiffs' direction; one struck the front passenger door near the place where Parker crouched on the floor.

Plaintiffs recounted that, once out of the alley, they sought to drive to the nearest police station. After traveling several blocks, they were approached by an unmarked vehicle equipped with what appeared to be a portable emergency light. Carter stopped his car. The same men who had confronted plaintiffs in the alley jumped out of the vehicle, pointing a shotgun and pistols. Two of the men pulled Carter from his automobile, threw him to the ground, struck him with the butt of a pistol, put his hands in handcuffs, and kicked and beat him. The third man directed a shotgun at Parker and commanded: "Bitch, get out of the car." Carter, prone on the pavement with hands cuffed behind him, endeavored to ask why plaintiffs were encountering such treatment. One of the men placed a pistol to Carter's head and threatened: "Nigger, shut the fuck up or I'll blow your mother fucking brains out."

Several police cars soon arrived on the scene and plaintiffs learned that their accosters were officers Vanderbloemen, Markovich, and Tarantella of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Narcotics Task Force (NTF) "rip team." The police officers took plaintiffs to the NTF office, where it became apparent that, contrary to the NTF officers' assumption, Carter and Parker had not been engaged in a drug transaction when confronted in the alley. At that point, the apprehending officers asserted that Carter's automobile had struck Markovich as Carter backed out of the alley, and that Vanderbloemen, believing Markovich lay under the wheels of the car, had tried to stop the vehicle by firing his revolver. Based on that report, Carter was charged with assault on an armed police officer.

Parker stated that, during this time, she was taunted by NTF officers, accused of being a prostitute, and told by one of the officers that he would have fired his shotgun into Carter's car in the alley had another officer not been in the way. Eventually, Parker was informed that she would be held overnight because of a small quantity of marijuana found in her possessions.

The charge against Parker was dropped the next day, and Carter was released on his own recognizance. A little over a year later, the grand jury refused to return an indictment against Carter on the felony charge, and the matter was dismissed. Carter asserted that he was not notified of the dismissal, and remained unaware of it until some three and a half months later when he researched the Superior Court files himself. Although the charge against him had been dropped on May 5, 1983, Carter did not recover his automobile from the MPD until August 25 of that year.

B. Defendant's Version

According to the testimony of officers Markovich and Tarantella, at about 3:00 a.m. on the morning of March 22, 1982, the officers observed plaintiffs sitting in a car with the light on in an alley at the rear of 1430 W Street, N.W. The officers proceeded into the alley in an unmarked car until almost parallel to Carter's automobile, at which point one of them observed what he believed to be drug paraphernalia in the parked car. The three officers then jumped out of their car; one went to the front, one to the rear, and one to the side of Carter's automobile. The officers did not dispute that one of them yelled, "Freeze. Don't move." They stated, however, that officer Tarantella banged on the passenger windshield with his police identification badge and said, "Police officers; open the door." As Parker dove to the floor, Tarantella screamed to the other two officers to get down. Officer Markovich, at the rear of Carter's car, then shouted, "Police!" and told Carter to turn his car off, but Carter, instead, put the car in reverse. This caused Markovich to fall. Although Markovich rolled behind the police car, the other officers lost sight of him and thought he was being dragged out of the alley by Carter's car. Officer Vanderbloemen then fired at the car in an effort to stop it.

The three officers jumped back in their automobile and gave chase, advising other police units of the situation by radio. Once the officers pulled alongside Carter's moving vehicle, they displayed a police badge and shouted, "Police! Pull over!" Carter stopped, but then accelerated again; his automobile came to a halt only when the police car moved in front of the vehicle and blocked its way.

The officers admit that they pulled Carter from his car. The car then began to move, they said, because Carter had left it in gear; Parker, at that moment, attempted to get behind the steering wheel and drive away. Officer Tarantella pointed a shotgun at her, while officer Markovich jumped into the car and stopped it. The officers testified that during this time none of them witnessed any physical abuse of Carter. One of them did hear an officer, whom he thought to be Vanderbloemen, use profanity in addressing Carter.

Plaintiffs were arrested and taken to the NTF office at police headquarters. There, Carter gave an account of the occurrences, which made no reference to police abuse. Parker refused to provide any statement. Carter was charged with assault on a police officer; after marijuana was found in Parker's belongings, she was charged with possession of marijuana.

At headquarters, an investigation of the episode began immediately and automatically, because Vanderbloemen had discharged his service revolver during the fray. Meanwhile, officer Tarantella had proceeded to the alley to assist investigators in taking photographs and drawing diagrams, and to search for drugs or drug paraphernalia. The search turned up no such items. Each of the three officers separately gave a written statement concerning the incident. The Director of the Department's Morals Division, Inspector Coligan, and the NTF officers' supervisor, Lieutenant Jones, then...

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