Carter v. Good

Decision Date07 June 1996
Docket NumberCivil No. 4:94CV200.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
PartiesScott CARTER, Plaintiff, v. Daniel J. GOOD, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Rutherford County; and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Surety, Defendants.

Anita S. Hodgkiss, C. Margaret Errington, Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Gresham & Sumter, P.A., Charlotte, NC, for plaintiff.

G. Michael Barnhill, W. Clark Goodman, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Charlotte, NC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

THORNBURG, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and to strike an affidavit submitted by Plaintiff in opposition thereto. For the reasons stated below, the motion to strike is granted and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment is appropriate in any civil action in which there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment as a matter of law is warranted for one party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if a reasonable jury considering the evidence could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, here the Plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

In ruling on the pending motion, the district court must construe the facts and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), on remand In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S.Ct. 1955, 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987). Defendants have the initial burden of pointing out an absence of facts, combinations of facts or evidence to support the Plaintiffs case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, if that is accomplished, Plaintiff must then demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact, a burden not met by a mere scintilla of evidence. Stroud, supra.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Scott Carter (Carter) was first employed with the Rutherford County Sheriff's Department (Department) as a road deputy in April 1990. The Sheriff at that time was Ed Searcy and the Chief Deputy was John Smart, Jr. (Smart), both of whom were Democrats. In the fall of 1990, Daniel Good (Good), a Republican, won the election and took office as Sheriff. Good did not discharge Smart but moved him into the position of captain of the road deputies. As such, Smart became Carter's supervisor. Good named Floyd Laughter (Laughter) as his Chief Deputy. Carter continued as a road deputy under Smart's supervision and in July 1993, was promoted by Good to the position of corporal. Sheriff Good came up for reelection in 1994. In November 1993, Smart announced his plans to run as the Democratic candidate. As a result, Smart resigned from his position in accordance with departmental policy. Carter was terminated from employment in March 1994.

Beyond these facts, the parties do not agree. Carter maintains he was discharged for exercising his free speech right to campaign and vote for Smart; Defendants maintain Carter was terminated for insubordinate conduct. Thus, in keeping with the standard of review for summary judgment, the Court sets forth the remaining facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.

An understanding of the structure of the Sheriff's Department is necessary to the factual context. Directly beneath Sheriff Good in the chain of command was Chief Deputy Laughter. Deposition of Sheriff Daniel J. Good, at 19. Smart was the third in command as captain of the road department. Id. Underneath him were five road sergeants, each in charge of a different shift. Id., at 21. Next came the lieutenant of detectives, Captain Gee, who supervised that division, a sergeant in charge of the jail, and a sergeant in charge of the DARE program. Id., at 20, 21, 28. The rank below sergeant was that of corporal. Id., at 24. When a regular road deputy was promoted to the position of corporal, he did not receive any additional income or responsibilities except when the sergeant was not available on a shift. Id., at 24-5. At that time, he had to function in the same capacity as the sergeant for that shift. Id. Until early in 1994, Carter was a corporal in the road division which meant he functioned as a road deputy unless the night shift sergeant was off-duty.

In developing and implementing policies as sheriff, Good took information and advice from Laughter, Smart, and Gee. Id., at 31-32. One policy which was reduced to writing involved political activities of members of the Department who were "permitted to support the political party of their choice when they are off-duty. At no time will officers engage in any political activity when they are on-duty, in uniform or while operating an assigned or non-assigned county owned vehicle." Exhibit 1, Policy on Political Activity, attached to Good Deposition. As will be noted later, Sheriff Good construed this policy to mean that an off-duty deputy could not communicate about the upcoming election with an on-duty deputy. In addition, Plaintiff claims that while this was the official policy, the Sheriff made it clear to his Department that no one should support any candidate other than him.

In view of the upcoming campaign for sheriff, Good met with employees of the department in November 1993, to

make sure that they understood several things about the upcoming campaign at that time, one of which was to make sure that they understood that they were under no obligation whatsoever to vote for me, they were under no obligation to provide me with political contributions, that they could support the person that they so chose to support, provided that while they were on duty, as such, that they were considered to be — I expected them to be loyal to this department and to do their job as an unbiased police officer would the job.

Good Deposition, at 40-41. Members of the Department report that what Good meant by being "loyal" was the forbidding of any political activity, whether on or off duty, unless it was in support of Good. Affidavit of John Smart, Jr., dated March 29, 1996, at 3, attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment; Affidavit of John Smart, III, at 2-3; Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Sheriff Good and John Smart, III, at 5 ("Again, all you gotta do is do what you're doing and stay out of overt, I mean, you know politics that means working on anyone's campaign. You don't have to work on mine, but you know, by the same token you can't work on anybody else's.")1; Deposition of Scott Carter at 78. At the above-described meeting, Chief Deputy Laughter solicited campaign contributions from on-duty employees after Good left the room. Carter Deposition at 78. Moreover, on at least one occasion Chief Laughter contributed money to Good's campaign while on-duty when he was approached by other deputies. Deposition of Floyd A. Laughter, at 52, attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. On another occasion, deputies got together during the changing of shifts, while some were on-duty, to take up money to rent a billboard to support Good's campaign. Deposition of Donald R. Huckabee, at 84, attached to Defendant's Memorandum.

Carter's father-in-law, Robert Jones, was a close friend and ardent supporter of Smart in his campaign for sheriff. Carter claims Good assumed he would know about Smart's plan to run for election from his father-in-law. Thus, Good tried to obtain information from Carter about Smart's intentions. Carter Deposition, at 32-33. During one meeting, Good told Carter that he would be fired if he campaigned for Smart. Id. Carter told Smart about this meeting. Id., at 35.

Good called another meeting with Carter at which Captain Gee and Chief Deputy Laughter were present and during which Carter was accused of interfering with an informant in a federal drug investigation. Id., at 41. Carter explained that he was friends with the narcotics officer involved with the case and simply assisted that officer in selling a Christmas tree to the informant. Id., at 41-42.

Apparently as a result of the above, Good met with Carter in February 1994, to advise he was being transferred to the jail. Id., at 36-37. While Good did not say the "assignment" was permanent, in the interim Carter would not be a road deputy although his rank as corporal was not changed. Id., at 36-37. During this meeting, Carter told Good he was supporting Smart "100 percent". Id.

On March 4, 1994, Carter, who was off-duty, and a friend went to the Pizza Hut in Forest City, North Carolina, after a ball-game. Id., at 58. While there, he saw Officers Huckabee, Guffey, Parker, and Scoggins, all of whom were on-duty. Id. Officer Huckabee approached Carter at the table and asked him how he was doing, saying he was sorry Carter had been transferred to the jail. Id., at 59. Carter's friend handed Huckabee a political brochure for Smart which Huckabee threw back on the table.2 Id., at 60. Carter told Huckabee that he had been the only deputy strong enough to stand up to Good by telling him whom he supported for sheriff. Id., at 59. During this encounter, Carter was wearing a "John Smart for Sheriff" hat. Id., at 63. Huckabee reported the incident to Good; and on March 8, 1994, Carter was telephoned by Laughter and told his services with the department were no longer needed. Id., at 65.

According to Sheriff Good, the Pizza Hut incident was the event which precipitated Carter's termination. Good Deposition, at 100. After Smart resigned to campaign...

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