Carter v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 01 May 1992
• Citation: 598 So.2d 1350
• Parties: Joseph E. CARTER, Jr., and Debbie McClung Carter v. Keith HENDERSON, d/b/a Builders Supply Company, Inc. 1901585.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1350

598 So.2d 1350

Joseph E. CARTER, Jr., and Debbie McClung Carter v. Keith HENDERSON, d/b/a Builders Supply Company, Inc.

1901585.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 1, 1992.

Thomas J. Knight, Anniston, for appellants.

H.C. Ireland III and Gary L. Weaver of Porterfield, Harper & Mills, P.A., Birmingham, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

This case arose out of a contract by defendant Keith Henderson, d/b/a Builders Supply Company, Inc. to build a lake house for the plaintiffs, Joseph E. Carter, Jr., and Debbie McClung Carter. Two issues are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Carters' motions for directed verdict and for JNOV, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Carters' motion for new trial sought on the grounds that the jury verdict was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and that a juror had failed to answer truthfully a voir dire question about a relationship between himself and the defendant, Henderson.

In 1980, Joseph and Debbie Carter purchased a parcel of land from Mr. Howell Henderson, the father of the defendant, Keith Henderson. This lot was located on a peninsula jutting out into Lake Logan Martin in St. Clair County, Alabama. The lot was rectangular in shape, with one of the longer sides fronting on a public road, and the other longer side fronting on Lake Logan Martin. In October, 1983, the Carters approached Henderson about building a house for them on the lot. On November 28, 1983, the Carters and Henderson signed a written "construction agreement," apparently drafted by the Carters' attorney. The construction agreement referred to "Exhibit A" and "Exhibit B" and made those exhibits part of the written contract. However, neither Exhibit A nor Exhibit B was attached to the construction agreement admitted into evidence at trial. In fact, exactly what documents constituted Exhibits A and B was hotly contested at trial. The Carters testified that Exhibit A was the deed to the property and that Exhibit B was a "description of materials" provided to the Carters by Henderson. According to the Carters, the "description of materials" called for Henderson to put wooden windows in the house, rather than aluminum windows. Henderson testified that Exhibit A was merely a separate description of the property, and that Exhibit B was the proposed house plans.

In the early months of 1984, Henderson began constructing the Carters' house. It was to be a two-story house, with the upper floor consisting of living area and the lower floor consisting of a basement, with one half of it finished (liveable) and one half unfinished (unexcavated, dirt). In March 1984, the Carters moved into the house. Soon thereafter, they began experiencing numerous problems. Henderson made numerous attempts to satisfy the Carters, and did, at personal expense, remedy several of the Carters' complaints. However, Henderson was unable to remedy the Carters' two major complaints: a water condensation problem on their windows, and a "waterproofing" problem in the unexcavated portion of their basement.

After a year or more of attempts to remedy these two problems, the Carters sued Henderson, alleging a breach of contract. They alleged that the construction agreement had called for wooden windows and that they had actually gotten aluminum windows. This difference in materials, they alleged, had caused the water condensation problem they were experiencing. The Carters also alleged that Henderson had breached their contract by not "waterproofing" the basement. After Henderson answered the complaint, the Carters amended their complaint to seek damages for mental anguish and inconvenience resulting from the alleged breach. The case was submitted to a jury; the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Henderson and against the Carters. The Carters appealed.

The Directed Verdict and JNOV Issue

The Carters argue that Henderson's contractual obligations were so clear, and his breach of those obligations so obvious, that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor. The Carters assert that the contract clearly called for wooden windows, rather than aluminum windows, to be installed in their house. Also, they stress that the contract called for the basement to be "waterproofed," and they argue that because water from the outside leaked into the basement this was a breach of the contract. We cannot agree with the Carters that resolution of the issues in this case was so simple.

Initially, we note that a motion for directed verdict is a procedural device by which one party tests the sufficiency of the other party's evidence. See, Rule 50(a), Ala.R.Civ.P.; Alabama Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So.2d 589 (Ala.1990); John R. Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.1990); J. Hoffman & S. Guin, Alabama Civil Procedure § 8.37 (1990). Similarly, a motion for JNOV simply "permits the trial court to revisit its earlier ruling denying the motion for directed verdict." Alabama Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So.2d 589, 591 (Ala.1990). The ultimate question, of course, as to either motion, is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow submission of the case or issue to the jury for a factual resolution. Hoffman & Guin, supra, at § 8.37. For actions filed after June 11, 1987, the standard of review applicable to motions for directed verdict and JNOV is the "substantial evidence rule." See, § 12-21-12(a), Ala.Code 1975; Koch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 565 So.2d 226, 228 (Ala.1990). Thus, in an action filed after June 11, 1987, a nonmovant must present "substantial evidence" ¹ supporting each element of his cause of action or defense to withstand a movant's motion for a directed verdict or JNOV. This calls for "a purely objective determination of whether the party having the burden of proof has produced [sufficient] evidence [of a factual dispute] requiring resolution by the jury." Ex parte Oliver, 532 So.2d 627, 628 (Ala.1988); and see, John R. Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375 (Ala.1990).

Additionally, in reviewing motions for directed verdict and motions for JNOV, this Court must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must entertain such reasonable evidentiary inferences as the jury would be free to draw. Williams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 38 (Ala.1991).

In the case at bar, we conclude, after a thorough review of the record, that Henderson presented more than sufficient evidence of factual disputes requiring resolution by the jury. Specifically, Henderson asserted that he did not breach the construction contract as it related to the type of windows to be installed, because the contract did not specify wooden windows. That is, there was a factual dispute requiring jury resolution as to whether the "description of materials" was indeed part of the contract. The Carters asserted that it was their understanding that Exhibit B was the description of materials, and that it called for wooden windows. Henderson, on the other hand, testified that Exhibit B was merely a copy of the house plans, and that the ...