Carter v. Hinkle
| Decision Date | 07 March 1949 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3457. |
| Citation | 189 Va. 1 |
| Parties | BISHOP EDWARD CARTER, ET AL. v. JACOB B. HINKLE. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
1. ACTIONS — Splitting Causes of Action — Injuries to Person and Property Resulting from Single Tortious Act Give Rise to Distinct Causes of Action — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action for damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff as a result of a collision between a taxicab owned and driven by him and an automobile owned by one defendant and operated by his agent, the other defendant. Plaintiff had previously recovered a judgment against defendant automobile owner for damages to his taxicab and damages for the loss of its use, arising from the same collision. This judgment had been paid and marked satisfied, and defendants contended that the judgment and its satisfaction was a bar to plaintiff's right to bring a second action.
Held: That there was no merit in the contention. A single tort, resulting in damage to both person and property, gave rise to distinct causes of action and recovery in one was no bar to an action subsequently commenced for the other.
2. ACTIONS — Splitting Causes of Action — Injuries to Person and Property Resulting from Single Tortious Act Give Rise to Distinct Causes of Action Because of Differences in Rules of Law Applicable. — Injury to person and injury to property are essentially different and give rise to two causes of action; to hold that only one cause of action exists would be impractical or at least inconvenient in the administration of justice, and they should not be blended. Different periods of limitations apply; the plaintiff cannot assign his right of action for injury to his person, while he can assign that for injury to his property; action for injury to his person would abate or be lost by his death before a recovery; injury to property would be an action that would survive and might be seized by creditors or passed to an assignee in bankruptcy. Because of the great differences in the rules of law applicable, an injury to person and one to property, though resulting from the same tortious act, constitute different causes of action.
3. TORTS — Pleading and Practice — Separate Actions against Tort Feasor for Damage to Person and Property Not Vexatious. — When a tort feasor has committed a tort resulting in damage to both person and property there is nothing vexatious or unreasonable in prosecuting separate actions against him.
4. ACTIONS — Splitting Causes of Action — When Separate Primary Rights Are Invaded by Same Wrong Two Causes of Action Exist. — It is important to determine whether a complaint states more than one cause of action, and to make the determination it must be ascertained whether more than one primary right has been invaded. If two separate and distinct primary rights could be invaded by one and the same wrong, or if the single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and separate legal wrongs, in either case two causes of action would exist.
5. ACTIONS — Joinder of Causes of Action — Status of Common Law Pleading and Practice in Virginia — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action for damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff as a result of a collision between a taxicab owned and driven by him and an automobile owned by one defendant and operated by his agent, the other defendant. Plaintiff had previously recovered a judgment against defendant automobile owner for damage to his taxicab and damages for the loss of its use, arising from the same collision. This judgment had been paid and marked satisfied, and defendants contended that the judgment and its satisfaction was a bar to plaintiff's right to bring a second action. Plaintiff contended that an English decision allowing two recoveries in a similar situation was declaratory of the common law and applicable under section 2 of the Code of 1942 (Michie), which provides that the common law of England shall continue in full force in Virginia and be the rule of decision except in those respects wherein it is altered by the General Assembly.
Held: The contention was sound. No doubt at common law a person injured in both his person and property through the same negligence of a defendant could join both claims for damages in the same action but he did not have to do so. Two actions could have been maintained and still can be maintained today in Virginia because under section 2 we still have as a part of our law the common law, including common law pleading and practice, and the General Assembly has not seen fit to change or alter the common law in that respect.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Alleghany county. Hon. Earl L. Abbott, judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
Woods, Rogers, Muse & Walker and Sidney F. Parham, Jr., for the plaintiffs in error.
J. C. Goodwin, for the defendant in error.
A taxicab owned and driven by Hinkle was involved in a head-on collision with an automobile owned by the defendant, Smith, and operated by his agent, the defendant, Carter. The collision occurred in Alleghany county, on U.S. Route 60, near the town of Covington, on December 20, 1946, and it is conceded that it was the proximate result of the negligence of the defendant, Carter. The taxi was damaged and an action was instituted by the plaintiff, Hinkle, against the defendant, Smith, for $1,000, $750 of which represented damage to the taxi and $250 damages for the loss of the use of it. Judgment was recovered, the full amount paid thereon and it was marked satisfied.
Later, Hinkle instituted another action against the two named defendants seeking to recover for personal injuries received by him by reason of the collision. The defendants pleaded that the judgment and its satisfaction in the first action was a bar to Hinkle's right to bring the second action for the personal injuries. The court overruled that contention and permitted the case to go to the jury. A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,000, and judgment was entered, from which this writ of error was obtained.
The question involved is one of law: May one who has suffered both damage to his property and injury to his person as the result of a single wrongful act maintain two separate actions therefor, or is a judgment obtained in the first action a bar to the second? We have no Virginia decision upon the point.
The question has been presented to the courts many times and there is a direct conflict of American authority on the subject. The majority of the American courts of last resort are of the view that but one single cause of action exists and that but one action may be brought therefor. Typical of this view is the case of King v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (1900), 80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W. 1113, 81 Am.St.Rep. 238, 50 L.R.A. 161.
On the other hand a respectable and increasing minority of the courts are of the view that a single tort, resulting in damage to both person and property, gives rise to two distinct causes of action, and that, therefore, recovery in one is no bar to an action subsequently commenced for the other. The minority view is based upon the English case of Brunsden Humphrey (1884), L.R. 14 Q.B.D. 141.
The question we are dealing with has been the subject of serious judicial comment and controversy in America for nearly half a century. The reason for the controversy seems to be in the divergent views on the interpretation of the words, "cause of action". All of the cases hold that as a general rule a single cause of action cannot be split into several claims and separate actions maintained thereon. A few of them are Secor Sturgis (1880), 16 N.Y. 548; Smelker Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1900), 106 Wis. 135, 81 N.W. 994, and Patnode Westenhaver (1902), 114 Wis. 460, 90 N.W. 467. The cases on both sides of this question are legion and all of them will not be cited or discussed. They may be found in American Law Reports annotated, and the digests. See 47 A.L.R. 536; 64 A.L.R. 663; 127 A.L.R. 1081; 140 A.L.R. 1241, and 166 A.L.R. 870. See also 1 C.J.S., Actions, section 104; 1 Am. Jur., Actions, section 114, and Michie's Jur., Actions, Vol. 1, p. 107.
The Massachusetts court in Dearden Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.(2d) 644, 127 A.L.R. 1077, in reiterating its former position adopting the majority view, said that damages resulting from a single tort, even though such damages are partly property damages and partly personal injury damages, are, when suffered by one person, the subject of only one suit as against the wrongdoer, the different injuries being merely items of damage proceeding from the same wrong.
Typical of the minority rule are the cases of Vasu Kohlers, Inc. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.(2d) 707, 166 A.L.R. 855, and Reilly Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772. In the latter case, which is a leading one, the court had this to say: ...
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