Carter v. Kentucky
Decision Date | 09 March 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-5060,80-5060 |
Citation | 101 S.Ct. 1112,450 U.S. 288,67 L.Ed.2d 241 |
Parties | Lonnie Joe CARTER, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of KENTUCKY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
At petitioner's criminal trial in a Kentucky court in which no testimony was introduced on behalf of the defense, the trial judge refused petitioner's requested jury instruction that "[t]he [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way." On appeal from petitioner's conviction, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected his argument that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the trial judge to give the requested instruction, holding that such instruction would have required the judge to "comment upon" the petitioner's failure to testify in violation of a Kentucky statute prohibiting such a comment.
Held: Petitioner had a right to the requested instruction under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, a state trial judge having a constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify. Pp. 295-305.
(a) The penalty imposed upon a defendant for the exercise of his constitutional privilege not to testify is severe when there is an adverse comment on his silence, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, but even without adverse comment, a jury, unless instructed otherwise, may well draw adverse inferences from a defendant's silence. Instructions to the jury on the law are perhaps nowhere more important than in the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. While no judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a criminal accusation, a judge can, and must, if requested to do so, use the unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum. Pp. 299-303.
(b) Kentucky's interest in protecting the defendant is insufficient justification for refusing the requested instruction, since "[i]t would be strange indeed to conclude that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to protect." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1094, 53 L.Ed.2d 319. The fact that the jury was instructed to determine petitioner's guilt "from the evidence alone" does not excuse the refusal to give the requested instruction, since a jury, not knowing the technical meaning of "evidence," can be expected to notice a defendant's failure to testify, and, without limiting instructions, to speculate about incriminating inferences from a defendant's silence. Nor was an instruction that the law presumes a defendant to be innocent a substitute for the requested instruction, since it is doubtful that it contributed significantly to the jury's proper understanding of petitioner's failure to testify. And defense counsel's own argument that petitioner did not have to take the stand could not have had the purging effect that the requested instruction would have had. Pp. 303-304.
Ky., 598 S.W.2d 763, reversed and remanded.
Kevin Michael McNally, Frankfort, Ky., for petitioner.
Robert V. Bullock, Frankfort, Ky., for respondent.
In this case a Kentucky criminal trial judge refused a defendant's request to give the following jury instruction: "The defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way." The Supreme Court of Kentucky found no error.1 We granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's contention that a defendant, upon request has a right to such an instruction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 449 U.S. 819, 101 S.Ct. 71, 66 L.Ed.2d 21.2
In the early morning of December 22, 1978, Officer Deborah Ellison of the Hopkinsville, Kentucky, Police Department, on routine patrol in downtown Hopkinsville, noticed something in the alley between Young's Hardware Store and Edna's Furniture Store. She backed her car up, flashed her spotlight down the alley, and saw two men stooped alongside one of the buildings. The men ran off. Officer Ellison drove her squad car down the alley and found a hole in the side of Young's Hardware Store. She radioed Officer Leroy Davis, whom she knew to be in the area, informing him that two men had fled from the alley.
Soon after receiving Ellison's call, Officer Davis saw two men run across a street near where he had been patrolling. The two ran in opposite directions, and Davis proceeded after one of them. Following a chase, during which he twice lost sight of the man he was pursuing, Davis was finally able to stop him. The man was later identified as the petitioner, Lonnie Joe Carter. During the course of the chase, Davis saw the petitioner drop two objects: a gym bag and a radio tuned to a police band. When apprehended, the petitioner was wearing gloves but no jacket. While Davis was pursuing the petitioner, Officer Ellison inspected the alley near the hole in the building wall. She found two jackets, along with some merchandise that had apparently been removed from the hardware store.
After arresting the petitioner, Davis brought him to Officer Ellison to see if she could identify him as one of the men she had seen in the alley. Ellison noted that he was of similar height and weight to one of the men in the alley, and that he wore similar clothing, but because it had been too dark to get a good view of the men's faces, she could not make a more positive identification. The petitioner was then taken to police headquarters.
The petitioner was subsequently indicted for third-degree burglary of Young's Hardware Store. The indictment also charged him with being a persistent felony offender, in violation of Ky.Rev.Stat. § 532.080 (Supp.1980), on the basis of previous felony convictions. At the trial, the voir dire examination of prospective jurors was conducted solely by the judge.3 The prosecutor's opening statement recounted the evidence expected to be introduced against the petitioner. The opening statement of defense counsel began as follows:
The prosecution rested after calling Officers Ellison, Davis, another officer, and the owner of Young's Hardware Store. The trial judge then held a conference, outside of the hearing of the jury, to determine whether the petitioner would testify, and whether the prosecutor would be permitted to impeach the petitioner with his prior felony convictions. Defense counsel stated:
Counsel then explained to the petitioner that if he testified the Commonwealth could "use the fact that you have several offenses on your record . . . [to] impeach your . . . propensity to tell the truth . . . ." Counsel added that in his experience this was "a heavy thing; it is very serious, and I think juries take it very seriously . . . ." The judge indicated that under Kentucky law he had "discretionary control" over the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment, and cautioned the prosecutor that he might be inviting a reversal if he introduced more than three prior felony convictions, strongly suggesting that the prosecutor rely on the most recent convictions only. The judge then addressed the petitioner:
Upon returning to open court, the petitioner's counsel advised the court that there would be no testimony introduced on behalf of the defense. He then requested that the following instruction be given to the jury:
"The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way."
The trial court refused the request.
The prosecutor began his summation by stating that he intended to review the evidence "that we were privileged to hear," and cautioned the jury to "[c]onsider only what you have heard up here as evidence in this case and not something that you might speculate happened or could have happened. . . ." After mentioning admissions that the petitioner had allegedly made at police headquarters,5 the prosecutor argued:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gaines v. Marsh
...v. Perez , 103 A.3d 344, 348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis , 528 Pa. 440, 598 A.2d 975, 979 (1991) ). In Carter v. Kentucky , the United States Supreme Court held a "state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that ......
-
People v. McCarrick
...in legal principles; to function effectively, and justly, they must be accurately instructed in the law." (Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 302, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241.) Reversal is required where there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied or misconstrued" the......
-
People v. Brown
...that the comments of the accused's attorney cannot cure crucial omissions from the instructions. (E.g., Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 304, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 1121, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 [Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify]; Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 488-489, 98 S.Ct. 193......
-
People v. Daveggio
...trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so." ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 300, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241.) If Michaud means to suggest that our state-law holding that courts should honor requests to omit CALJIC No......
-
Defenses and special evidentiary charges
...error to refuse a defendant’s requested instruction on failure to testify. James v. Kentucky , 466 U.S. 341 (1984); Carter v. Kentucky , 450 U.S. 288 (1981); White v. State , 779 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). The same is true in the pu......
-
Pronouncements of the U.s. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1980-1981
...is Required to Give Requested Instruction on the Effect of the Defendant's Failure to Testify. a. Carter v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981). In the trial of a criminal case a state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to instruct......
-
Table of cases
...158 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) 3:1440 Carson v. Hagaman 884 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, no pet.) 1:210 Carter v. Kentucky 450 U.S. 288 (1981) 1:240, 3:900, 3:910 - C - Texas Criminal Jury Charges C-8 Name Citation Court Section Carter v. State 810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App.......
-
Interrogations, confessions and other statements
...[ See Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor may not comment on defendant’s exercise of privilege); Carter v. Kentucky , 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (court must instruct jury that it cannot draw any adverse inference from defendant’s choice not to testify).] §8:82 Criminal Defense ......