Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FISHBURNE, Justice.
• Citation: Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1950)
• Decision Date: 27 November 1950
• Docket Number: 16436.
• Parties: CARTER et al. v. LAKE CITY BASEBALL CLUB, Inc., et al.

62 S.E.2d 470

218 S.C. 255

CARTER et al. v. LAKE CITY BASEBALL CLUB, Inc., et al.

No. 16436.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

November 27, 1950

Samuel Want, Sam Rogol and Leroy M. Want, all of Darlington, for appellants.

McEachin & Townsend, Florence, A. W. Wimberly, Lake City, for respondents.

FISHBURNE, Justice.

This action was instituted by the appellants for themselves and others similarly situated, against the Lake City Baseball Club Inc., a Corporation, and the trustees of Lake City School District, for the purpose of obtaining the injunctive process of the court to prevent the respondents, school trustees from leasing or otherwise permitting the use of the athletic field of the school for the playing of professional baseball at night by the respondent baseball club.

Two legal propositions of unusual interest and importance are presented by the appeal: (1) That the trustees are without power to lease or permit the use of the school athletic field for night professional baseball, especially under the circumstance sof this case; and (2) That the conditions shown by the testimony to exist, are such as to render the playing of professional baseball at night on the athletic field a private nuisance.

A reference was dispensed with. The circuit judge heard the testimony in open court, and thereafter filed his decree, adjudging as a matter of law that the trustees of the school district possess the power to lease and permit the use of the athletic grounds for professional baseball; and that, subject to compliance by respondents with certain conditions stated in the order, the appellants are not entitled to injunctive relief on the ground of a private nuisance against the use of the athletic field for the playing of professional baseball at night under the circumstances disclosed by the testimony. Accordingly, he dissolved the temporary restraining order granted at the time of the institution of the action, and dismissed the complaint.

The complaint alleges in substance that during the years 1947, 1948 and 1949, the school athletic field, which is immediately in the rear of the public school buildings, was leased by the trustees to the Lake City Baseball Club for the playing of professional baseball at night during the baseball season. For the years 1947 and 1948 there was a written lease, and it was extended and authorized by the trustees for the year 1949, but no written instrument by way of renewal was executed.

A return and answer was filed by the trustees, but they have no counsel of record. In the body of their pleading it is set forth that this board prays the court to enter judgment defining its powers and authority in the premises.

The return and answer of the Baseball Club is in effect a general denial of the allegations of the complaint respecting the nuisance features of the complaint, and a rejection of the contention of the appellants that the respondent trustees are without power to lease the athletic field for the purposes in question.

The school lot is situated in the town of Lake City, a town of about 5,000 population, on the north side of Main Street. The school buildings face on this street, and extend back a distance of about 170 feet. The physical property is bounded on the North by Dancing Street; on the East by Blanding Street; and on the West by Carolina Avenue. The nuisance angle of the case is presented and emphasized by the plaintiffs and others whose homes border on the school grounds and the athletic field. The residences on Dancing Street, which is about 40 feet wide, face the rear of the ball field. The bleachers and grandstand are on the eastern side of the athletic field, and are just about ten feet from the rear of the residential lots on Blanding Street.

Before discussing the issue of nuisance we will consider the right and power of the respondent school trustees to lease the athletic field.

The Lake City Baseball Club, which is a member of the Palmetto League, was chartered by the state as a business corporation in April 1947, with a capital stock of $5,000.00, divided into 500 shares of the par value of $10.00 each, with a board of directors and the usual corporate officers. There are about fifty stockholders, most of whom live in and around Lake City. While this corporation is amenable to suit, it is insolvent. The testimony shows that it is kept alive in its operation largely by local contributions; that it now owes a thousand dollars, and has assets of only $2.75. The respondent Board of Trustees is not liable to a law action. Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42. It is therefore apparent that any damage and injury sustained by appellants is irreparable, and that the only relief available to appellants, if they are entitled to any, is through the injunctive process of the court of equity.

The school trustees executed a written lease to the Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., under date May 10, 1947. It is stated in the lease that the athletic field is leased to the Baseball Club 'for the purpose of, and at the times needed, to play baseball games in connection with its schedule with Palmetto League, and such other extra games as the lessee may schedule, for the term of the 1947 baseball season.' The lessee is given the right to renew the contract for the 1948 season 'jointly with the American Legion Team, if the American Legion decides to sponsor a team, and, if not, then to this lessee alone, but upon such terms as may hereafter be agreed upon between the parties.' (The American Legion did not sponsor a team and the lease contract enured to the sole benefit of the Lake City Baseball Club, Inc.)

The lessee is given the right, at its own expense, to erect poles and fixtures on the premises for the purpose of flood-lighting the field for night games; and also the right to erect seats, bleachers and grandstands and other helpful improvements, but upon the stipulation that all such improvements and equipment will be left on the premises as the property of the lessor upon the termination of the lease. The lessee is also granted the right to sublet concessions for use while games are being played, but the lessor is not to receive any of the funds earned in such connection. Under the terms of the lease, the use of the athletic field house, showers and lockers for the convenience of the teams and of visiting teams, is afforded the lessee. The lessee agrees to pay for water and electricity used during the games and to keep the premises in good repair.

The lease, as stated, was verbally renewed for the 1949 season.

The appellant property owners are not contesting in any way the use of the athletic field for school activities, or the casual or occasional use of the field for athletic contests which may have a commercial aspect. Nor dod they contend that the operation of a commercial baseball park is a nuisance per se. They deny the power of the school trustees to become contractual parties to an operation which they charge constitutes a public or private nuisance.

There are several applicable statutes in the Code dealing with the powers of school trustees in connection with the public schools of the state, but we need consider only Section 5358, sub-division 6, entitled 'Control school property', which vests the school trustees with the power 'to take care of, manage and control the school property of the district.' Other sub-sections clothe the school trustees with the authority to provide school houses, control the educational interests of the districts, and other matters relative thereto. But sub-section 6, from which we quote, is the only provision which has direct relevancy to the issue presented here as to the owner of a Board of School Trustees to lease school property. If they have such power, it must be referred to the authority granted to them to 'take care of, manage and control the school property of the district.'

The doctrine is generally recognized that a school district is a body politic and corporate under the laws of the state, with limited powers confined generally to those expressly enumerated and those necessary implied. Although in general terms, powers may be broadly given, the character of the corporation itself and the purposes for which it was created supply limitations in view of which the language employed may be read.

It is stated in 47 Am.Jur., Sec. 67, Page 344:

'While there appears to be considerable conflict in the reported cases as to whether school property may be used for other than school purposes, or, if so, as to what uses are permissible, there is a liberalizing tendency in favor of extending permissible uses. In determining the question, the courts may be governed by the wording and import of statutes prescribing the powers and duties of those charged with the care of school property, or, if the statute is general in nature, by considerations of public policy, depending largely on the attitude of the taxpayers in the district. Other considerations affecting the result may be found in the changing times, or in the historical recognition of the propriety of devoting school property to certain uses.

'According to one line of decisions, taking the more liberal view, school authorities may grant the use of school buildings for other than school uses, provided the primary use of the building for school purposes is not interfered with, particularly where the funds of the district are augmented thereby. But another line of decisions apparently restricts the use of school property strictly and entirely to school purposes, on the ground that money raised by taxation for one purpose cannot be used even indirectly for any other * * *.

'Even in those jurisdictions wherein the use of schoolhouses for other than school purposes...