Carter v. Lanzetta

• Decision Date: 12 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 48231,48231
• Citation: Carter v. Lanzetta, 249 La. 1098, 193 So.2d 259 (La. 1966)
• Parties: Carl B. CARTER and Juanita WEST, wife of Carl B. Carter v. Josie LANZETTA and Camello Lanzetta.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 259

193 So.2d 259

249 La. 1098

Carl B. CARTER and Juanita WEST, wife of Carl B. Carter v. Josie LANZETTA and Camello Lanzetta.

No. 48231.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 12, 1966.

Smith, Waltzer & Jones, Arthel J. Scheuermann, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-applicants.

O'Keefe, O'Keefe, Fedoroff & Varela, Gerald P. Fedoroff, New Orleans, for defendants-respondents.

McCALEB, Justice.

This is a suit for recovery of workmen's compensation under R.S. 23:1021, et seq. Mrs. Carter, the injured employee, was hired on May 7, 1964 by the defendants (husband and wife) who own a corner grocery and sandwich shop, to replace temporarily their sandwich maker and waitress at the lunch counter operated in the store. In the course of this work Mrs. Carter was required to operate an electrically powered meat-slicing machine. For her services she was paid $4.00 for the work day which began at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 2:30 in the afternoon. On the day Mrs. Carter worked (there is some dispute as to whether or not her employment was for just one day or for a longer period) she was paid $4.00 by Mrs. Lanzetta at 2:30 p.m., the end of the work day, and she was either given or purchased a piece of pie at the counter. Thereafter, she remained in the store chatting with Mrs. Lanzetta for approximately 20 or 30 minutes. On leaving the store at about 3:00 p.m. Mrs. Carter lost her footing on the cement step adjoining the front door, fell to the sidewalk and sustained a fracture of two ribs and a fracture of the ocalsis of the left foot extending into the sub-talar joint.

Plaintiffs (the employee and her husband) claim that, as a result of the injury to her left foot, Mrs. Carter continues to experience substantial pain upon walking and standing and that she is totally and permanently disabled to do sales work, the only work for which she is suited by training and experience. Hence compensation at the rate of $10.00 ¹ per week for 400 weeks is claimed together with legal interest, medical expenses, statutory penalties and attorney's fees.

Defendants originally asserted in their answer that Mrs. Carter's injuries were not sustained on the premises and that her employment was not of a hazardous nature. However, these contentions are no longer pressed and have apparently been abandoned. Actually, the sole defense to the case is that, since Mrs. Carter was hired for one day only, her employment was terminated completely as soon as she was paid for her services and, in any event she was not injured in the course of her employment as she unnecessarily remained in the store for 20 to 30 minutes talking to Mrs. Lanzetta before leaving the premises.

The trial judge dismissed the suit concluding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment since Mrs. Carter had completed her work, had been paid her wages and thereafter tarried on the premises for 20 to 30 minutes discussing various topics with Mrs. Lanzetta.

On Appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed. See Carter v. Lanzetta 185 So.2d 331. That court was of the opinion that, when Mrs. Carter was paid for her day's work at 2:30 p.m., '* * * it not only terminated the working day but also the employer-employee relationship, since the employment was only for that one day.' In addition the court further reasoned that, because Mrs. Carter thereafter remained on the premises for one-half four to chat and socialize with her employer before she fell and was injured while descending the step on the way to the sidewalk, '* * * she was not injured in the course of her employment.' ²

Plaintiffs applied for certiorari contending that, forasmuch as Mrs. Carter was injured on the premises while in the act of departing therefrom, she was within the course of her employment and that the holding to the contrary by the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, is in direct conflict with that of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in Simmons v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 185 So.2d 822. The application was granted and the matter has been submitted for our determination.

We think the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeal are clearly wrong. Initially, it is apt to observe that it has long been well settled, not only here but in practically all states which have enacted Workmen's Compensation statutes, that such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval. The rule is well stated in Malone, Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice, Section 169, p. 193, as follows:

'The observation has been made in previous sections that an employee is acting in the course of his employment while he is actually engaged in his employer's work even before or after working hours. Furthermore, even if he is finished the day's work and is preparing to leave, or is in the act of leaving, he in entitled to a reasonable period while still on the premises which is regarded as within the course of the employment. The working day embraces these intervals just as it includes reasonable periods for rest, relaxation or the attendance of personal needs. This applies also to periods prior to the actual beginning of work under similar circumstances.' (Emphasis ours). ³

Thus, it matters not that Mrs. Carter was to work for just one day, as the Court of Appeal found, inasmuch as the brevity of the hiring affords no basis for the court's ruling that liability under the Workmen's Compensation law terminated at the moment the employee received payment for her services. Even a casual employee engaged in a hazardous occupation is covered under the act (see Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice, Sec. 55, p. 57; Powell v. Travelers Insurance Company, 117 So.2d 610 (La.App.1960) regardless of the short duration of his employment and is entitled to safe ingress and egress to and from the employer's premises to the same extent as the regular employee.

Nor do we think that Mrs. Carter became a loiterer on the premises because she remained thereon for 20 or 30 minutes after she had been paid and engaged in conversation pertaining to religion with her employer, Mrs. Lanzetta. Indeed, we see no undue prolongation of her exit from the premises under the circumstances of the case. ⁴ Certainly there is nothing in the record to indicate that the delay of 20 to 30 minutes increased the hazard of the employment or enlarged Mrs. Carter's exposure to danger. See Blattner v. Loyal Order of Moose, etc., 264 Minn. 79, 117 N.W.2d 570. Besides, consideration must be given to the fact that Mrs. Carter was engaged in conversation with her employer and, whether the conversation pertained to social matters or otherwise, we think it manifest that the employee under such conditions is not in a position to hastily withdraw. See Dobson v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 228 La. 837, 84 So.2d 210 and Brown v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 240 La. 1051, 126 So.2d 768.

We conclude that the accident occurred during the course of the employment. ⁵ As indicated in the beginning, the fact that defendants' business contained hazardous features, an electrically powered slicing machine to which plaintiff was exposed, is sufficient to bring the case within our Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence, the only remaining matter for consideration is the nature of plaintiff's injuries and the duration of her disability.

Plaintiffs assert that Mrs. Carter can no longer perform work requiring periods of standing, walking or heavy lifting and that, since she is fitted by training and experience for sales work only, she is totally and permanently disabled to perform work of a reasonable character within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation law. In support of this position, reliance is placed on Mrs. Carter's testimony and the medical opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Ray J. Haddad, Jr., an orthopedist practicing in the city of New Orleans.

Mrs. Carter avouched that, since sustaining her injuries, she has been in pain all of the time, particularly so when standing or walking. On the day of the accident she was taken to Baptist Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Haddad. By X-Rays, it was ascertained that Mrs. Carter sustained a fracture of the sixth and seventh ribs on the left side and a fracture involving the left...