Carter v. Littlefied
| Full Citation | Carter v. Littlefied, 20-cv-365-JFH-JFJ (N.D. Okla. May 16, 2023) |
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-365-JFH-JFJ |
| Parties | THOMAS JEREMIAH CARTER, Plaintiff, v. ALICIA LITTLEFIED, KENNETH WRIGHT, RANDALL YATES, CAROLINE M. WEAVER, ADRIANO CORONEL, and GLEN MULREADY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
Now before the Court are two separate motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Thomas Jeremiah Carter's Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 40; Dkt. No. 49. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Adriano Coronel (“Coronel”), Alicia Littlefield (“Littlefield”), Glenn Mulready (“Mulready”), Kenneth Wright (“Wright”), and Randall Yates (“Yates”) [Dkt. No. 40] and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Caroline Weaver (“Weaver”) [Dkt. No. 49] are GRANTED.
On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff Thomas Jeremiah Carter (“Plaintiff”) filed his original Complaint in this matter. Dkt. No. 2. Shortly thereafter, several defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 8. Plaintiff obtained leave to amend his original and subsequent pleading,[1] and his Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) is now the operative pleading in this matter. Dkt. No. 34. Because the original motion to dismiss was rendered moot by the amendment of the original complaint, the Court has not yet addressed the merits of any challenges to Plaintiff's claims. See Dkt. No. 36.
Plaintiff alleges that, while that he was working as an after-hours security guard and checkin manager at Pine Island RV Resort (“Pine Island”) in May of 2016, he became involved in a dispute with Elizabeth Sheply (“Sheply”), a resident and employee of Pine Island. Dkt. No. 34 at ¶ 20-22. Sheply called the Delaware County Sheriff's Department, and the Sheriff dispatched a deputy to investigate. Id. at ¶¶ 20-25. An information was filed concerning the altercation and a warrant was issued for Plaintiff's arrest. See id. at pp. 74-79 (Exs. 9-11). Plaintiff claims he was not aware of the warrant until early 2019. Id. at ¶ 81.
Two Petitions for Protective Order were filed following the dispute between Plaintiff and Sheply. The first, filed by Sheply, was dismissed soon after filing. Id. at pp 37-44 (Ex. 2). The second was filed by another individual associated with Pine Island, Boyd Stover (“Stover”). Id. at 55-71 (Exs 5-7).[2] It is not clear when Plaintiff first became aware of the Petition filed by Sheply, but it is evident from the Complaint that Plaintiff did know about, and hired counsel to represent him in connection with, the Petition filed by Stover. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.
Nearly three years later, in February 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from an employment firm informing him-apparently for the first time-that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 81. Soon after receiving that letter, Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with Delaware County Clerk Caroline Weaver. The FOIA request sought information concerning Judge Alicia Littlefield, District Attorney Kenneth Wright, former Oklahoma District Attorney Randall Yates, and Sheriff Harlan Moore, all of whom were identified in the documents associated with the 2016 criminal proceedings. Id. at ¶ 32; id. at p. 74 (); id. at p. 78 ().[3] Additional FOIA requests and other requests were sent to Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Glen Mulready and the Oklahoma Risk Management Office (“ORM”), where Adriano Coronel is employed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-35, 37-41. Plaintiff claims none of the Defendants provided any substantive responses to his various FOIA and discovery requests. Id. at ¶¶ 32-38.[4]
Broadly speaking, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants engaged in tortious conduct during the proceedings that gave rise to the warrant, which Plaintiff suggests was improperly obtained was issued without affording Plaintiff due process, and was improperly made public. E.g., id. at ¶¶ 46-49. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants violated his rights by enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Protective Orders filed against him, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 54-55, by failing to respond to discovery and other requests, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 90-91, and by initiating, failing to retract, and refusing to provide additional time to gather evidence concerning an ORM tort claim proceeding, id. at ¶¶ 80-81. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' behavior constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and various other state and federal laws.
The Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under any cognizable legal theory, that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred, and that all Defendants are entitled to qualified and statutory immunity. Dkt. No. 40 at 6-10; Dkt. No. 49 at 3-14. In addition, Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Coronel, and Mulready argue that any claims brought against them in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Dkt. No. 40 at 8-10. Finally, Defendants Littlefield, Wright, and Yates submit that they are entitled to absolute immunity, as the allegations against them concern actions taken in their official capacities. Dkt. No. 40 at 4-5. Having reviewed the Parties' briefing, the Complaint, and the exhibits thereto, the Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
The question of whether Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Coronel, and Mulready (the ) are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is a threshold one addressed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Davis v. California, No. 17-2125-JAR-JPO, 2017 WL 4758928, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2017). Generally speaking, the Eleventh Amendment shields states from, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction over, claims in which private citizens seeks money damages from a sovereign state. See Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1080 (10th Cir. 2006); Opala v. Watt, 454 F.3d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (). This shield extends to claims against state officers, like the State Defendants, to the extent those officers are sued in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Such claims are, in effect, claims against the state itself, and the Eleventh Amendment does not permit a plaintiff to accomplish indirectly what it cannot do by suing a state directly. Id.
There are exceptions to the general rule, two of which may apply in the context of claims for damages against state employees.[5] The State may expressly waive its sovereign immunity, or Congress may override it. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. “[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” Id.
None of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply here. Oklahoma has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, Oklahoma has expressed its intent to maintain sovereign immunity for itself, its political subdivisions, and its employees acting within the scope of their employment, except as specifically set forth in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“OGTCA”). See 51 Okla. Stat. §§ 151 et seq.; Gradle v. Oklahoma, 203 Fed.Appx. 179, 183 (10th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, Congress has not abrogated Oklahoma's sovereign immunity with respect to any of the claims set forth in the Complaint. See, e.g., Patillo v. Larned State Hosp., 462 Fed.Appx. 780, 783 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claims against state entities on the grounds that the state entities' immunity “had not been abrogated or waived in connection with §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, or 1986”); Ash v. Buttigieg, No. CIV-22-371-R, 2022 WL 17225732, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2022) (). Because there has been no waiver and no Congressional abrogation of Oklahoma's sovereign immunity, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants in their official capacities.[6] Those claims are dismissed with prejudice.
The Defendants argue that this action is time-barred. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff specifically alleged that he was unaware of the warrant for his arrest until thirty months after it issued. See Dkt. No. 34 at ¶ 81. Given this allegation-which must be accepted as true at this stage[7]-it simply cannot be said that the statute of limitations began to run in June of 2016. Instead, the time period for filing an action began to run approximately thirty months later, around February 2019. Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). There is currently no basis for dismissing Plaintiff's claims on statute of limitations grounds.
Having determined that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants...
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