Carter v. Lynn Housing Authority
| Decision Date | 14 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-P-171.,05-P-171. |
| Citation | 851 N.E.2d 437,66 Mass. App. Ct. 117 |
| Parties | Pamela CARTER v. LYNN HOUSING AUTHORITY. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Webb F. Primason, Lynn, for the defendant.
Jennifer G. Hayden (James Breslauer, Lynn, with her) for the plaintiff.
Present: DUFFLY, CYPHER, & KANTROWITZ, JJ.
The defendant, Lynn Housing Authority (LHA), appeals from a grant of summary judgment in the Housing Court in favor of the plaintiff, Pamela Carter, reversing the LHA's termination of Carter's section 8 rent subsidy assistance payments.1 We agree with the defendant and reverse.
The LHA raises several arguments on appeal, claiming that (1) the Housing Court judge erred by holding that the LHA's termination of Carter's benefits was incurably defective because neither the termination letter nor the hearing officer's written decision recited that all of the factors required to be considered by the applicable regulations were actually considered or that a sanction less than termination was actually considered; (2) the judge erred by holding that the summary judgment record established that the LHA's termination of Carter was an abuse of discretion; and (3) the judge improperly relied upon an unreported Federal District Court case from the Northern District of Illinois.
Facts. On or about March 1, 2000, Carter and her two children, then ages fourteen and eighteen, moved into apartment no. 2 at 20 Wyman Street in Lynn, pursuant to a lease she entered into with the owner of the property, Robert Ryan. Carter held a section 8 voucher administered by the LHA, and the remainder of her rent was paid pursuant to a contract between Ryan and the LHA. Prior to Carter's occupancy of the apartment, and again on or about April 1, 2001, and February 26, 2002, the apartment was inspected by an LHA inspector, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(8)(C). It was found to be free from violations of the housing quality standards (HQS), as established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(8)(B)2 and 24 C.F.R. § 982.401.3
The record is unclear as to why, in early 2002, Ryan brought a summary process action against Carter in the Housing Court. What is known is that on June 26, 2002, the parties entered into an agreement for judgment signed by Carter, Ryan, and the court's housing specialist. The parties mutually agreed to terminate the existing lease, and Ryan agreed to return Carter's security deposit by July 5, 2002, and to return to her $1,005 in rent overcharge payments; Carter, in turn, agreed to vacate the apartment on or before September 2, 2002. In addition, each party waived all then-existing claims against the other with prejudice. On or about September 2, 2002, Carter and one of her children, then age seventeen, moved to a new apartment in Lynn.
On or about November 26, 2002, Ryan filed suit against Carter, claiming that Carter had caused substantial damage to the apartment, and seeking $2,000. On February 12, 2003, after conducting a hearing in which she viewed a video of the apartment provided by Ryan, the Housing Court clerk-magistrate found for Ryan and granted him $1,440 in damages for waste exceeding normal wear and tear. Judgment entered on February 13, 2003. This decision apparently was not appealed.
On April 11, 2003, the LHA formally notified Carter of its decision to terminate her section 8 subsidy, effective May 31, 2003.4 Carter then sought review of the LHA's decision. After a hearing on May 8, 2003, during which Carter presented witnesses and evidence on her behalf, the hearing officer affirmed the LHA's decision to terminate Carter's section 8 assistance.5 In conjunction with cross motions for summary judgment, the LHA provided the affidavit of David Moore, the LHA's rental assistance program manager who terminated Carter's section 8 eligibility.6 In his affidavit Moore averred that he had determined that Carter and/or her family had "breached their obligations under the rent subsidy program and that the appropriate remedy was to terminate assistance to the family." He further stated that he had "reviewed the facts, and considered the factors set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i)."7
The motion judge, on summary judgment,8 concluded that the termination of assistance was not in accordance with 24 C.F.R. § 982.552, because the LHA's decision did not show that it had properly considered "`all relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of denial or termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or failure' as required by 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i)."
In addition, the motion judge stated that "[t]here is also no indication that the LHA considered its other remedies as provided by relevant HUD regulations." The judge ruled that the LHA had abused its discretion in terminating Carter's benefits and ordered that the termination of her section 8 assistance be annulled and that her rent assistance be reinstated.
Standard of review. Anderson St. Assocs. v. Boston, 442 Mass. 812, 816, 817 N.E.2d 759 (2004).
It was error for the judge to engage in fact finding. See note 8, supra.9 "When considering a motion for summary judgment, the judge should not consider the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence, nor should the judge make findings of fact." Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 244, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991), citing Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 370, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982). We also conclude that the judge's rulings on the undisputed material facts were incorrect as matter of law, and we therefore reverse the judgment in favor of Carter and order the entry of judgment for the LHA.
HUD regulations. Section 982.551(c) of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that "[t]he family is responsible for an HQS breach caused by the family as described in § 982.404(b)." Section 982.404(b) addresses those family obligations of a section 8 tenant, providing in pertinent part:
The termination process is addressed by 24 C.F.R. § 982.552. It provides that: "The PHA may at any time . . . terminate program assistance for a participant, for any of the following grounds: (i) If the family violates any family obligations under the program (see § 982.551)." 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1).
With regard to the circumstances to be considered, subsection (2) reads:
"In determining whether to . . . terminate assistance because of action or failure to act by members of the family: (i) The PHA may consider all relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of denial or termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or failure" (emphasis supplied).
Discussion. On appeal, Carter is not contesting that she breached the HQS in the apartment at 20 Wyman Street, no. 2. The decision of the Housing Court clerk-magistrate in the earlier case found that Carter had committed waste in the apartment and awarded damages in the amount of $1,440 to the landlord.
The key regulatory provision in this case is 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i). The motion judge determined that the termination of Carter's section 8 voucher was "not `in accordance with Sec. 982.552'" because of the LHA's failure to consider all relevant circumstances. While Carter agrees and urges us to interpret the language beginning with "[t]he PHA may consider all relevant circumstances" to mean that the PHA is required to consider all relevant circumstances, the LHA emphasizes that the consideration of these circumstances is within the LHA's discretion.
The "mandatory informal hearing procedure is . . . founded on due process principles." Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Authy., 66 Mass.App.Ct. 103, 109, 845 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (2006). The due process requirements are carefully spelled out in the HUD regulations, see id. at 109-111, 845 N.E.2d at 1166-1167, and were satisfied in this case. In accordance with 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)(2)(i), the termination letter gave Carter adequate notice of why her benefits were being terminated. And, as required by 24...
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Costa v. Fall River Housing Authority, 06-P-1094.
...v. Lynn Hous. Authy., 66 Mass.App.Ct. 103, 109-110, 845 N.E.2d 1160 (2006) (citing Federal decisions); Carter v. Lynn Hous. Authy., 66 Mass. App.Ct., 117, 124, 851 N.E.2d 437, S.C., 450 Mass. 626, 880 N.E.2d 778 (2008).9 As the judge in this case observed, the HUD regulations and the more g......
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Carter v. Lynn Housing Authority
...and the Appeals Court, by a divided court, reversed and ordered that judgment enter for the LHA. Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 66 Mass.App. Ct. 117, 127, 851 N.E.2d 437 (2006) (Carter). We granted the plaintiffs application for further appellate review. After hearing oral argument in March, 2......
- Carter v. Lynn Housing Authority, 05-P-171.