Carter v. McClaughry

• Decision Date: 10 December 1900
• Parties: CARTER v. McCLAUGHRY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

105 F. 614

CARTER v. McCLAUGHRY.

United States Circuit Court, D. Kansas.

December 10, 1900

Frank P. Blair and C. H. Grosvenor, for petitioner.

John W Claus, Deputy Judge Advocate General, for respondent.

Before THAYER, Circuit Judge, and HOOK, District Judge.

HOOK District Judge.

This is a proceeding in habeas corpus. The writ having been allowed the cause arises on petitioner's demurrer to the return thereto. Oberlin M. Carter, who was a captain in the corps of engineers of the United States army, was tried before a general court-martial which convened at Savannah, Ga., upon 4 charges of violation of the articles of war and 37 specifications thereunder. He was found guilty of the offenses set forth in 16 of the specifications and of the 4 charges which the specifications supported. In accordance with the practice in such tribunals, the court-martial imposed a lumping sentence, and adjudged the accused 'to be dismissed from the service of the United States, to suffer a fine of five thousand dollars, to be confined at hard labor at such place as the proper authority may direct for five years, and the crime, punishment, name, and place of abode of the accused to be published in the newspapers in and about the station and in the state from which the accused came or where he usually resides. ' As required by law, the record of the proceedings before the court-martial was submitted to the president for his action thereon. The president disapproved of the findings of the court-martial as to 12 of the 16 specifications, and approved of the remainder, and also of the sentence. The action of the president left in force the findings of guilty under the 4 charges and 1 specification supporting each charge; and although the determination of the court-martial as to 12 of the specifications was set aside, no diminution was made in the punishment that had been imposed. The secretary of war thereupon designated the United States penitentiary at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., as the place of confinement of the prisoner, and he is now in the custody of the warden of that institution, who is the respondent herein. The entire sentence, excepting the service of the term of imprisonment, has been executed. The relator has been dismissed from the service of the United States, he has paid the fine imposed, and the specified publication has been made.

Prior to Carter's removal to the penitentiary at Ft. Leavenworth, a writ of habeas corpus was obtained in his behalf from the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. Upon hearing, the writ was dismissed, and he was remanded to the custody of the military authorities. In re Carter, 97 F. 496. An appeal from the order dismissing the writ was taken to the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit, and that court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Rose v. Roberts, 40 C.C.A. 199, 99 F. 948. A petition for a writ of certiorari to the circuit court of appeals was presented to the supreme court, and was by that court denied. Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S. 684, 20 Sup.Ct. 1026, 44 L.Ed. 638. At the same time an appeal directly to the supreme court, and also a writ of error, were allowed by a judge of the circuit court, which, upon hearing, were dismissed. Id., 177 U.S. 496, 20 Sup.Ct. 713, 44 L.Ed. 861. The supreme court, in dismissing the appeal and proceeding in error, did not pass upon the questions affecting the validity of the conviction and sentence of Carter, but held that, since an appeal had been prosecuted from the circuit court to the circuit court of appeals, and that court had acted on the whole case, including the constitutional questions connected therewith, the supreme court would not entertain a direct appeal from the circuit court in the same cause; in other words, it was held that a defeated party did not have the right to have his case finally determined in the supreme court and in the circuit court of appeals on independent appeals. Being restrained of his liberty by the respondent pursuant to the sentence of the court-martial as approved by the president and the action of the secretary of war thereon, it is contended in behalf of Carter that his imprisonment is in violation of the constitution of the United States, and is otherwise illegal, and without warrant of law.

At the threshold of the case counsel for respondent interposes the objection that by reason of the aforementioned proceedings in the courts, and the orders and judgments rendered by them respectively, the matters sought to be presented were considered by the circuit court for the Southern district of New York and by the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit, but, while the judgments of those courts are recognized as of highly persuasive authority, they do not amount to res adjudicata, nor prevent a re-examination of the same questions in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. The action of the supreme court was confined to a denial of the application for a writ of certiorari, which is not allowed as a matter of right, and to a dismissal of the appellate proceedings without a consideration of the merits of the case. It is, therefore, the duty of this court to give due consideration to the case presented.

The limited scope of inquiry in a case of this character is well defined by many decisions. A writ of habeas corpus cannot be converted into a proceeding in error. A court to which an application is made for the discharge of one restrained of his liberty pursuant to the judgment and sentence of another court cannot inquire whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction, nor consider whether, in the progress of the trial, errors were committed by the trial court as to matters within its jurisdiction. In such a case the writ of habeas corpus is, in effect, a collateral attack; and, if the court pronouncing the sentence had jurisdiction of the accused and of the offense for which he was tried, and did not exceed its jurisdiction in the imposition of the sentence, the case is not open to further inquiry. Courts-martial are independent tribunals created by the same authority to which this court owes its existence, and they have as complete power and jurisdiction to judicially determine any cause before them involving offenses under the articles of war as this court has over controversies committed by law to its cognizance. The limitations on the power of this court to inquire into matters connected with the judgments of other civil courts by means of the writ of habeas corpus apply with equal force to the judgments of courts-martial. This consideration is sufficient to eliminate a number of petitioner's objections without further discussion.

The charges preferred against Carter before the court-martial and of which he was found guilty, were: (1) Conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of the sixtieth article of war; (2) Causing false and fraudulent claims to be made against the United States, in violation of the sixtieth article of war; (3) conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of the sixty-first article of war (4) embezzlement, as defined in section 5488, Rev. St. U.S., in violation of the sixty-second article of war. It is not denied that the court-martial by which Carter was tried had jurisdiction of his person, but it is contended that the finding of guilty under the fourth charge is illegal and void, in that the acts described in the specification supporting the charge are insufficient to constitute the offense, and that they show that the offense, if any was committed, was cognizable under the sixtieth article of war, for the violation of...