Carter v. Milford Valley Memorial Hosp., 990203-CA.

• Citation: 2000 Utah Ct. App. 021,996 P.2d 1076
• Decision Date: 10 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 990203-CA.,990203-CA.
• Parties: Max R. CARTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a governmental agency of Beaver County, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

996 P.2d 1076

2000 Utah Ct. App. 021

Max R. CARTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a governmental agency of Beaver County, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 990203-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

February 10, 2000.

Floyd W. Holm, Cedar City, for Appellant.

M. Dayle Jeffs, Jeffs & Jeffs, Provo, for Appellee.

Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and WILKINS.¹

OPINION

ORME, Judge:

¶ 1 Max R. Carter appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of Milford Valley Memorial Hospital premised on his failure to conform with the procedural requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act (the Malpractice Act). Carter contends that the paramedics responsible for a delay in transporting his wife to the hospital are not properly classified as "health care providers" under the Malpractice Act. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Anna Rae Carter, a resident of Minersville, Utah, became seriously ill, due to a heart condition, on October 8, 1995. Max Carter, her husband, called for emergency medical assistance, and an ambulance located in Minersville and operated by Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, rushed to assist the Carters.

¶ 3 There apparently is no full service hospital in Minersville, so to address emergency needs, ambulance services with emergency medical service personnel (paramedics)² are stationed in Minersville. Minersville is located approximately midway between Milford Valley Memorial Hospital and Beaver Valley Hospital. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, including its ambulance services, are owned and operated by the Beaver County Hospital Service District, a governmental entity.

¶ 4 When the ambulance arrived at the Carters' home, Mrs. Carter was placed inside. The ambulance quickly departed for Beaver Valley Hospital, located in Beaver, Utah, approximately eighteen miles from Minersville. Soon after departure, the ambulance staff noticed that a gauge in the ambulance was operating erratically, and, concerned that this was an indicator of a more serious problem that might cause a mechanical breakdown, radioed for a second ambulance. An ambulance was then dispatched from Beaver to meet the Minersville ambulance en route. The Minersville ambulance continued to run properly despite the erratic gauge and did not actually experience a mechanical problem causing it to slow its progress or to stop.

¶ 5 Nonetheless, when the Beaver ambulance met the Minersville ambulance, both stopped, and the paramedics transferred Mrs. Carter to the Beaver ambulance. This transfer resulted in a twenty-minute delay.³ The Beaver ambulance then resumed the drive to Beaver Valley Hospital. Upon arrival, Mrs. Carter was air-lifted to the University of Utah Hospital where she died some nine days later.

¶ 6 Carter brought a wrongful death action against Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, alleging the delay caused by the ambulance transfer was the proximate cause of her eventual demise. Both sides agree that Carter had filed his notice of intent to sue in compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and that he did so within the one-year statutory time limit provided in that Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 to -15 (1997 & Supp.1999).⁴ However, Carter's Complaint was not filed until January 6, 1998, over two years after the incident in question.

¶ 7 In his Complaint, Carter alleged negligent care and maintenance of the ambulance by the Minersville ambulance staff and that such negligence led to his wife's death. In response, the Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the delay occurred while health care was being rendered to the decedent by the Hospital's ambulance paramedics, who it asserts are "health care providers" under the Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to -17 (1996 & Supp.1999).

¶ 8 The trial court agreed with the Hospital, concluding that the ambulance services qualified as the actions of health care providers and that Carter's failure to file his complaint within two years violated the limitations period set forth in the Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996). The motion for summary judgment was granted, and Carter's action was dismissed.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 Carter now appeals, arguing that the Malpractice Act does not apply to this case. Carter first argues that mechanics are not health care providers, and that his action is based on a mechanic's oversight. His theory is wholly speculative. Nothing in, or attached to, his response to the motion for summary judgment points to any particular mechanic, actual mechanical breakdown, or specific maintenance oversight, nor is there any specific mention of which gauge acted erratically. In other words, we are asked to infer that a mechanic, in the exercise of ordinary care, would have caught the problem that evidenced itself in an unspecified gauge and fixed it, thus precluding the delay attributable to the malfunctioning gauge. We reject Carter's attempt to recast his cause of action to focus on theorized actors and speculative oversights in hopes of avoiding the application of the Malpractice Act.⁵ Cf. Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989)

(rejecting plaintiff's attempts to recast cause of action to avoid Governmental Immunity Act).

¶ 10 The gravamen of Carter's Complaint, fairly read, properly places in issue only the paramedics' decision to change ambulances in the face of a malfunctioning gauge, albeit with no discernible impairment of the ambulance's ability to operate. The decision to call for another ambulance, and to transfer Mrs. Carter to it rather than to have it follow and be available in the event of an actual breakdown, was a decision made by the paramedics in the course and scope of their duty to get Mrs. Carter to the hospital in a safe but speedy manner. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the paramedics, in deciding to transfer Mrs. Carter to another ambulance, were acting as "health care provider[s]" under the Malpractice Act.

¶ 11 Carter alternatively contends that while the paramedics were employees or agents of the Hospital, they, like the speculative mechanic, would also not qualify as health care providers, and consequently, the four-year statute of limitations for general negligence should apply.

¶ 12 "`Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Because a summary judgment presents questions of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness." In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The Malpractice Act was enacted in 1976 to "control the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance." Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (Platts II).

Being characterized as a "health care provider" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp.1999) entails certain procedural protections against lawsuits — protections not granted other alleged tortfeasors. When suing a health care provider, a plaintiff must follow specified steps, including: (1) giving notice to the health care provider ninety days before commencement of the action, see id. § 78-14-8 (1996); (2) participating in a prelitigation panel review, see id. § 78-14-12(2) (Supp.1999); and (3) filing the complaint within the abbreviated two-year statute of limitations period. See id. § 78-14-4 (1996). If these requirements are not fully met, the action will be dismissed. See Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1992); Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 30-31 (Utah 1981).

¶ 14 Because the hospital being sued in this case is owned and operated by a governmental entity, Carter's lawsuit also implicates the Governmental Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) & (7) (Supp. 1999) ("`Governmental entity' means the state and its political subdivisions" and includes "any county, ... special improvement or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation."). When filing a claim against a political subdivision, separate procedural requirements must also be met, including: (1) filing a notice of claim with the governing body within one year after the claim arises, see id. § 63-30-13; (2) allowing the governing body to approve or deny the claim, or waiting until ninety days after filing the notice, whichever occurs first, see id. § 63-30-14 (1997); and (3) commencing the action within one year from either the denial of the claim or the running of the ninety-day period. See id. § 63-30-15.

¶ 15 Carter complied with the unique procedural requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, but not the requirements of the Malpractice Act. We note that in cases where both the Governmental Immunity Act and the Malpractice Act apply, compliance with the procedural requirements of both is required. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-10 (1996). Therefore, fulfilling the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act does not absolve a plaintiff from also complying with the procedural requirements of the Malpractice Act if both Acts apply. Failure to comply with all the procedural requirements of each Act, when both are implicated, may be fatal to the cause of action. See Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr., 617 P.2d 352, 353-54 (Utah 1980)

.

¶ 16 Thus, Carter's compliance with the procedural requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act is no excuse for his noncompliance with the Malpractice Act if it otherwise applies. And, whether it applies is a simple function of whether the Hospital's paramedics are "health care providers" under the Malpractice Act. If they are, Carter's suit against the Hospital is indeed barred.

¶ 17 The Hospital argues that its ambulance services are an extension of the Hospital. We do not regard this characterization as...