Carter v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., Case No. 3:09-cv-628-J-34JBT

• Decision Date: 29 May 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09-cv-628-J-34JBT
• Parties: RAYMOND J. CARTER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

RAYMOND J. CARTER, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:09-cv-628-J-34JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

Date: May 29, 2012

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Carter initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. #1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 28, 2009, pursuant to the mailbox rule. He challenges a 2001 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, first degree arson, and armed burglary with assault on six grounds. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents'Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Response to Order to Show Cause (Response) (Doc. #18); Exhibits (Resp. Ex.) (Doc. #19). On October 6, 2009, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. #14), admonishing Petitioner regarding his obligations and giving Petitioner a time frame in which to submit a reply. Petitioner submitted a brief in reply on May 7, 2010. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Answer (Reply) (Doc. #24). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On February 3, 2000, a grand jury issued a six-count Indictment that was ultimately superceded by an amended indictment, charging Petitioner with two counts of first degree murder (counts one and two), two counts of attempted first degree murder (counts three and four), one count of first degree arson (count five), and one count of armed burglary (count six). Resp. Ex. B at 7-8, 289-92. After jury selection, Carter proceeded to a jury trial. Resp. Ex. C, Transcript of the Jury Trial (Tr.). At the conclusion of the trial, a jury found Carter guilty, as charged. Resp. Ex. B at 381-87, Verdicts; Tr. at 1399-1401. On August 30, 2001, the trial court sentenced Carter to a term of life imprisonment without parole on count one; a concurrent term of life imprisonment without parole on count two; a concurrent term of thirty years of imprisonment on count three; a concurrent term of thirty years of imprisonment on count four; a concurrent term of thirty years ofimprisonment on count five; and a concurrent term of life imprisonment without parole on count six. Resp. Ex. B at 393-402.

On appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Initial Brief, arguing that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress his January 26, 2000 statement. Resp. Exs. E; F. The State filed an Answer Brief and Supplemental Answer Brief. Resp. Exs. G; H. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief. Resp. Ex. I. On March 31, 2003, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence per curiam without issuing a written opinion. Carter v. State, 842 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Resp. Ex. J. The mandate issued on April 16, 2003. Resp. Ex. K. Petitioner did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court.

On October 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, see Resp. Ex. V at 1-35, and filed an amended motion in 2004, see id. at 36-53. In his requests for post conviction relief (Rule 3.850 motion), Petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to: effectively cross-examine a State witness, Norman Gibson (ground one); call several material witnesses: Robert C. Stevens, Ms. Peeples, Prymus Brown, and a Fire Department K-9 Officer (ground two); present evidence of a lay witness that Norman Gibson had committed the crime (ground three); move for a mistrial based on the State's circumstantial evidence and prosecutorial misconduct relating to Jerry Bailey, the Statewitness, informing the court that the prosecutor had told him to change his statement (amended motion, ground one); inform the jury that defense witness Tracy Henry was a drug user and also re-question her about the time she had seen Carter (amended motion, ground two); and properly investigate an autopsy report (amended motion, ground three). The trial court conducted a Huff hearing¹ on March 1, 2007, at which Carter, proceeding pro se, had the opportunity to discuss his claims with the court. Resp. Ex. L, Transcript of the March 1, 2007 Hearing. On April 18, 2007, the trial court denied the motions for post conviction relief. Id. at 87-95. The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on May 16, 2007. Id. at 96-111, 112.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motions and filed a brief. Resp. Ex. N. The State filed a notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief. Resp. Ex. O. Pursuant to the appellate court's order, the State ultimately responded. Resp. Exs. P; Q. On December 26, 2007, the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing or for the court to attach those portions of the record thatconclusively refute the remaining claims.² Carter v. State, 970 So.2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Resp. Ex. R. The mandate issued on January 11, 2008. Resp. Ex. S. The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing February 22, 2008. Resp. Exs. T; U.

On remand, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motions and attached those portions of the record that conclusively refute his claims. Resp. Ex. V at 116-298. The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on March 6, 2008. Id. at 299-362, 363.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motions and filed a brief. Resp. Ex. X. The State filed a notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief. Resp. Ex. Y. On October 6, 2008, the appellate court affirmed the denial per curiam, see Carter v. State, 993 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Resp. Ex. Z, and the mandate issued on November 3, 2008, see Resp. Ex. BB. The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on December 9, 2008. Resp. Exs AA; DD. Petitioner attempted to appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, but the court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction on December 11, 2008. Carter v. State, 999 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2008); Resp. Ex. FF.

On January 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. Citing Grate v. State, 750 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam),³ the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on January 23, 2009. Carter v. State, 2 So.3d 981 (Fla. 2009); Resp. Ex. II.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition is timely filed within the one-year period of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Response at 6-9.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess[Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Standard of Review

The Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is described as follows:

As explained by the Supreme Court, the phrase "'clearly established Federal law' . . . refers to the holdings . . . of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We have held that to be "contrary to" clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule "that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law," or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court "when faced with materially indistinguishable facts." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).

As regards the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), we have held as follows:

A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established law if the state court unreasonably extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context. An application of federal law cannot be considered unreasonable merely because it is, in our judgment, incorrect or erroneous; a state court decision must also be unreasonable. Questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo, as is the districtcourt's conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the state court's application of federal law.

Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In sum, "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) commands that for a writ to issue because the state court made an "unreasonable determination of the facts," the petitioner must rebut "the presumption of correctness [of a state court's factual findings] by clear and convincing evidence."[⁴ ] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1).

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 647 (2010).

Finally, for a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's determination will be entitled to deference for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that explains the state court's rationale for such a ruling. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770,...