Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
Citation | 65 Utah 465,238 P. 259 |
Decision Date | 24 June 1925 |
Docket Number | 4206 |
Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
Parties | CARTER v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO |
Appeal from District Court, Third District Salt Lake County; Wm. M McCrea, Judge.
Action by Josephine Young Carter against the Standard Accident Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Ray Van Cott and A. E. Moreton, both of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Booth Lee, Badger, Rich & Rich and D. N. Straup, all of Salt Lake City, for respondent.
THURMAN J. GIDEON, C. J., FRICK, J., and MATHISON, District Judge, concur. STRAUP, J., being disqualified did not participate. CHERRY, J., concurring in the judgment.
The plaintiff instituted this action to recover the sum of $ 7,500 and interest thereon, alleged to be due on an accident policy issued by the defendant to her husband, Charles Smith Carter, in which policy plaintiff is named as the beneficiary in case of death.
The complaint in substance, alleges that the policy was issued to Carter on the 30th day of March, 1915, insuring him for a period of 12 calendar months against "loss resulting from bodily injuries, effected directly, exclusively, and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means, except when intentionally self-inflicted, while sane or insane, in the sum of $ 7,500 as provided in the policy." It is then alleged that the policy was annually renewed thereafter on payment of the same sum upon each renewal, and that the policy was thereby duly and regularly continued in force until the 30th day of March, 1923, all of which renewal payments were paid by the said Carter and received by the defendant.
It is then alleged that on the 13th day of September, 1922, at Salt Lake City, Utah Carter died, through accidental means, the manner of his death being alleged in the terms employed in the policy as above set forth. In addition thereto the plaintiff alleges that the "exact cause of his death is unknown, except that it occurred in either one or the other or both of the following causes and circumstances, to wit." Plaintiff then alleges, in substance, that for several days previous to his death deceased had been confined to his room in the Wilson Hotel on account of sickness which caused him to become weak and dizzy while standing on his feet; and that on said 13th of September, 1922, between the hours of 10 a. m. and 4 p. m. he had occasion to get up from his bed in said hotel to go into an adjoining room towards the telephone installed therein, and while standing near said telephone in said room he fell to the floor with such force and violence that he instantly died, and was found under the telephone on the floor, reclining upon his back, on the afternoon of said date.
In the alternative, plaintiff alleges the same condition of deceased as to being sick, weak, and dizzy, and in addition thereto alleges that he suffered from insomnia; that he was frequently unable to sleep without the use of medicine; that for that purpose he frequently took small quantities of laudanum, and had made it a practice to carry laudanum with him for several years in a small bottle; that on the date of his death he had in his possession a 2-ounce bottle partly filled with laudanum, which he had obtained several months prior, and from time to time had used therefrom when afflicted with insomnia. Plaintiff then alleges upon her information and belief that deceased on the said date was afflicted with insomnia, that he attempted to take a small quantity of said laudanum to induce sleep, as was his custom, and in so doing he accidentally took an overdose, as a result of which he died, the deceased, however, not intending to inflict an injury upon himself.
The foregoing are the only allegations of the complaint material on this appeal.
The defendant, answering, admitted the issuance of the policy, the renewal thereof, the payment and receipt of the annual payments, and the continuance of the policy in force down to the date of the death of deceased as alleged in the complaint. It also admits the death of deceased on the date alleged, but denies that his death was accidental or by accidental means in either form as alleged in the complaint, but on the contrary as a separate answer and defense, defendant alleges that the death of deceased was "intentionally self-inflicted by said deceased while sane or insane, by his taking internally, knowingly, and intentionally, poison, to wit, laudanum, on September 13, 1922, in a large quantity, sufficient to cause death, and with the intention and purpose, as this defendant is advised and believes and therefore alleges, of causing his own death, and that said poison so taken did cause his death on said 13th day of September, 1922."
The jury to whom the case was tried rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount prayed for in the complaint; motion for new trial was denied, and judgment entered. From the judgment so entered the defendant appeals.
The case was submitted to the jury upon the issues presented by the pleadings as above set forth, with instructions by the court applicable to the issues thus presented.
In the argument on motion for a new trial, respondent resisted the motion, not only upon the grounds that there was evidence to prove that the death of the deceased was caused by accidental means within the terms of the policy, but that the statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 1171), eliminating suicide as a defense was controlling, and therefore in any event the motion for a new trial should be denied. The statute referred to will hereinafter be quoted and considered in connection with the respective contentions of the parties concerning the same.
The motion for a new trial was denied.
It is not our intention at this stage of the opinion to enter into a detailed statement of the evidence. For our present purpose it is sufficient to say that on the 13th day of September, 1922, the insured, Charles Smith Carter, hereinafter called Carter, was found dead in his room, No. 142 at the Wilson Hotel, Salt Lake City, Utah, under such circumstances as to engender a controversy between plaintiff and defendant as to whether his death was caused by accidental means, or whether he had deliberately and intentionally committed suicide.
As hereinbefore suggested, at the argument on motion for a new trial respondent invoked the statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 1171, as conclusive reason why the motion for a new trial should be denied. Upon that question amicus curiae have appeared upon each side of the question, by permission of the court, and filed exhaustive and illuminating briefs. As the parties litigant respectively have adopted the briefs so filed, for the sake of brevity such briefs will be referred to as "appellant's brief" and "respondents's brief," and counsel presenting them will be referred to as "appellant's counsel" and "respondent's counsel."
The statute referred to reads as follows:
1171. "From and after the passage of this chapter, the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year of any life insurance company doing business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary and whether said policy holder was sane or insane."
Appellant's counsel discuss the question under four heads in substance as follows: (1) The statute has no application to an accident insurance policy. (2) Notwithstanding the statute, the suicide of the holder of an accident insurance policy, while sane, is not an accident, and therefore not a death from which a recovery can be had. (3) The burden of proof was on the respondent to show that the death of the insured was effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means. (4) The policy in question was issued for one year only; every renewal thereafter was a new contract, and therefore the defense of suicide is available under any construction of section 1171, because the insured died within the first policy year of the policy.
The argument of appellant's counsel under every head above set forth in effect goes to the point that the statute has no application to an accident insurance policy. Various statutes of the state relating to insurance and insurance companies are reviewed, comparisons made, and distinctions pointed out relating to the different classes of insurance and insurance companies. It suits our convenience for the present to reserve this phase of the argument for later consideration.
There appears to be only two other states of the Union with statutes in any respect similar to the Utah statute above quoted, viz., Missouri and Colorado. The Utah and Colorado statutes are identical in every particular. The Missouri statute was passed in 1879, and reads as follows:
"In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void." Rev. St. 1919, § 6150.
The Colorado statute (C. L. 1921, § 2532), as it now reads was enacted in 1907, and the Utah statute in 1909.
As far as this court is concerned the question presented here is one of first impression. A somewhat similar question involving an interpretation of the Utah statute has recently been decided in favor of respondent's contention here by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal from the United States...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cramer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston
...69, 70; Gohlke v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n, 198 Iowa 144, 197 N.W. 1004, 35 A. L.R. 1177, 1183; Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A.L.R. 1495, 1518, 1519; Hodgson v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 155, 165 N.Y.S. 293, 297; Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Jo......
-
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co.
... ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 701, 163 Cal.Rptr. 857, in which the Court of ... and the Courts of Appeal focus or base their holdings upon a standard indicating that the means are not accidental when the natural, probable, ... Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. (1917) 100 Misc. 155, 165 N.Y.S. 293, 297-298 [the insured was ... be a hazardous investment, and one which he ought not to make." (Carter ... Page 338 ... v. [866 P.2d 796] Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (1925) 65 ... ...
-
Brannaker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
... ... 135; Sutter v. Mass. Bond & Ins. Co., 215 ... Ill.App. 341; Townsend v. Com. Trav. M. Acc. Assn., ... 231 N.Y. 148, 131 N.E. 871; Bailey v. Interstate Cas ... Co., 8 A.D. 127, 40 N.Y.S. 513; Hodgson v. Preferred ... Acc. Ins. Co., 165 N.Y.S. 293; Carter v. Standard A ... Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pa. 259, 41 A. L. R. 1495; ... Ry. Mail Assn. v ... ...
-
Miriam S. Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
... ... have developed. It is said in Caldwell v ... Travelers Ins. Co. , 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907, 39 ... A.L.R. 56, 61: "There are two ... habitual act of shaking a furnace, Husbands v ... Indiana Trav. Acc. Assn. , 194 Ind. 586, 133 N.E ... 130, 35 A.L.R. 1184; where a strain, ... conscious that it would be harmful, Carter v ... Standard Acc. Ins. Co. , 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 ... A.L.R ... ...