Carter v. State, 28603

Decision Date26 January 1951
Docket NumberNo. 28603,28603
PartiesCARTER v. STATE.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

James C. Cooper, Public Defender, Rushville, for appellant.

J. Emmett McManamon, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Coughlin, Harold V. Whitelock, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.

JASPER, Judge.

Appellant was charged by affidavit in three counts (1) with the crimes of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, under § 10-4709, Burns' 1942 Replacement; (2) robbery, under § 10-4101, Burns' 1942 Replacement; and (3) automobile banditry, under § 10-4710, Burns' 1942 Replacement; all arising out of the identical robbery. A plea of not guilty was entered, there was a trial by jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned for robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and for robbery. Judgment on each count was entered, and appellant was sentenced on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.

The sole question presented is whether or not error was committed in entering judgment on the first and second counts of the affidavit. Appellant contends that robbery is contained in the offense of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and that he should have been found guilty and sentenced on the first count only. In the case of Kokenes v. State, 1938, 213 Ind. 476, 479, 480, 13 N.E.2d 524, 525, 526, robbery while armed and robbery were charged in separate counts arising out of the identical robbery. There was a verdict of guilty upon both counts, and judgment and sentence followed upon both counts. This court said:

'It does not follow, however, that a defendant may be convicted for committing a robbery and committing a robbery while armed, where the same identical robbery is involved. * * *

'The offenses here involved are in the same category. The same robbery is involved in both, but in one the offense is aggravated by the fact that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. If the robbery be established, but it is not proven that he was armed, there should be a conviction for robbery. If the robbery is established and that he was armed, there should be a conviction under the statute in question. Guilt under the latter necessarily implies that the defendant is guilty of the robbery. The judgment should have been for the greater offense. The court entered judgment and sentenced the defendant under both counts; the sentences to run concurrently, however. This was error * * *.' 1

In the case now before this court the identical robbery is involved in both the...

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29 cases
  • Richardson v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 1, 1999
    ... ... this additional requirement to an independent state double jeopardy protection found in Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution." Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind.1997) ... Rather, it relied upon lesser-included jury instruction case law. See Tawney, 439 N.E.2d at 588 ... ...
  • McFarland v. State, 2-177A33
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 22, 1979
    ...Indiana has thereby taken the position that concurrent sentencing can also constitute multiple punishment. See also, Carter v. State, (1951) 229 Ind. 205, 96 N.E.2d 273 (defendant's chances of parole may be affected). Accordingly, most of the Indiana cases have specifically vacated the conv......
  • Carter v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • March 31, 1977
    ...murders), the defendants assign, as further error, the multiple 'convictions' for one and the same homicide. They cite Carter v. State, (1951) 229 Ind. 205, 96 N.E.2d 273, as authority for their position. We note that we did say in that opinion that the jury should have returned a verdict o......
  • Campbell v. State, 28704
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • February 26, 1951
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