Carter v. State
Decision Date | 01 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 0506,0506 |
Parties | Antwan Leroy CARTER, v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Sherrie B. Glasser, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Leigh S. Halstad, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Patricia Jessamy, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Submitted before SALMON, KENNEY, ADKINS, JJ.
A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Antwan Leroy Carter, appellant, of possession of a regulated firearm by one previously convicted of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of twenty-one, and unlawful discharge of a firearm within the City of Baltimore. In challenging his convictions, appellant presents two issues of first impression in Maryland:
We shall hold first that, because the fact of a prior conviction is an element of the offense charged, the State had a right to introduce evidence of the prior conviction to the jury. Second, because appellant offered, as a fall-back position, to stipulate that he was guilty of a prior crime of violence, the trial court was required to weigh the probative value of introducing evidence of the name of his crime against the risk of unfair prejudice to appellant in doing so. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
Baltimore City Police Officer Ronald Marriott testified that at approximately 10:45 on the night of August 29, 2000, he was in the 900 block of Coppin Court when he heard gunfire that he estimated to be within 100 yards of his location. Marriott ran to the location from which the gunfire originated. He saw two men wearing white sweatshirts running down Bethune Road, toward Bunch Road. He also saw appellant approximately 50 yards from him, holding a handgun and firing it into the air. After firing the gun, appellant followed the other men.
Officer Marriott followed appellant. He lost sight of him for 10 or 15 seconds when appellant ran between two houses, but eventually caught up to appellant and placed him under arrest. Appellant did not have a gun on him when he was arrested. Police officers searched the area, but were unable to find the gun. A gunshot residue test performed on appellant's right hand after his arrest, however, returned a positive result.
As a result of this incident, appellant was charged with possession of a regulated firearm by one previously convicted of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of twenty-one, and unlawful discharge of a firearm within the City of Baltimore.1 Before trial, defense counsel requested that the trial court "sanitiz[e] the first count."
Defense counsel continued to urge the trial court not to permit the State to present evidence to the jury regarding appellant's prior conviction for a crime of violence.
When the State announced its intention to introduce a certified copy of appellant's prior conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon, a handgun, defense counsel offered to stipulate that appellant had been convicted previously of a crime of violence. The trial court rejected that suggestion, reasoning that such a stipulation would allow the jury to speculate as to what the crime of violence was and possibly conclude that it was "something maybe even worse than robbery [with a] deadly weapon[.]" Ultimately, the trial court permitted the State to introduce redacted docket entries, showing a conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon, but eliminating any mention of a handgun.
As part of its instructions to the jury, the trial court explained:
You have heard evidence that the Defendant has been convicted of a crime. You may consider this evidence in determining the guilt[] or innocence of the Defendant with respect to the crime charged of possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence. However, you may not consider this evidence in determining the Defendant's guilt[] or innocence of the crime of possession of a regulated firearm by a person who is under 21 years of age or of the crime of discharging a firearm within the City of Baltimore.
Appellant took no exception to this instruction at trial. Except to the extent that it refers to his prior crime, appellant does not challenge the validity of this instruction on appeal.2 After the jury convicted appellant of all three crimes, he filed this appeal.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce and disclose to the jury evidence of his prior conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon. He asserts that "[o]nce the defense indicated that it was willing to stipulate to the existence of that conviction, the State had no legitimate need for the evidence." According to appellant, the trial court also erred in declining to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice it presented to appellant. Even if the trial court did exercise its discretion, appellant contends, its refusal to exclude evidence of the prior conviction constituted an abuse of that discretion because, "[g]iven the defense counsel's willingness to concede the existence of the prior conviction, it was simply unnecessary to apprise the jury of this prejudicial element."
The State counters that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence and providing a limiting instruction to the jury. The State also points out that appellant "never explained to the trial court, nor does he explain on appeal, how the jury could convict him of a crime where the evidence of one element of that crime (whether stipulated to or proven by docket entry submitted to the court) was not presented to the jury."
Maryland courts never before have considered whether a trial court errs when it refuses to permit a defendant to withhold evidence from the jury by conceding a prior conviction that is an element of the crime charged. In State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 559-60, 677 A.2d 602 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that when parties stipulate to a fact to be disclosed to a jury, the question of whether a particular piece of evidence also may be offered to prove the stipulated fact is committed to the discretion of the trial court, which must balance the competing interests of the parties. In Broberg, a homicide case, the parties stipulated to the identity of the victim, and...
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