Carter v. State
| Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 54, 55, 56, Sept. Term, 2017,54, 55, 56, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Citation | 192 A.3d 695,461 Md. 295 |
| Parties | Daniel CARTER v. STATE of Maryland James E. Bowie v. State of Maryland Matthew Timothy McCullough v. State of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued By Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents.
Amicus Curiae for Juvenile Law Center; Juvenile Sentencing Project, Legal Clinic, Quinnipiac University School of Law; and The Sentencing Project: Booth Ripke, Esquire, Nathans & Biddle LLP, 120 E. Baltimore Street, Suite 1800, Baltimore, MD 21202, Marsha L. Levick, Esquire, Juvenile Law Center, 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19107.
Amicus Curiae for Present and Former Juvenile Lifers: Renée M. Hutchins, Esquire, Michael Pinard, Esquire, University of Maryland Carey School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore Street, Suite 360, Baltimore, MD 21201-1786.
Amicus Curiae for University of Baltimore Juvenile Justice Project: Lila N. Meadows, Esquire, Jane C. Murphy, Esquire, Juvenile Justice Project, University of Baltimore School of Law, 1420 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21201.
Amicus Curiae for Criminal Justice Clinic at American University's Washington College of Law: Binny Miller, Esquire, American University, Washington College of Law, 4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW, Suite 265, Washington, DC 20016.
Amicus Curiae for Calvin McNeill, Nathaniel Foster, Kenneth Tucker, Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative and ACLU of Maryland: Sonia Kumar, Esquire, Deborah Jeon, Esquire, ACLU of Maryland, 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350, Baltimore, MD 21211.
Argued By Robert Taylor, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued Before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.
It has been said that "mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution; justice without mercy is cruelty."1 A sentence of life in prison without parole may be just for certain adult offenders, but the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments precludes that sentence for a juvenile offender unless the defendant is an incorrigible murderer. Although there need not be a guarantee of release on parole, a sentence imposed on a juvenile offender must provide "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."2
In this opinion, we consider three cases involving crimes that were committed when each Petitioner was a juvenile.3 None of the sentences imposed in these cases was explicitly "life without parole." In two cases, the Petitioners were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In the third case, the Petitioner was sentenced to 100 years incarceration and will not be eligible for parole until he has served approximately 50 years in custody. Each Petitioner asserts that he is effectively serving a sentence of life without parole, because the laws governing parole in Maryland do not provide him with a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." They have each filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
With respect to the two Petitioners serving life sentences, we hold that their sentences are legal as the laws governing parole of inmates serving life sentences in Maryland, including the parole statute, regulations, and a recent executive order adopted by the Governor, on their face allow a juvenile offender serving a life sentence a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."4 We express no opinion as to whether those laws have been, or will be, carried out legally, as that issue is not before us and may be litigated in the future. With respect to the Petitioner who is serving a 100-year sentence, we hold that the sentence is effectively a sentence of life without parole violative of the Eighth Amendment and that the Petitioner is entitled to be re-sentenced to a legal sentence.5
As a predicate to explaining our decisions in these case, we first outline the constitutional limits on the punishment of juveniles recognized in recent Supreme Court decisions, then summarize the laws governing parole and executive clemency in Maryland, and finally describe the facts and procedural histories of the three cases before us.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." That prohibition applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962). The Maryland Constitution contains similar proscriptions. See Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 16 (), Article 25 ().6
During the past 15 years, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions in which it held that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution places limits on the sentencing of juvenile offenders that do not apply to the sentencing of adult offenders. In particular, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty and severely restricts the imposition of a sentence of life without parole.
Juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to the death penalty ( Roper v. Simmons )
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibits the imposition of the death penalty against a defendant who committed the offense as a juvenile – i.e. , when the defendant was less than 18 years old. Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).
In its opinion, the Court first identified a developing consensus among the states that suggested that "the evolving standards of decency" were against the imposition of the death penalty when the offender was under the age of 18. 543 U.S. at 561, 564-75, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The Court found the basis for this consensus in well accepted differences between juveniles and adults. It stated that the death penalty is reserved for the worst offenders, and that several characteristics of juveniles make it difficult to reliably say whether a juvenile offender belongs in that category.
The Court identified the following characteristics of juveniles: (1) juveniles lack maturity, leading to "an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," as well as "impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions"; (2) juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and peer pressure due, in part, to juveniles having less control over their environment or freedom "to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting"; (3) the personality of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult, and their traits are more transitory and less fixed. 543 U.S. at 569-70, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In light of these characteristics, the usual sentencing justifications for the death penalty – retribution and deterrence – did not provide adequate justification for imposing the death penalty against juvenile offenders. Id. at 571-72, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
The Court concluded that the differences between juveniles and adults "are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability." The confluence of these factors led the Supreme Court to adopt a categorical prohibition against the imposition of the death penalty against juvenile offenders. 543 U.S. at 572-73, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
Juvenile non-homicide offenders may not be sentenced to life without parole ( Graham v. Florida )
Five years later, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Roper to overturn the sentence of a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.7 Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). In contrast to its decision in Roper , the Court did not conclude that this punishment was unconstitutional for all juvenile offenders. Rather, the Court drew a distinction between juveniles convicted of homicide and those who had been convicted of other offenses, and held that a sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
The Court first considered whether there were "indicia of a national consensus" on the subject. After reviewing various statistics on state laws concerning juvenile sentencing and actual practice, the Court concluded that "life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual." 560 U.S. at 66, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Court then considered whether the challenged practice serves legitimate penological goals. The Court reiterated its analysis in Roper that juveniles have "lessened culpability" in comparison to adults. It also distinguished between homicide and non-homicide offenders, recognizing that "defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious form of punishment than are murderers." Id. at 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Accordingly, "when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability." Id. The Court also noted that life without parole is an "especially harsh" sentence for a juvenile defendant as it condemns the juvenile to a larger percentage of the individual's life in prison than a much older individual who receives the same sentence. Id. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
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...places limits on the sentencing of juvenile offenders that do not apply to the sentencing of adult offenders." Carter v. State , 461 Md. 295, 308, 192 A.3d 695 (2018). These cases, although distinguishable from this case, form the basis for the issues presented by appellant.In Roper v. Simm......
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