Carter v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 6:20-cv-04020-DCC |
| Parties | Rondell Carter, Petitioner, v. Warden of Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Petitioner proceeding pro se, is seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF Nos. 1, 7. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Return and Memorandum on February 19, 2021. ECF Nos. 15, 16. Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 19, 21.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald for pretrial proceedings and a Report and Recommendation ("Report"). On March 24, 2021, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. ECF No. 22. Petitioner filed objections to the Report on August 21, 2018; Respondent filed a Reply and Petitioner filed Reply and a Supplement. ECF Nos. 24, 26 27, 28.
Petitioner was indicted on charges of burglary in the first degree, two counts of kidnapping, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, two counts of armed robbery, and assault and battery with intent to kill in the Georgetown County Court of General Sessions. App. 447-56, 334-35. Petitioner's trial began on June 27, 2011, and he was represented by James R. Felts (“trial counsel”) and Gerald E. Harmon. App. 1. Petitioner was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of five years for the possession of a firearm offense and life imprisonment for the assault and battery with intent to kill, first degree burglary, kidnapping, and armed robbery offenses. App. 334-50.
Petitioner appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. App. 352. Petitioner was represented in his direct appeal by Robert M. Pachak (“appellate counsel”). Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conviction. State v. Carter, No. 2013-UP-157, 2013 WL 8507865, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2013).
Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas on July 18, 2013. App. 361. A hearing was held on the application on February 5, 2015. App. 373-98. By order dated April 27, 2015, the PCR court denied Petitioner's PCR application. App. 399-409. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal.
Petitioner filed his second PCR application on January 6, 2016. App. 410-17. A hearing was held on May 23, 2017. App. 426-37. On August 15, 2017, the second PCR court granted Petitioner's second PCR application in part pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), allowing Petitioner to file an appeal of his first PCR application. App. 438-46. The remainder of his second PCR application was denied. Id.
Petitioner's counsel filed a Johnson[1] petition appealing the PCR court's order by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina and a request to withdraw as counsel. ECF No. 15-2. The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied the petition on September 22, 2020.[2] ECF No. 15-5. Petitioner filed this action on November 13, 2020.[3] ECF No. 1.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) .
Petitioner's claims are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his petition cannot be granted unless the claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). Importantly, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct, ” and Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Petitioner raised three grounds in his Petition, and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. The Magistrate Judge provided a thorough recitation of the procedural history and the relevant law, including the summary judgment standard and the habeas corpus standard of review, which the Court incorporates into this Order by reference.[4] As all of Petitioner's grounds raise issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and appellate counsel, the Court will begin with a brief discussion of the relevant law.
To be entitled to relief on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must show that (1) trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's error, the result of that proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 687-94 (1984). Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a “‘reasonably competent attorney.'” Id. at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970)). There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case. Id. at 690.
The review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in federal habeas is not simply a new review of the merits; rather, habeas review is centered upon whether the state court decision was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, each step in the review process requires deference-deference to counsel and deference to the state court that previously reviewed counsel's actions:
Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential, ” and when the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of “‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'” 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). Although Strickland involved a claim concerning the alleged ineffective assistance of the defendant's trial counsel, the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, as well as the Strickland standard for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, was extended to appellate proceedings in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). Effective assistance of appellate counsel does not require the presentation of all issues on appeal that may have merit, and “we must accord appellate counsel the presumption that he decided which issues were most likely to afford relief on appeal.” Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 164 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986), cited with approval by Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288.
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that evidence was erroneously admitted when there was an issue with the chain of custody. ECF No. 7 at 5. At trial, trial counsel made a motion in limine requesting that certain evidence be suppressed because there was no record custodian and there was “no way to know where it came from.” App. 60. The State argued that the evidence was not fungible and that it was going to be authenticated by an evidence custodian. App. 60-61. The trial court denied the motion but stated that trial counsel could raise the issue again if the State sought to introduce the evidence and did not lay a proper...
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