Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger

• Decision Date: 19 May 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. S14A0273,S14X0274.,s. S14A0273
• Citation: Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger, 295 Ga. 195, 758 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. 2014)
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: CARTERSVILLE RANCH, LLC v. James R. DELLINGER, JR., et al.

295 Ga. 195

758 S.E.2d 781

CARTERSVILLE RANCH, LLC

v.James R. DELLINGER, JR., et al.

Nos. S14A0273, S14X0274.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 19, 2014.

Brandon Lowell Bowen, Frank Edward Jenkins, III, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C., Cartersville, Lee Charles Davis, W. Henry Parkman, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Atlanta, for appellant.

William A. Neel, Jr., Neel Law Firm, Cartersville, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal and cross-appeal involve a dispute over the legal ownership of mineral rights to land located in Bartow County, Georgia. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that appellee, James R. Dellinger, Jr. (Dellinger) held a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights and granted summary judgment in his favor on claims filed by appellant, Cartersville Ranch, LLC (Cartersville Ranch). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision in the main appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.

“On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.” Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 469, 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013) (quoting Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 717–718(4), 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001)). So viewed, the evidence on summary judgment shows the following.

Cartersville Ranch owns the surface rights to approximately 211 acres of land in Bartow County, Georgia. Cartersville Ranch's predecessor-in-title, L.L. Cline, acquired the surface rights to this property from W.C. Satterfield pursuant to a 1918 deed in which Satterfield, as grantor, sought to convey all the property he owned in Land Lot 270 of the 5th District and 3rd Section of Bartow County to grantee, Cline, while reserving the mineral rights.¹ THE 1918 DEED IDENtifies this property as consisting of all of Land Lot 270 with the exception of a small portion of land owned by M.G. Dobbins. ² The language of the reservation of rights in the deed reads as follows:

and also excepting and reserving all ores, minerals, and mineral substances upon and in said lot of land, along with the right to mine and remove same; Provided, however, that should said first party, or his assigns, desire to make and Maintain Mud dams, dumps, ponds or ditches upon the west half of said lot 270, and in that event said party of the first part, his heirs or assigns, shall pay second party, his heirs or assigns for the land so used for dumps, and dams, ponds or ditches at the rate of thirty-five ($35.00) per acre.

W.C. Satterfield died in 1923 leaving his entire estate, including the reserved mineral rights, to his wife, Mary Cobb Satterfield. Through testamentary succession, evidenced in part by an Executor's Deed of Distribution dated April 30, 1983, the reserved mineral rights eventually passed to Dellinger as sole surviving heir of W.C. and Mary Cobb Satterfield's daughter, Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger. Along with other property, the 1983 Executor's Deed conveyed to Dellinger “the mineral interest and mining privileges in 155 acres, more or less, of Lot 270 in the 5th District and 3rd Section of Bartow County, Georgia.”

Cartersville Ranch commenced this action by filing a petition for declaratory relief against Dellinger and others ³ seeking to extinguish the reserved mineral rights by adverse possession pursuant to OCGA § 44–5–168 (the Mineral Lapse Statute) based on non-use of the rights and non-payment of taxes for the previous seven years. Dellinger answered the complaint, admitting that all the mineral rights at issue in this action had passed through testamentary succession to him and asserting that he was the exclusive owner of the mineral interests reserved under the 1918 deed.⁴ DELLINGER FURTHER asserted that he had for tax year 2011 and prior years continuously paid the taxes on these mineral interests as assessed by Bartow County.⁵

Cartersville Ranch thereafter amended its complaint to additionally argue that the reservation of mineral rights in the 1918 deed created an indefinite purchase option which violated Georgia's Rule Against Perpetuities such that the reservation clause was void ab initio. Dellinger denied the additional allegations and filed a counterclaim seeking, among other things, a declaration that he remained sole owner of the mineral rights to all the property owned by Cartersville Ranch in Land Lot 270. Dellinger moved for summary judgment on Cartersville Ranch's claims and Cartersville Ranch filed both a response and cross-motion for summary judgment in which it argued for the first time that the conveyance of the mineral rights from Dellinger's mother to Dellinger was unenforceable because the description of the mineral rights in the 1983 Executor's Deed was too vague or indefinite to be enforced. Cartersville Ranch also objected to Dellinger's affidavit filed in support of his summary judgment motion. Despite the fact that Dellinger had not yet had an opportunity to respond to Cartersville Ranch's submissions, the parties agreed to argue both motions at the previously scheduled hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court agreed to allow time for each party to submit one final response brief. Thereafter, Dellinger filed a supplemental brief with four supporting affidavits. Cartersville Ranch also filed a supplemental brief and objected to Dellinger's additional affidavits as late-filed evidence.

The trial court granted Dellinger summary judgment on Cartersville Ranch's claims and denied Cartersville Ranch's cross-motion finding that (1) the legal description in the 1918 deed was not invalid due to vagueness or indefiniteness because it was clear the parties to the deed believed the land lot to be 160 acres,⁶ (2) the proviso in the 1918 deed did not violate the rule against perpetuities because it was a penalty clause and not an option to purchase, and (3) Dellinger's interest in the property had not lapsed as he had paid taxes on the subject mineral rights for at least the past several years. Cartersville Ranch moved for reconsideration and for a ruling on its objections. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order sustaining the objections to the affidavits while denying Cartersville Ranch's motion for reconsideration, noting that it had not relied on the evidence contained in the affidavits in granting summary judgment to Dellinger. Cartersville Ranch appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to this Court and Dellinger filed a cross-appeal (S 14X0274) challenging the evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits.

1. Cartersville Ranch first challenges the trial court's finding that Dellinger had a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights reserved under the terms of the 1918 deed. Cartersville Ranch argues that because the 1983 Executor's Deed of Distribution conveyed to Dellinger the “mineral interest and mining privileges in 155 acres, more or less, of Lot 270,” while this land lot actually contains 220 acres, the deed's conveyance of the mineral rights was too indefinite to be enforced. See Strickland v. CMCR Investments, LLC, 279 Ga. 112, 114, 610 S.E.2d 71 (2005) (a description of less than all of the acreage within a specified land lot is insufficiently definite to convey any particular acreage within the land lot); Brown v. Mitchell, 225 Ga. 115, 166 S.E.2d 571 (1969).

This argument, however, misconstrues the import of the 1983 Executor's Deed which merely served as a deed of assent for the estate of Dellinger's mother. See generally OCGA § 53–8–15.⁷ Under Georgia law, Dellinger's interest in this property derived from his mother's will. See Phillips v. Phillips, 260 Ga. 265, 392 S.E.2d 523 (1990); Williams v. Williams, 236 Ga. 133, 135, 223 S.E.2d 109 (1976) (devisees have an inchoate title in realty which is perfected when the executor assents to the devise); Jimerson v. Republic Land & Inv. Co., Inc., 234 Ga.App. 417, 506 S.E.2d 920 (1998).⁸As the devisee under his mother's will, Dellinger obtained a legally protected interest in all of the property she owned at the time of her death, including the mineral rights reserved under the 1918 deed. ⁹ See Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 201–202, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976); Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga.App. 768, 773, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006). See also Johnson v. Porter, 115 Ga. 401, 403–404, 41 S.E. 644 (1902) (the taking of a deed from the executor to only part of the land devised does not affect the rights of the devisee nor estop him or her from asserting a claim to the rest of the land). Moreover, even if the 1983 Executor's Deed's conveyance of the mineral rights interest to Dellinger was ineffective, ¹⁰ Georgia law provides that title to all property of an estate remains vested in the executors for purposes of the estate's administration until its distribution. See OCGA § 53–8–15(a). Thus, both as devisee of the property under his mother's will and as a co-executor of her estate, it is evident that Dellinger has a legally enforceable interest in the reserved mineral rights.

Generally,

a defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case, but may point out by reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support any essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Nix, 274 Ga. 801, 803, 560 S.E.2d 650 (2002).

Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010). Where a defendant “discharges this burden, the nonmoving party ... must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.” Id. (quoting Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991)). See OCGA § 9–11–56(e). As Cartersville Ranch has failed to point to any evidence showing that anyone other than Dellinger obtained an interest in...