Cartmell v. Credit Control, LLC
| Decision Date | 10 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:19-cv-1626,5:19-cv-1626 |
| Parties | WILLIAM CARTMELL, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT CONTROL, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
This is an action brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), in which Plaintiff William Cartmell contends that Defendant Credit Control, LLC's attempt to collect a debt violated several provisions of that statute. As with many FDCPA cases, this case rests on the content of Credit Control's collection letter ("the Letter"), which offered Cartmell three "payment options" for repayment of the debt. Significantly, the Letter failed to notify Cartmell that repayment of any part of the debt—which at the time the Letter was sent was beyond the statute of limitations and therefore not judicially recoverable—could revive the debt and subject him to liability. Cartmell contends this omission constituted a violation of the FDCPA's prohibition on unfair and deceptive debt-collection practices.
There are currently four motions pending before the Court, each with opposition: Credit Control's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Cartmell's failure to establish standing, Cartmell's motion for class certification, and both parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Because "[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established [is] a threshold matter" that "'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception,'" Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)), Credit Control's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must be resolved before the motions for either class certification or summary judgment can be addressed.1
Having reviewed both parties' arguments, the Court concludes that Cartmell has established standing sufficient to invoke the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, for the reasons set forth below, Credit Control's motion to dismiss is denied.
The following are the relevant facts asserted in the Amended Complaint. Significantly, these facts—namely, the existence, date, and content of the Letter, as well as the nature and timeliness of the debt—are not in dispute.
Prior to April 23, 2018, Cartmell incurred a credit card debt to Credit One Bank, which was subsequently sold or transferred to LVNV Funding, LLC. Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl."), ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 14-15, 17. On or about April 23, 2018, Credit Control, LLC, a debt collector, caused to be delivered to Cartmell a collection letter in an attempt to collect on the debt. Id. ¶ 20. As of April 23, 2018, more than six years had elapsed since the last payment or activity on the LVNH Funding debt. Id. ¶ 24. The Letter offered Cartmell three "options" to pay the time-barred debt, while also stating, Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. However—and at the heart of the dispute in this case—the Letter failed to inform Cartmell that should he choose one of the payment options and make a payment, such action might revive the statute of limitations for debt-collection purposes, which could expose him to future liability on the debt. Id. ¶ 26. Based on this omission, Cartmell asserts causes of action for violations of (1) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits the use of false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt,2 as well as (2) 15 U.S.C. §1692f, which prohibits the use of any unfair or unconscionable means to collect any debt. See id. ¶¶ 35-45.
The initial Complaint in this action was filed on or about April 15, 2019. See ECF No. 1. Counsel appeared before the Court for a Rule 16 initial conference on August 6, 2019, at which time a discovery schedule was put in place. See ECF Nos. 7, 9. On August 13, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation allowing Cartmell to file an Amended Complaint, see ECF Nos. 13-14, which was accepted for filing and remains the operative pleading in the case.3
In October 2019, the Court received correspondence from counsel indicating the existence of a potential discovery dispute. After receipt of this correspondence, on October 31, 2019, the Court extended the expert discovery deadline and scheduled a telephone conference, which was held on November 4, 2019. See ECF No. 18. At the conference, the Court issued several directives intended to resolve the dispute.4 See ECF No. 21.
On December 4, 2019, the previously-set deadline for the filing of dispositive motions, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, see ECF Nos. 27, 30, in addition to a motion for class certification filed by Cartmell, see ECF No. 29, and the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by Credit Control, see ECF No. 28.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), "a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim." In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012); Lenell v. Advanced Min. Tech., Inc., No. 14-CV-01924, 2014 WL 7008609, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) . Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). "The latter, a factual challenge, attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or 'otherwise present[ing] competing facts.'" Davis, 824 F.3d at 346 (quoting Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)). When a movant presents a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the burden is on theplaintiff to show the presence of jurisdiction, and the trial court "may independently evaluate the evidence regarding disputes over jurisdictional facts, rather than assuming that the plaintiff's allegations are true." Lenell, 2014 WL 7008609, at *2 ().
The initial question, then, is whether Credit Control's challenge to jurisdiction is facial or factual, the answer to which will in turn dictate the scope of what the Court may consider in resolving the challenge—the allegations alone if the challenge is facial, or evidence beyond the pleadings if the challenge is factual. See In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243. Credit Control contends that evidence outside the pleadings negates subject matter jurisdiction. According to Credit Control, Cartmell's deposition testimony establishes that he 5 Credit Control's Moving Memorandum ("Credit Control Mem."), ECF No. 28, at 5. Cartmell responds by arguing, in essence, that because Credit Control violated a substantive right conveyed by the FDCPA—the right to be free from false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection—as opposed to a mere procedural right, the violation in and of itself is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. See, e.g., Cartmell's Opposition Memorandum ("Cartmell Opp'n."), ECF No. 34, at 6-9.
Although the key facts alleged in the operative pleading are not contested—Credit Control does not dispute the nature of the debt or the content of the Letter, or that the Letter wassent to Cartmell by Credit Control in an attempt to collect on the debt—because Credit Control asserts facts beyond the pleadings are dispositive as to jurisdiction, Credit Control's motion is properly considered a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, the Court is free to weigh evidence beyond the pleadings in its analysis.6 See CNA, 535 F.3d at 140, 145.
With an understanding of the nature and contours of Credit Control's challenge to jurisdiction, the Court briefly reviews principles of Article III standing generally before turning to a review of standing principles in the context of the FDCPA specifically.
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