Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 49501,49501
• Citation: 254 La. 330,223 So.2d 822
• Parties: Ethel B. CARTWRIGHT v. FIREMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 822

223 So.2d 822

254 La. 330

Ethel B. CARTWRIGHT v. FIREMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY.

No. 49501.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 9, 1969.

Francis E. Mire, Lake Charles, for relator.

Stockwell, St. Dizier, Sievert & Viccellio, Robert W. Clements, Lake Charles, for defendant-respondent.

HAMITER, Justice.

Ethel B. Cartwright brought this direct action against Firemen's Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, the automobile public liability insurer of Dr. Garland Kent, to recover for property damage and personal injuries allegedly suffered when Dr. Kent's automobile, while being operated by him, struck the rear of her car when she was stopped in obedience to a traffic signal. (Dr. Kent himself was not named as a defendant.) The petition recited several acts of negligence by Dr. Kent in the operation of his vehicle.

The defendant denied any negligence on the part of Dr. Kent and averred that the accident was unavoidable, it having been caused by the sudden and unexpected failure of the brakes of the Kent automobile.

Following a trial the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. La.App., 213 So.2d 154. We granted certiorari on plaintiff's application. 252 La. 956, 215 So.2d 127.

The record herein fully sustains the finding of the Court of Appeal, as set forth in its opinion, which was as follows: 'The Cartwright automobile was stopped at a stop-sign inhibiting entrance into an intersection. As Dr. Kent approached it from the rear, he slowed to a 5--10 mile per hour coast. When about one and one-half car-lengths behind, he applied his brakes more forcibly, it then being time to stop completely. Nothing happened; his foot just went to the floor. Within a second, he struck the Cartwright vehicle.

'The investigating police officer found brake fluid in the vicinity of the car, and a stream of brake fluid leading to it starting from about ten feet behind the point of impact. He tested the brakes and found they had no braking power. A mechanic who repaired the vehicle found that the left front brake line had ruptured and had released all the fluid from the brake system.

'The expert evidence is uncontradicted that the loss of brake fluid is virtually simultaneous with such a rupture, and that prior detection is very difficult of a latent defect in the brake line which will suddenly rupture after gradual stress over a period of time.

'The evidence further shows that Dr. Kent had his automobile inspected every six months for defects, that he had brake repairs about six weeks before the accident, and that he had no advance notice of the latent weakness of the brake line, nor could reasonable observation have given him any.'

The issue presented under these facts is whether an automobile owner is strictly and absolutely responsible for damages caused by a defect in his vehicle, regardless of the fact that he had no reasonable means of discovering such defect and had used every precaution to maintain the machine in a safe condition. Otherwise stated, the question is; Is the automobile owner liable, when without fault, for damages resulting from a latent defect in his vehicle?

We have considered this issue but once before, then on an application for certiorari in a case in which the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit adhered to the doctrine of no liability without fault; and it squarely held that proof that plaintiff's damages were caused by a latent defect in defendant's automobile relieved him of liability for the damages when it was shown that he used reasonable means to keep his vehicle in a safe working condition. de la Houssaye v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, La.App., 202 So.2d 287. Therein, we denied certiorari with the observation that 'On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.' 251 La. 671, 205 So.2d 440.

Prior to our discussion of the issue presented, we observe that strongly motivating our action in issuing certiorari in the instant case were certain comments contained in an especially concurring opinion of one of the judges of the Court of Appeal. Therein, that judge disapproved the rationale of and the result reached in de la Houssaye, supra, and he indicated that he would vote otherwise if a majority of the court gave approval to the views expressed in his concurring opinion. We felt that his observations tended to create uncertainty in this area of the law as stated in the de la Houssaye case, when viewed in the light of our denial of certiorari there, and that a definitive expression by this court would serve to resolve the unsettling effect.

There is little doubt that in this jurisdiction, in suits sounding in tort, there can be no recovery without fault except in those instances where strict liability is provided by legislative action. For examples, with respect to the exceptions, the absolute liability of the owner of a building is ordered when damage is occasioned because of vices in its construction (Revised Civil Code Article 2322); and the liability of the 'master' is declared for 'the damage caused * * * by whatever is thrown out of his house into the street * * *.' (Revised Civil Code Article 177.)

That such is the settled jurisprudence is recognized by plaintiff and by the author of the concurring opinion. Nevertheless, they contend that (as expressed in such opinion): 'In the light of modern traffic conditions and our crowded and urbanized society, and in the light of More recent legislation, certainly the better rule (and quite possibly the legislatively-intended rule) would be instead to apply a strict liability against owners who permit vehicles with defective brakes--highly dangerous instrumentalities, whether the defects are latent or not--to be operated on the highways and to do harm to innocent persons lawfully on or near the highway.' (Italics ours.)

The further urge that Revised Civil Code Article 2317, when read in connection with LRS 32:341 (which provides that motor vehicles when operated on a highway of this state 'shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle'), is broad enough to provide a concept or policy of liability without...