Cartwright v. United States, 1:08-cv-103 / 1:04-cr-33

• Decision Date: 01 December 2011
• Docket Number: 1:08-cv-103 / 1:04-cr-33
• Parties: RAYMOND CARTWRIGHT Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

RAYMOND CARTWRIGHT Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent.

1:08-cv-103 / 1:04-cr-33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT CHATTANOOGA

Dated: December 1, 2011

Chief Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM

On April 25, 2008, Raymond Cartwright ("Petitioner") filed a 68 page document entitled "Motion special and limited entry of appearance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255" (Court File No. 104). The Court construed this filing as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct Petitioner's sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Court File No. 109). However, because the motion was "voluminous" and "virtually indecipherable," the Court ordered Petitioner to re-file within 30 days a new § 2255 motion. Petitioner did so, and it is his amended § 2255 motion which is now before the Court ("the § 2255 motion") (Court File No. 113).

The Court did not take immediate action on Petitioner's § 2255 motion, however, because Petitioner had an appeal pending regarding the Court's earlier denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.¹ On May 24, 2010, Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was denied, thus the present motion effectively came before the Court once more. In the interim between 2008 and 2010, however, Petitioner had filed approximately 23variously-captioned supplemental pleadings, almost all of which raise substantive arguments in favor of his § 2255 motion. It appearing to the Court that many of the supplemental pleadings may be untimely raising new grounds for relief outside of the one-year limitation period imposed in § 2255 cases,² the Court ordered the Government to file a response to Petitioner's § 2255 motion and the various supplemental pleadings, insofar as those pleadings support a ground for relief that was timely raised. The Court further instructed the Government to identify any claims in the supplemental pleadings which are untimely. On November 24, 2010, the Government filed its response (Court File No. 164). On December 29, 2010, Petitioner filed his reply (Court File No. 169).

For the reasons which follow, the Court determines none of Petitioner's myriad claims are meritorious. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Petitioner's amended § 2255 motion (Court File No. 113), as well as the various supplemental pleadings (Court File Nos. 104, 115-125, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 143-145, 147, 150, 152, & 153).

I. RELEVANT FACTS

At trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The underlying facts supporting Petitioner's conviction are taken from the summary provided in the Sixth Circuit's opinion affirming Petitioner's conviction:

On October 25, 2003, Detective Kevin White of the Bradley County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office") observed Appellant Raymond Cartwright, Jr. driving a red Mercury Cougar. Detective White attempted to stop Appellant's vehicle because he knew that Appellant was driving on a revoked license and that there was an outstanding warrant for Appellant's arrest. Although Appellant managed to evade Detective White by driving at a high rate of speed, the detective and other members of the Sheriff's Office later stopped and arrested Appellant, who at the time was a passenger in a red Jeep Cherokee. When Sergeant Tom Wasson searched Appellant, he found a .22 caliber round on Appellant's person.

On January 27, 2004, Detective White stopped the same red Mercury Cougar after he observed it twice cross the center line. Earlier that day, a man had approached Detective David Shoemaker and Detective White, and the man told the two detectives that Appellant had approached him and had attempted to sell him a shotgun. When the car was stopped, Appellant was riding in the front passenger seat. Detective White found several 12-gauge shotgun shells, one next to the driver's seat and the rest in the armrest console of the car. At that time, Appellant told Detective Shoemaker (1) that the shells belonged to Chris Phillips, (2) that the shells were in his car because Phillips had given Appellant a 12-gauge Ithaca shotgun to sell for him, and (3) that Appellant no longer had the gun because he had given it back to Phillips. Officer Maskew later recovered an Ithaca pump 12-gauge shotgun based on information he received from Appellant. . . .

[At trial,] Detective Shoemaker testified that Appellant had confessed to him regarding the January 2004 incident that (1) the shotgun shells belonged to Chris Phillips, (2) the shells were in his car because Phillips had given Appellant a 12-gauge Ithaca shotgun to sell for him, and (3) Appellant no longer had the gun because he had given it back to Phillips. James Raby testified that in January of 2004, Appellant tried to sell him an Ithaca pump shotgun. Raby also testified that although he never saw the shotgun because he told Appellant that he was not interested in buying it, Appellant claimed he had the shotgun in the trunk of his car when he offered to sell it to Raby.

Appellant presented only one witness, his brother Scott Cartwright. Cartwright testified that Appellant gave him the red Mercury Cougar about two months prior to the October 25, 2003 incident. Although Cartwright claimed that he owned the car, he admitted that he let Appellant drive it. Cartwright also testified that the shell involved in the October 2003 incident was his and that his father had given him the shell before he died. However, Cartwright testified that he did not know anything about the shells involved in the January 2004 incident.

On May 4, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts 1 and 2, and it returned a verdict of not guilty on Counts 3 and 4. On May 10, 2005, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial and a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal.

Appellant claimed that his motions should be granted on the basis of insufficient evidence and the verdict being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of his claim, Appellant noted that the red Cougar belonged to his brother Scott Cartwright; that based on the testimony at trial, there was no proof that Appellant knowingly possessed the shells; that Raby testified that he never saw a shotgun; that no other witness testified that he saw Appellant in the possession of a shotgun; and that there was a lack of evidence tying Appellant to a shotgun.

On July 28, 2005, the district court denied these motions. The district court first considered the motion for judgment of acquittal. The court noted that Detective Shoemaker testified that Appellant confessed that he had been trying to sell a shotgun for Phillips and that Appellant knew the shells were in the car, as they had come from his attempts to make the sale. The district court further stated that Appellant's confession was consistent with Raby's testimony that Appellant had tried to sell him a shotgun and had told him the gun was in the trunk of the Cougar. The district court also pointed out that Appellant's only witness did not offer any testimony about the January 2004 incident. Accordingly, the court held that "there was ample evidence upon which the jury could have based its finding [that Appellant] knowingly possessed the shotgun shells." J.A. at 42. The district court reiterated its discussion of Raby's and Detective Shoemaker's testimony in holding that "there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction on Count 2" also. J.A. at 42. Finally, the district court denied the motion for a new trial on the grounds that "there was ample evidence upon which the jury could have based its verdict," again referring to Appellant's confession to Detective Shoemaker and the testimony of other witnesses. J.A. at 44.

United States v. Cartwright, 221 F. App'x 438, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2007).

At sentencing, the Court found Petitioner's prior convictions rendered him an Armed Career Criminal under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. On December 1, 2005, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 288 months, with five years' supervised release (Court File No. 79).

Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising only one issue: sufficiency of the evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling. See Cartwright, 221 F. App'x at 442. Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied. Petitioner also filed a "Motion Pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) Newly Discovered Evidence" (Court File No. 107), whichthe Court denied (Court File No. 109). Petitioner appealed this ruling, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court (see Court File No. 140). Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied. See Cartwright, v. United States, No. 09-10364, 2010 WL 1654883 (U.S. May 24, 2010).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code permits a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court to move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, correct, or set aside the sentence, on the grounds:

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Petitioner has the burden of establishing any claim asserted in the petition. See Bowers v. Battles, 568 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1977); Mayes v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Tenn. 2000). It is a "well-settled principle that to obtain collateral review relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982)).

Where a constitutional error is alleged in order to...