Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Bd. of School Trustees

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MILLER
• Citation: Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 586 N.E.2d 1273, 146 Ill.2d 347, 167 Ill.Dec. 1 (Ill. 1992)
• Decision Date: 30 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 71022,71022
• Parties: , 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 967 Paul L. CARVER et al., Appellants, v. BOND/FAYETTE/EFFINGHAM REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES et al., Appellees.

Page 1273

586 N.E.2d 1273

146 Ill.2d 347, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 72

Ed. Law Rep. 967

Paul L. CARVER et al., Appellants, v. BOND/FAYETTE/EFFINGHAM REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES et al., Appellees.

No. 71022.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 30, 1992.

Patrick J. Hitpas, John Hudspeth, Carlyle, for appellants.

Don Sheafor, State's Atty., Vandalia, for appellee Regional Board of School Trustees for Bond, Fayette and Effingham Counties.

David L. Miller, Corbell & Miller, Ltd., Vandalia, Everett E. Nicholson, Jr., and Merry C. Rhoades, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., Chicago, for appellees Mulberry Grove Community Unit School Dist. No. 1.

Chief Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 1988, petitioners Paul and Christine Carver, and James and Maxine Barth, sought to detach their property from Mulberry Grove Community Unit School District No. 1 and to annex it to Carlyle Community Unit School District No. 1. Pursuant to the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 7-2 et seq.), they filed a joint petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees of Bond, Fayette and Effingham Counties (the Mulberry Board) and with the Regional Board of School Trustees for Clinton and Washington Counties (the Carlyle Board). Following a hearing conducted before both groups of regional trustees, members of the Mulberry Board voted 4-3 against the proposed detachment and annexation. The Carlyle Board separately voted 4-0 in favor of such action.

Within 30 days of the joint hearing, the regional school superintendent of Bond, Fayette and Effingham Counties entered an order denying the request for a boundary change. Petitioners then sought judicial review in the circuit court of Bond County. The trial judge upheld the administrative decision. The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. (203 Ill.App.3d 799, 148 Ill.Dec. 829, 561 N.E.2d 135.) We granted the petitioners' appeal under Supreme Court Rule 315 (134 Ill.2d R. 315), to address two issues:

(1) whether the School Code requires regional boards of trustees to vote as a single body on petitions for detachment and annexation; and

(2) whether the regional superintendent's order denying the petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at the joint hearing.

Petitioners first claim that the regional boards failed to follow proper statutory procedures. They argue that sections 7-2 and 7-6 of the School Code, when read together, require the regional boards of all affected school districts to vote as a single body on petitions for detachment and annexation. Petitioners thus maintain that the regional superintendent erred when he entered a unilateral order denying their petition because the cumulative vote of the members of both boards was 7-4 in favor of the proposed boundary change.

The relevant portions of sections 7-2 and 7-6 of the School Code are as follows:

"Boundaries of existing school districts lying within two or more counties may be changed by detachment, annexation, division, dissolution or any combination thereof by the concurrent action of, taken following a joint hearing before, the regional boards of school trustees of each region affected." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 7-2.

"Within 10 days after the conclusion of a joint hearing required under the provisions of Section 7-2, each regional board of school trustees shall meet together and render a decision with regard to the joint hearing on the petition. If the regional boards of school trustees fail to enter a joint order either granting or denying the petition, the regional superintendent of schools for the educational service region in which the joint hearing is held shall enter an order denying the petition * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 7-6.

The phrase "concurrent action" is not defined in the School Code. In Rayfield v. People ex rel. McElvain (1893), 144 Ill. 332, 33 N.E. 188, however, this court held that statutory language requiring the formation of a new school district "by the concurrent action of the several boards of trustees" did not mean by the joint action of the boards. (Rayfield, 144 Ill. at 335-36, 33 N.E. 188 (construing section 51 of the revised School Law of 1889); see also People ex rel. Scott v. Nelson (1911), 252 Ill. 514, 517, 96 N.E. 1071 (recognizing propriety of separate votes by two township boards under another predecessor school district statute requiring concurrent action).) Thus, concurrent action means "the independent action of each board separately, each agreeing to such change [in school district boundaries]." (Heppe v. Mooberry (1932), 350 Ill. 641, 647, 183 N.E. 636.) The principle that "concurrent action" does not mean "joint action" has long been followed by our appellate court. See, e.g., Konald v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 220 (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 512, 520, 69 Ill.Dec. 837, 448 N.E.2d 555; Harris v. Regional Board of School Trustees (1980), 82 Ill.App.3d 710, 712, 38 Ill.Dec. 18, 403 N.E.2d 33; In re Matter of the Detachment of Territory from Bloom Township High School District Number 206 (1965), 59 Ill.App.2d 415, 430, 207 N.E.2d 694; People ex rel. Chamberlin v. Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 (1943), 319 Ill.App. 370, 378, 49 N.E.2d 666.

Petitioners argue, however, that these cases are not dispositive because they were decided when detachment and annexation proceedings were conducted in a bifurcated manner. In the past, the regional board of the area subject to detachment conducted a hearing on the petition; the board considering annexation later voted--independently--on the basis of a transcript. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 122, par. 7-1 et seq.) In 1988, the legislature amended the School Code to provide for joint hearings. (Pub.Act 85-260, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.) Petitioners maintain that this change evidences the legislature's intent to alter the meaning of "concurrent action."

We begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language, which is the best indication of legislative intent. (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 350, 167 N.E.2d 169.) As amended, section 7-2 refers to "concurrent action" and "joint hearing." Section 7-6 mentions "joint hearing" and "joint order." Nowhere does the School Code expressly provide for a "joint vote." Nevertheless, petitioners argue that the words "meet together," "joint order" and "a decision" in section 7-6 imply a single vote, with the results tabulated together.

If "each regional board" is to render a decision, however, two decisions necessarily result. Moreover, had the legislature intended to equate "concurrent" and "joint," it would not have used two different words. When the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended. (Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill.2d 69, 100, 199 N.E.2d 769.) Further, this court presumes that the legislature knew of the prior interpretation placed on its language by judicial decision. (Illinois Power Co. v. City of Jacksonville (1960), 18 Ill.2d 618, 622, 165 N.E.2d 300.) Where terms used in a statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments, they are to be understood as previously interpreted by the courts unless the legislature clearly indicates a contrary intention. People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank (1935), 361 Ill. 75, 78-79, 197 N.E. 537.

This court has recognized a difference between "concurrent" and "joint" action by school trustees for nearly a century. In the absence of statutory change, we may assume that the legislature has no quarrel with our interpretation of these terms. (See Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n (1962), 26 Ill.2d 32, 46-47, 185 N.E.2d 877.) If the legislature had been dissatisfied with our prior interpretation of "concurrent action," it could have effected a change in the law by amending the statute. (People v. Singleton (1984), 103 Ill.2d 339, 343-44, 82 Ill.Dec. 666, 469 N.E.2d 200.) We will not, under the guise of "statutory construction," read into the statute a substantive change the legislature did not see fit to make. People v. Hare (1988), 119 Ill.2d 441, 447, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879.

Our interpretation of the statute is strengthened by a closer look at section 7-6, which requires the superintendent to deny the petition if the boards fail to enter a joint order. As the appellate court observed, this provision would be meaningless if the legislature intended the boards to vote together. (203 Ill.App.3d at 803, 148 Ill.Dec. 829, 561 N.E.2d 135.) Petitioners argue that this language describes the procedure to be taken in case of a tie vote. This construction, however, ignores the fact that a tie would result in a denial of the petition, thereby rendering any decision by the regional superintendent superfluous. Moreover, under the petitioners' view, when detachment and annexation is sought from one region to two or more regions, annexing regions could pool their votes, guaranteeing approval of the petition and leaving the detaching region with no voice in the matter.

Thus, we are not persuaded that anything in section 7-6 implicitly alters the requirements of "concurrent action" in section 7-2. We therefore hold that the regional school boards did not err in voting separately and rendering independent decisions on the petition. Their actions, as well as the regional superintendent's denial of the petition after the divided vote, complied with the procedural requirements of the School Code.

Petitioners next argue that the decision of the regional boards was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented at the joint hearing. In support of this argument, they maintain that the trial judge, in affirming the administrative decision, improperly considered de minimis financial...