Carver v. KNOX COUNTY, TENN., Civ. 3-86-299.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 3-86-299.,Civ. 3-86-299.
• Citation: 753 F. Supp. 1398
• Parties: Wayne Dillard CARVER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

753 F. Supp. 1398

Wayne Dillard CARVER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 3-86-299.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, N.D.

March 19, 1990.

John E. Eldridge and Dean Rivkin, University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Richard T. Beeler, Knox County Law Director, Robert H. Watson, Sr., John Duffey, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants.

David Himmelreich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for third-party defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JARVIS, District Judge.

On October 6, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a memorandum opinion which ordered this court to undertake the following:

(1) Sever the claims against the state defendants and transfer them to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee where they will be assigned to District Judge Thomas A. Higgins;¹ and

(2) Redetermine the claims against the county defendants under proper standards and without the unsupported conclusion that the presence of TDOC-sentenced inmates was the proximate cause of the constitutional violations previously found by this court.

Carver v. Knox County, Tennessee, 887 F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir.1989). The Sixth Circuit subsequently "clarified" its memorandum opinion on November 21, 1989, see id. at 1294-95, in which it reiterated that this court's "findings of historical facts, as distinguished from its conclusions respecting these facts, were not clearly erroneous." Id. at 1294 (emphasis in original).

In reversing this court as to its conclusions of law, the Sixth Circuit initially stated on October 6, 1989, inter alia:

Finally, though it referenced particular conditions in specified locations, the district court appeared to base many of its conclusions of law finding constitutional violations on a "totality of the circumstances" approach, particularly in light of its conclusion that the presence of TDOC-sentenced inmates was the "proximate cause" of the violations it found. This court has rejected a "totality of the circumstances" approach to deciding Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1985); Groseclose v. Dutton, 829 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.1987). That approach likewise is not permitted in dealing with Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees.

Id. at 1293-94. The Sixth Circuit subsequently observed on November 21, 1989:

This court reasoned that the district court's conclusion that impermissible or unconstitutional conditions existed in the Knox County facilities as a direct result of the presence of TDOC-sentenced prisoners was erroneous because the district court appeared to base its conclusion at least in part on the assumption that overcrowding in a penal institution, in and of itself, creates a constitutional violation. The law is to the contrary. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2398-99, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The district court's erroneous assumption appears to have led to the unsupportable conclusion that the presence of TDOC-sentenced prisoners in the Knox County facilities was the proximate cause of the unconstitutional conditions it found to exist.

Id. at 1294 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Sixth Circuit ordered a remand that:

... requires the district court to re-examine its conclusions by applying the correct legal analysis. It should first analyze local conditions in terms of food, ventilation, condition of cells and holding areas, medical care, acts of violence, sanitation, ratio of guards to inmates, and eating arrangements, and other similar practices and circumstances and then fashion a remedy for the "uniquely local" practices and circumstances causing any unconstitutional violations found to exist. To the extent that the presence of TDOC-sentenced prisoners may be found to contribute to unconstitutional conditions, however, the district court may not order a remedy that requires removal of such prisoners from the Knox County facilities. Instead, the district court is to transfer that portion of the case to the Middle District of Tennessee.

Id.. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that it has already accomplished precisely what the Sixth Circuit now orders on remand, and this court, like the Sixth Circuit undertook to do on November 21, 1989, makes the following observations in order to remove any doubts about the meaning of this court's opinion of January 25, 1989, 753 F.Supp. 1370 see Doc. 132 in this important case.

1. With regard to the Sixth Circuit's finding that this court "appeared to base many of its conclusions of law finding constitutional violations on a `totality of the circumstances' approach", see id. at 1294 (emphasis added), this court previously stated as follows:

Finally, in evaluating the convicted inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, the court is mindful that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently rejected the "totality of the circumstances" test. Groseclose v. Dutton, 829 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.1987); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925-26 (6th Cir.1985). In other words, even though this court is required to consider all of the prison's conditions and circumstances in evaluating the sentenced inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, the court must find a specific condition on which to base an Eighth Amendment claim, i.e., it must amount to a deprivation of "life's necessities." Walker, 771 F.2d at 925 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399).

See 753 F.Supp. at 1385-86. Thus, as the above language indicates, this court neither intended to use, nor did it in fact use, the "totality of the circumstances" test.² Rather, this court was acutely aware that it "must find a specific condition on which to base an Eighth Amendment claim ..." see 753 F.Supp. at 1386 (emphasis added). However, this court was also required to examine all of the prison's conditions at the same time that it examined specific conditions. As the Sixth Circuit recently stated:

Subsequent to Rhodes, this circuit has interpreted its language as requiring an examination of "all the prison's conditions and circumstances, rather than isolated conditions and events, when addressing eighth amendment claims." Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir.1985). Moreover, "in certain extreme circumstances the totality itself may amount to an eighth amendment violation, but there still must exist a specific condition on which to base the eighth amendment claim." Id.

Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 864 (6th Cir.1990). Furthermore, although not specifically stated in the opinion, this court did not employ the "totality of the circumstances" approach in dealing with Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees. In conformity with the applicable law, this court did note that "... conditions and practices in a given institution which would constitute impermissible punishment of convicted prisoners under the less scrutinizing Eighth Amendment would likewise be unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees." (citations omitted) See 753 F.Supp. at 1386. Because this court did, in fact, find constitutional violations under the Eighth Amendment, it likewise was compelled to find those same constitutional violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, this court analyzed the facts under what it then believed to have been the correct legal standard and will do so again.

2. With regard to the Sixth Circuit's finding that this court "appeared to base its conclusion at least in part on the assumption that overcrowding in a penal institution, in and of itself, creates a constitutional violation," see Carver, 887 F.2d at 1293 (emphasis added), this court utilized the following legal standard on the issue of overcrowding:

In Bell v. Wolfish³, the Supreme Court recognized that "confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the due process clause as to whether these conditions amounted to punishment ..." 441 U.S. at 542 99 S.Ct. at 1875-76. The constitutional standard on overcrowding cannot be expressed in a square footage formula. Rather, whether a particular institution is unconstitutionally overcrowded depends on a number of factors including the size of the inmate's living space, the length of time the inmate spends in his cell each day, the length of time of his incarceration, his opportunity for exercise and his general sanitary and living conditions. Id. at 543 99 S.Ct. at 1876; Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F.Supp. 1252 at 1295 (S.D.W.Va.1981). In this regard, the Supreme Court has emphasized the length of confinement under allegedly deplorable conditions as being relevant to the analysis of an Eighth Amendment claim. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979), the Supreme Court noted:

It is equally plain, however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of "grue" might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.

Id., 437 U.S. at 686-87, 98 S.Ct. at 2571.

753 F.Supp. at 1386-87. The legal standard employed by this court, therefore, recognizes that the issue in question is not overcrowding per se — rather, it is unconstitutional overcrowding. In other words, this court recognizes that a prison facility is not unconstitutional simply because it is overcrowded. In order to ascertain whether a...