Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers

• Decision Date: 21 June 1954
• Citation: 196 Va. 1,82 S.E.2d 588
• Parties: HOWARD H. CARWILE v. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 588

82 S.E.2d 588

196 Va. 1

HOWARD H. CARWILE v. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

June 21, 1954.

Howard H. Carwile, the plaintiff in error.

Blake, Taylor & Hazen, for the defendant in error.

JUDGE: SMITH

SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action for libel brought by Howard H. Carwile, a practicing attorney at law in the city of Richmond, Virginia, referred to as plaintiff, against Richmond Newspapers Incorporated, referred to as defendant. The motion for judgment contains two counts, one of libel at common law and the other of insulting words under Code, § 8-630. ¹ After filing its grounds of defense, the defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment, which motion the trial court sustained and entered final judgment in favor of the defendant, to which judgment we granted this writ of error.

The question presented for our decision is whether this action of the trial court in sustaining the motion and entering final judgment is correct.

In the spring of 1952, plaintiff delivered several radio addresses, publicly charging that graft, corruption and bribery existed in the Richmond City Police Department, at which time he demanded a grand jury investigation of the charges. A grand jury was impanelled and heard the testimony of witnesses concerning these charges and on July 2, 1952, filed a written report thereon, but it failed to return an indictment. On the following morning the defendant published on the front page of its newspaper, Richmond Times-Dispatch, a newspaper which has an extensive circulation in the city of Richmond and throughout the state of Virginia, the following alleged defamatory language:

'Richard R. Foster, Director of Public Safety, and Police Chief C. D. Garton said they were 'very much pleased' with the report and saw it as a complete vindication of the Police Force.

'The two city officials evaded a direct answer to an inquiry as to whether they were considering a recommendation to the District Committee of the Virginia State Bar to take action against Carwile for his conduct in leveling the charges which cast a shadow across the entire Police Department.

'Safety Director Foster, who also spoke for Garton, said 'I neither will nor will not state at this time whether I will take action against Carwile.'

'Under the State Code, the State Bar as an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Appeals may request a court of competent jurisdiction to disbar an attorney for violation of the ethical code governing the professional conduct of attorneys.'

The motion for judgment charges that an editorial appearing in the same issue of the same paper is libelous. However, plaintiff admitted at the bar of this court that it was not in fact libelous and therefore no further reference will be made to it, except to say that the trial court should require the plaintiff to delete from his motion for judgment the phrase describing the editorial as 'a malicious lie.' This language is improper and its use in pleadings should not be permitted.

The motion for judgment is lengthy and verbose, but briefly, it alleges that the plaintiff is a citizen of Virginia of good character and a competent, ethical attorney at law who enjoys a good reputation in the city of Richmond and among the members of his profession; that the defendant knowing of plaintiff's good character and good professional reputation, did maliciously compose, publish and circulate the above words and statements which from their usual construction and common acceptation are construed as insults and tend to violence and a breach of the peace, and were meant and intended to convey the impression that the plaintiff was guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be subjected to a disbarment proceeding. The motion further alleges that the statements and words published by the defendant were untrue and were maliciously published and intended to injure the plaintiff's good name and professional integrity and prestige; that at the time of the publication no official action had been taken against the plaintiff or was contemplated by the District Committee of the Virginia State Bar; that no recommendations to the District Committee of the Virginia State Bar had been made by anyone leading to action against him, and that no public official had publicly declared his intentions of bringing any charges against him.

In its grounds of defense the defendant admits the publication, but denies that it is libelous. The grounds of defense further state that the publication was made without malice and was not meant or intended to defame the plaintiff or to convey the meaning that he was guilty of unethical or unprofessional conduct, and that it was privileged.

The motion for summary judgment, which was filed under Rule 3:20, ² asserts that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute between the parties because: (1) the words published by the defendant were not in themselves libelous and do not tend to violence and breach of the peace, (2) the words published are not susceptible of the meaning and innuendo attributed to them by the plaintiff and are not reasonably understood in any defamatory sense.

Rule 3:20 was adopted to provide trial courts with authority to bring litigation to an end at an early stage, when it clearly appears that one of the parties is entitled to judgment within the framework of the case as made out by the pleadings, the pretrial conference, and the admissions in depositions. Its purpose is to expedite litigation with as few technicalities as possible and thus avoid common law procedural tactics interposed for delay, but it does not substitute a new method of trial where an issue of fact exists. As stated by the Judicial Council for Virginia, in its Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure, prepared in January 1949, Rule 3:20 'provides for summary judgment in those cases that cannot be reached by demurrer in which the only dispute concerns a pure question of law. It applies only to cases in which no trial is necessary because no evidence could affect the result. ' The motion for summary judgment is appropriate 'after the parties are at issue' and is not intended as a substitute for a demurrer, a demurrer to the evidence or a motion to strike. When the motion for summary judgment is appropriate it should state the grounds upon which it is filed and otherwise meet the requirements of the Rules with respect to pleadings. Burke's Pleading and Practice (4th ed. Boyd 1952), § 189, pp. 303, 304.

The application of Rule 3:20 has come before us in two cases, both of which illustrate its proper use. In Phillips v. Brinkley, 194 Va. 62, 72 S.E. (2d) 339, summary judgment was entered by the trial court after it had heard evidence upon which there was no conflict and the sole issue to be determined was a question of law. In Housing Authority v. Laburnum Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E. (2d) 574, summary judgment was based upon the pleadings, exhibits and depositions. There were no material facts in dispute and the only issue presented was a question of law as to whether the statute of limitations was applicable.

It will be observed that the motion for summary judgment in the instant case is in many respects similar to a demurrer; however, when a demurrer is sustained there is not necessarily a finality to the case since the pleading may be amended, while sustaining a motion for summary judgment is a final disposition of the case. When the defendant filed its grounds of defense the parties were 'at issue,' and then when it filed its motion for summary judgment the defendant in effect said there was no fact genuinely in dispute because the...