Casa Del Caffe Vergnano S.P.A. v. ItalFlavors, LLC

Decision Date15 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 13–56091.,13–56091.
Citation816 F.3d 1208
Parties CASA DEL CAFFE VERGNANO S.P.A., a corporation organized under the laws of the Italian Republic; Caffe Vergnano USA Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Petitioners–Appellees, v. ITALFLAVORS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ItalFlavors San Diego, LLC, a California limited liability company, Respondents–Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

James R. Ballard and Owen M. Praskievicz (argued), Schwartz Semerdjian Ballard & Cauley LLP, San Diego, CA, for RespondentsAppellants.

Calvin E. Davis (argued) and Gary A. Collis, Gordon & Rees LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for PetitionersAppellees.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and EDWARD R. KORMAN, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge KORMAN; Dissent by Judge CALLAHAN

.

OPINION

KORMAN, District Judge:

This appeal from an order pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act granting a motion to compel arbitration raises a significant issue of whether a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause may enforce the clause notwithstanding compelling evidence that the contract was not a binding agreement. The facts underlying the appeal are largely undisputed. Specifically, in early 2010, Cesar and Hector Rabellino began planning to open an Italian-style coffee shop in the United States. At the time, Hector was living in Argentina, but hoped to move to the United States and operate his own business. The Rabellinos formed ItalFlavors, LLC and began discussions with Caffe Vergnano, an Italian corporation, to open a franchise in America.

On September 23, 2010, the Rabellinos met with Tommaso Lambert, a representative of Caffe Vergnano, in Italy. During the course of their three-hour meeting, the parties signed two agreements. The first—dated September 23, 2010 and which the parties refer to as the Commercial Contract—appears to be a franchise agreement setting forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. That agreement contains an arbitration clause providing that:

Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, or the breach, termination or validity thereof, which is not [resolved] directly between the Parties, shall be settled by final and binding arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as presently in force.

Per the terms set forth, the contract was to be construed according to Italian law with arbitration to be held in Geneva, Switzerland.

A Second Agreement—which the parties refer to as the Hold Harmless Agreement—was also signed that day. Although this agreement is dated September 24, 2010, neither party disputes that it was signed on September 23 during the same three-hour meeting as the Commercial Contract. The Hold Harmless Agreement provides in relevant part:

At the express request of Mr. Hector Rabellino, as the legal representative of the company Italflavors LLC, with registered offices in Greenwhich [sic; Greenwich] CT 06831 USA, Casa del Caffe Vergnano S.P.A. has prepared and herewith delivers a copy of the contract denominated "Commercial Contract" dated September 23, 2010.
The above-mentioned contract does not have any validity or effectiveness between the parties, as it was prepared and delivered by Casa del Caffe Vergnano S.p.A. solely for the purpose of allowing Mr. Hector Rabellino to submit a copy of it to the pertinent international agencies in order to obtain an entry visa to work in the United States of America....
This contract does not produce any effect between the parties, who as agreed will sign a future contract which will regulate their commercial relationship as soon as it is prepared in accordance with the federal and national laws of the United States of America.

According to the Rabellinos, the parties entered into the Hold Harmless Agreement because Caffe Vergnano had concerns that the Commercial Contract did not conform to U.S. franchise law and so sought to shield itself from liability by making the contract void while, at the same time, allowing Hector to use the Contract to obtain his visa. They contend that the parties intended to sign a binding contract at a later date. According to Lambert, the representative from Caffe Vergnano, the purpose of the Hold Harmless Agreement was not to render the Commercial Contract void, but rather to protect Caffe Vergnano from any liability in the event that Hector used the contract in a way that ran afoul of U.S. immigration laws.

ItalFlavors then began the process of opening a Caffe Vergnano franchise location in San Diego. This included signing an agreement with Caffe Vergnano regarding website domain registration and purchasing furniture, equipment, and coffee from Caffe Vergnano. ItalFlavors opened its franchise branch on April 20, 2011, but after months of struggles and financial failures, the store closed on December 20, 2011.

Blaming the failure of the venture on Caffe Vergnano's alleged failure to offer promised support, ItalFlavors filed suit in California, alleging a series of violations of California's Franchise Investment Law and Business and Professions Code. Subsequently, that action was stayed after Caffe Vergnano filed the petition to compel arbitration in the district court. The jurisdiction of the district court was properly invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and 9 U.S.C. § 203 (the Federal Arbitration Act) because the case arose under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The district court ultimately held that "the issue of whether the broad arbitration clause contained in the Commercial Contract survives after the September 24, 2010 agreement took effect should be submitted to the arbitrator." Thus, it granted Caffe Vergnano's petition and issued an order compelling arbitration. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district judge's order to compel arbitration de novo. In re Eber, 687 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.2012)

. Similarly, legal conclusions regarding the existence of a valid, binding contract are reviewed de novo and factual findings underlying it for clear error. U.S. for Use of Youngstown Welding & Eng'g Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 802 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.1986).

DISCUSSION

Starting with first principles, we reiterate the Supreme Court's repeated admonition that "[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of consent." Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) ; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ; Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741–42 (9th Cir.2014). Thus, "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347. Moreover, it is "well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to decide." Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 296–97, 130 S.Ct. 2847. While the Commercial Contract at issue here contained a clause committing the parties to arbitrate, the threshold issue is whether that document constituted a binding agreement at all. If it did not constitute such an agreement, it follows that the arbitration provision is not enforceable.

Because this case arises under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the issue of whether the Commercial Contract constituted a binding agreement is governed by federal common law, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 577–78 (7th Cir.2007)

(collecting cases), which, in turn, looks to "general principles for interpreting contracts." GECCMC 2005–C1 Plummer St. Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 671 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir.2012)(quoting Klamath Water Users Prot. Assoc. v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir.1999)

); accord InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 143–44 (1st Cir.2003). Often, those general principles are found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir.2013) (looking to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts when determining basic principles of contract law in the maritime context where federal common law applies).

Under these principles, "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981)

; see also Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 863, 103 S.Ct. 1587, 75 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In its ordinary meaning, a ‘contract’ is a legally enforceable bargain, formed by mutual consent and supported by consideration."). The mutual intention to be bound by an agreement is the sine qua non of legally enforceable contracts and recognition of this requirement is nearly universal. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 2, 17 ; Cal. Juris. 3d Contracts § 67 ("Mutual consent for a contract is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties...."). "Where all the parties to what would otherwise be a bargain manifest an intention that the transaction is not to be taken seriously, there is no such manifestation of assent to the exchange as is required by this Section." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18 cmt. c. Indeed, although our decision does not turn on Italian law, on this point Italian law is in accord with American law. See Principles of European Contract Law and Italian Law 94 (Luisa Antoniolli & Anna Veneziano eds., 2005) ("[P]romises made out of courtesy, as a joke, or in any other way that denotes the absence of a serious intention to create a binding legal relationship are not deemed enforceable.").

Thus, under...

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