Casado v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 18-22491-CIV-O'SULLIVAN
• Citation: 340 F.Supp.3d 1320
• Parties: Ephraim CASADO, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

340 F.Supp.3d 1320

Ephraim CASADO, Plaintiff,

v.MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 18-22491-CIV-O'SULLIVAN

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed October 23, 2018

Ariel Tai Ryan Nichol Lett, Lett Law, PLLC, Igor Hernandez, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Bernard Pastor, Ezra Saul Greenberg, Miami-Dade County Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

JOHN J. O'SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant Miami-Dade County's Motion to Dismiss (DE# 33, 8/9/18) and the Defendants Oliver Mayorga and William Baskins' Motion to Dismiss (DE# 34, 8/9/18). Having carefully considered the motions, responses and replies, it isORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant Miami-Dade County's Motion to Dismiss (DE# 33, 8/9/18) is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendants Oliver Mayorga and William Baskins' Motion to Dismiss (DE# 34, 8/9/18) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that contains a total of eleven counts:

Count I - false arrest and false imprisonment against the officers under Florida law; Count II - malicious prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; Count III - negligent hiring or retention under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; Count IV - negligent failure to train and supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; Count V - false arrest/false imprisonment claim deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sections1983 and 1988 against the officers; Count VI - deprivation of civil rights by excessive use of force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; Count VII - excessive force claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; Count VIII - battery against the County; Count IX - intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers and the County; Count X - civil conspiracy against the officers and the County; and Count XI - gross negligence against the County.

The plaintiff's claims in the Amended Complaint arise out of a traffic stop by two Miami-Dade County police detectives (hereinafter "Officers") that was purportedly due to the plaintiff allegedly throwing bottles out of his car window. The body camera videos show that the plaintiff exited his car with his hands up as ordered by the detectives. Detective Mayorga's body camera video shows that Detective Baskins approached the plaintiff and attempted to slam the plaintiff into the hood of his car. Video also shows Detective Baskins punching the plaintiff in the face repeatedly before Detective Baskins turned off his body camera. Sometime later Detective Baskins body camera video reveals that the camera was placed on the hood of the plaintiff's car. The verbal exchange between Detective Baskins and the plaintiff is also recorded on the video and includes Detective Baskins responding, "What the f**k are you going to do about it?," after the plaintiff asked for his badge number and questioned being punched in the face. The detectives arrested and charged the plaintiff with multiple offenses which were nolle prossed.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Miami-Dade County (hereinafter "the County") seeks to dismiss the following eight counts of the Amended Complaint: Count I (state law false arrest and imprisonment), Count III (negligent hiring or retention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), Count IV (negligent failure to train and supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), Count VI (excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), Count VIII (state law battery), Count IX (state law intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count X (state law civil conspiracy), and Count XI (state law gross negligence).

The County moves to dismiss the Section 1983 claims (Counts III, IV and VI) on the grounds that the allegations are conclusory and fail to satisfy the requirements to allege municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) or Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The County further contends that the plaintiff failed to identify a responsible County policymaker and plead sufficient facts supporting a ratification theory of liability; and that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that a custom or policy was the moving force behind the plaintiff's alleged constitutional violation. The County moves to dismiss the remaining state law claims as barred by Section 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes and/or sovereign immunity because the alleged actions were malicious, in bad faith, or with wanton and willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Additionally, the state law false arrest claim includes the state law battery claim, which cannot exist as a separate claim. Finally, the County argues that the Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading that incorporates each prior allegation into the subsequent counts.

The Officers seek dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for excessive force cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IX); and civil conspiracy (Count X). The Officers argue that the well-pled factual allegations of the Amended Complaint fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IX) and civil conspiracy (Count X). Additionally, the Section 1983 excessive force claim (Count VII) is subsumed in the Section 1983 false arrest claim (Count I) and cannot exist as an independent cause of action.

The plaintiff filed responses to the County's and the Officers' respective motions to dismiss, and the defendants filed their respective replies. Both motions to dismiss are ripe.

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court shall grant a motion to dismiss where, based upon a dispositive issue of law, the factual allegations of the complaint cannot support the asserted cause of action. Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11^th Cir. 2006) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Indeed, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court's analysis is limited to the four corners of the plaintiff's complaint and the attached exhibits. Grossman v. Nationsbank, 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) ; Milburn v. U.S., 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11^th Cir. 1984) ("Consideration of matters beyond the complaint is improper in the context of a motion to dismiss....").

On a motion to dismiss, the Court must also accept the plaintiff's well pled facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A motion to dismiss a complaint should not be granted if the factual allegations are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss "even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The issue to be decided by the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) ; Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 n.4 (11^th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). It is only "when on the basis of a dispositive issue of law no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action [that] dismissal of the complaint is appropriate." Excess Risk Underwriters, Inc. v. LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 208 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) ).

B. Monell Claims

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that "a municipality cannot be held liable under [48 U.S.C.] § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). "[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under [ section] 1983." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "Local governing bodies...can be sued directly under [ section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where...the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "[A]though the touchstone of the [ section] 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments...may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval...." Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

"[T]o impose [ section] 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate...