Casanova v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 31 March 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 2:20-CV-10413
• Parties: ANTHONY CASANOVA, Petitioner, v. SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ANTHONY CASANOVA, Petitioner,
v.
SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent,

CIVIL No. 2:20-CV-10413

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

March 31, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Anthony Casanova, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 through attorney Michael Ryan Waldo of the State Appellate Defender's Office. Petitioner challenges his conviction for first-degree felony murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316(1)(b). For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Muskegon County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts regarding petitioner's conviction from the Michigan Court of Appeals' opinion affirming his conviction,

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since they are presumed correct on habeas review. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

Defendant's conviction arises out of the sudden death of his infant son, TC, on January 4, 2013. The evidence established that TC was born perfectly healthy on October 26 2012. On the day in question, TC's mother left TC in defendant's care while she went to work. Hours later emergency personnel were called to defendant's house for an “unresponsive child.” First responders arrived to find TC unconscious, not breathing, and without a pulse He had multiple bruises, which appeared to be in varying degrees of healing, on his chest and abdomen. The responders were unable to revive TC.

An autopsy ultimately revealed that TC died of “multiple injuries.” The following injuries were noted by the medical examiner (ME): approximately 25 bruises on TC's chest and abdomen, circular in design, that were of “multiple varying colors;” a large hematoma on the right side of TC's head; a lacerated liver; a lacerated spleen; a total of 15 rib fractures, some of which had “callous formations” suggesting that they were older and healing; a contusion on the heart; a skull fracture several inches in length; and “a large amount of blood that had accumulated beneath the skull, not just associated with the fracture but from tearing of veins that connect the lining underneath the bone to the brain itself.” The ME concluded that TC's injuries were the result of significantly forceful and violent actions. She opined unequivocally that TC's injuries were not accidental but rather intentionally inflicted.

Defendant initially told various first responders, medical personnel, and a detective that TC sustained his injuries after defendant tripped over the family dog while carrying TC, causing defendant to drop the baby before ultimately falling on top of him.^[1] However, during a subsequent police interview and prior to being given his Miranda rights, defendant admitted “bouncing” TC off an air mattress seven or eight times in what was “a little more than a play bounce.” Later, and still prior to being Mirandized, defendant added that he might have squeezed TC “a little too hard” to stop his crying, with defendant also stating that he had

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bounced TC off the bed because of the crying. Defendant was then read his Miranda rights. Afterward, defendant informed police that, in response to TC's crying, he had squeezed TC twice in kind of a “bear hug, ” causing TC to lose his breath for a few seconds, and that when TC started crying again, defendant bounced him off the bed.

The trial court suppressed the un-Mirandized statements made by defendant, but allowed the admission of the statements made by defendant after he was given his Miranda rights.

People v. Casanova, No. 324819, 2018 WL 1072680, at * 1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018)(additional footnotes omitted).

The conviction was affirmed. Id., lv. den 503 Mich. 861, 917 N.W.2d 390 (2018); cert. den. sub nom Casanova v. Michigan, 139 S.Ct. 1192 (2019).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. Mr. Casanova was denied this Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where his trial attorney failed to present, or failed to discover through a reasonable investigation, evidence that would have directly contradicted the prosecution's assertion that he intentionally injured his son.

II. Mr. Casanova was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination where the trial court admitted Mr. Casanova's post-Miranda incriminating statements following more than two hours of interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court explained that “[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The “AEDPA

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thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). “[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his or her claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. A habeas petitioner should be denied relief as long as it is within the “realm of possibility” that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. See Woods v. Etherton, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim # 1. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Petitioner first argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and call an expert at trial to counter the conclusions and opinions of the medical examiner

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as to the cause of TC's death and the medical examiner's opinion that the death was intentional not accidental.

A defendant must satisfy two things to establish the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must demonstrate that his or her attorney's performance was so deficient that the attorney was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's behavior lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. Stated differently, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the defendant must show that such performance prejudiced his defense. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Strickland places the burden on the defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and not the state, to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009).

On habeas review, “the question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether

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that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.'” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)(quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). “The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different...