Casavant v. Campopiano

• Decision Date: 13 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-172-A,73-172-A
• Citation: 327 A.2d 831,114 R.I. 24
• Parties: Donat A. CASAVANT et ux. v. Hazel CAMPOPIANO et al. and Recamp Enterprises, Inc. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 831

327 A.2d 831

114 R.I. 24

Donat A. CASAVANT et ux. v. Hazel CAMPOPIANO et al. and Recamp Enterprises, Inc.

No. 73-172-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 13, 1974.

[114 R.I. 29] Almonte, Lisa & Pisano, Paul J. Pisano, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Gerald C. DeMaria, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This civil action was brought by the plaintiffs, Donat A. and Frances L. Casavant, against Hazel and Remo Campopiano and Recamp Enterprises, Inc. ¹ to recover damages incurred by the defendants' alleged breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The case was tried to a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury, who denied a motion to dismiss the suit as against Hazel Campopiano, the wife of Remo Campopiano, and found that by reason of the defendants' breach of warranty the plaintiffs had been damaged to the extent of $4,500. From that judgment the defendants are prosecuting an appeal in this court.

It is not disputed that defendant Remo Campopiano had been engaged in the business of building residential structures on speculation for approximately 20 years. The construction of these homes was undertaken without any specific prospective purchasers being in mind. It further appears from the evidence, that, upon completion of the basic structure of the house here involved, defendants rented it to a married couple who intended to purchase the house as soon as they were able to secure the necessary financing. Sometime within a year after taking possession, the tenants vacated the premises, and shortly thereafter defendants sold the house to plaintiffs, the deed thereto being dated October 24, 1968. In April of 1969 plaintiffs discovered that the roof of the house was sagging visibly. An inspection disclosed that the roof construction was defective and that such condition constituted a threat to the safety of the occupants. The trial justice found that the value of the house in October of 1968 was $13,000.

The defendants concede that in Padula v. J. J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973), the court established in this state the rule that a builder-vendor impliedly warrants to a buyer that he constructed the building to be transferred with reasonably good workmanship and that the dwelling is fit for human habitation. They argue, however, that the rule laid down in Padula has no application in the instant case. In support of this position, they contend that because of the intervening occupancy by others prior to the sale to plaintiffs, the dwelling was at the time of transfer not a new but a used home, the sale of which is not within the purview of the Padula rule.

We cannot agree. In the first place, the thrust of the Padula rule was to afford protection to home buyers from the overreaching of knowledgeable builder-vendors. That there had been an intervening tenancy should not, standing alone, deprive the buyer of that protection. The defendant, Mr. Campopiano, was in a much stronger bargaining position than plaintiff, Mr. Casavant. The former was an experienced developer who had built and sold many homes. Clearly, Mr. Campopiano, who built the house, was in a far better position to determine the condition of the structure of the roof than was Mr. Casavant. The latter, with a ninth-grade education, had purchased a house only once before the instant transaction. The evidence discloses that there was no access to the open space beneath the roof so that if plaintiffs had been sufficiently knowledgeable to evaluate effectively the condition thereof, the lack of access to make such an inspection would have rendered such expertise of no assistance in these circumstances.

Secondly, defendants' argument, as we understand it, is that because the house had been occupied prior to the sale to plaintiffs, the warranty should not be implied in the subsequent purchaser's favor because the structure is not a new house as contemplated in Padula. With this we do not agree. This argument might have merit if the intervening occupancy appeared to be causally connected with the defective condition of the roof or was of such extended duration as to make an application of the warranties unreasonable. In the absence of such findings, the court will assume that the builder-vendor was responsible for the existence of the defect and that the structure was a 'new' house as contemplated in Padula.

Thirdly, defendants retained title to the premises for the purpose of selling...