Casazza v. State

• Decision Date: 30 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 21217.,21217.
• Citation: 2000 SD 120,616 N.W.2d 872
• Parties: Christina CASAZZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE of South Dakota a Political Entity, Jeff Bloomberg, Secretary for the Department of Corrections of the State of South Dakota and Dwane Russell, Warden of the South Dakota Women's Prison, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

616 N.W.2d 872

2000 SD 120

Christina CASAZZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE of South Dakota a Political Entity, Jeff Bloomberg, Secretary for the Department of Corrections of the State of South Dakota and Dwane Russell, Warden of the South Dakota Women's Prison, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 21217.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs March 22, 2000.

Decided August 30, 2000.

Lee C. "Kit" McCahren of Olinger, Lovald, Robbennolt, McCahren and Reimers, Pierre, and Scott G. Hoy of Scott G. Hoy Law Office, Sioux Falls, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

Neil Fulton of May, Adam, Gerdes and Thompson, Pierre, Attorneys for defendants and appellees.

AMUNDSON, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Christina Casazza (Casazza) appeals the granting of summary judgment in favor of State of South Dakota (State), Secretary for the Department of Corrections Jeff Bloomberg (Bloomberg), and Warden Dwane Russell (Russell) of the Women's Prison based upon sovereign immunity and SDCL 3-21-8. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Casazza is an inmate at the South Dakota Women's Penitentiary. Casazza alleged that in late August of 1998 she was raped by Martin Aponte (Aponte), who was employed as a prison guard. She claims that Aponte had been flirting with her in the past; however, on the day in question, Aponte approached her in the dishroom of the prison, kissed her and asked her to go into the bathroom with him. Casazza refused to go into the bathroom, but Aponte put his hand on her back and lead her into the inmate bathroom.

[¶ 3.] After entering the bathroom, Aponte closed and locked the door. Aponte proceeded to kiss Casazza again. Casazza claims she began to cry and was telling Aponte "no," but he continued to kiss her and tell her that "it's okay, they will know if I do something wrong." Aponte then removed Casazza's top shirt, pulled down her pants and panties and had sexual intercourse with her. Casazza also claimed that Aponte raped her again a couple days later and the same events occurred in the inmate bathroom.

[¶ 4.] Casazza brought suit against State, Bloomberg and Russell claiming negligent supervision, negligent training, negligent hiring and negligent failure to take action to prevent Aponte from making inappropriate advances towards Casazza. Aponte's employment with the prison was ultimately terminated after investigations by the Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI), but he was never a party to this action.¹

[¶ 5.] Casazza provided evidence that Aponte's advances toward her were public. Michelle Lyons (Lyons), a fellow inmate, testified that she saw Aponte with Casazza several times. Lyons claimed that she saw Aponte put his hands on Casazza by grabbing her butt, running his fingers through her hair and telling Casazza her hair was soft, and would whistle at her and tell her she had a nice butt. Lyons claimed that there were other complaints against Aponte, but nothing was ever done. [¶ 6.] Russell testified that he became aware of Aponte's conduct after intercepting a letter from an inmate to her boyfriend. Russell learned several inmate names from the letter and began an investigation which ultimately led to Aponte being terminated for kissing two inmates.

[¶ 7.] Prior to trial, State, Russell and Bloomberg moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that Russell's and Bloomberg's actions were discretionary, and therefore, sovereign immunity applied. The trial court also found that SDCL 3-21-8² applied as a basis for granting summary judgment. Casazza appeals, raising the following issues:

1. Is the State and its officers immune from suit for a failure to supervise a guard who raped a prisoner?

2. Is SDCL 3-21-8 unconstitutional?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(c), we have often stated,

we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and showed entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. The nonmoving party, however, must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Our task on appeal is to determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. If there exists any basis which supports the ruling of the trial court, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper.

Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Ford, 1999 SD 147, ¶ 15, 603 N.W.2d 73, 76 (quoting Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 22, 588 N.W.2d 897, 902 (quoting Wildeboer v. South Dakota Junior Chamber of Comm., 1997 SD 33, ¶ 9, 561 N.W.2d 666, 668 (citations omitted))). Further, summary judgment should be granted "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Julson v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 SD 43, ¶ 5, 562 N.W.2d 117, 119 (quoting Ford v. Moore, 1996 SD 112, ¶ 7, 552 N.W.2d 850, 852 (quoting SDCL 15-6-56(c))). Finally, summary judgment will be affirmed "`only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the legal questions have been correctly decided.'" Id. (quoting Ford, 1996 SD 112, ¶ 7, 552 N.W.2d at 852 (citing Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801, 804 (S.D. 1987))).

[¶ 9.] We are also faced in this case whether SDCL 3-21-8 is unconstitutional. "[T]here is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional." Beals v. Pickerel Lake San. Dist., 1998 SD 42, ¶ 8, 578 N.W.2d 134, 135 (citing Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 898 (S.D.1995) (citing Specht v. City of Sioux Falls, 526 N.W.2d 727, 729 (S.D. 1995))).

DECISION

[¶ 10.] 1. Is the State and its officers immune from suit for a failure to supervise a guard who raped a prisoner?

Sovereign Immunity

[¶ 11.] It is well-established under the common law and South Dakota Constitution that "the governing acts of the state, its agencies, other public entities, and their employees cannot be attacked in court without the state's consent." Hansen v. South Dakota Dep't. of Transp., 1998 SD 109, ¶ 9, 584 N.W.2d 881, 881 (citing Wilson v. Hogan, 473 N.W.2d 492, 494 (S.D.1991) (citing S.D. Const. art. III, § 27; Blue Fox Bar, Inc. v. City of Yankton, 424 N.W.2d 915, 917 (S.D.1988))). Whether a state employee, who is sued in an individual capacity, is entitled to immunity depends upon "the function performed by the employee." Kruger v. Wilson, 325 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D.1982) (citing High-Grade Oil Co. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736 (S.D.1980); Sioux Falls Const. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454 (S.D. 1980)).

[¶ 12.] To be considered immune from suit, an employee's function must be discretionary, rather than ministerial. See id. at 854. The discretionary determination is made by considering the following factors:

(1) The nature and importance of the function that the officer is performing;

(2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion by the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the court on the conduct of the coordinate branch of government;

(3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the free exercise of his discretion by the officer;

(4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the officer;

(5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if the action is taken;

(6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be produced;

(7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other forms of relief.³

Kyllo, 535 N.W.2d at 902 (citing National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D.1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, comment f (1979))).

[¶ 13.] Unlike discretionary acts which provide immunity to a state employee, a state employee who "`fails to perform a merely ministerial duty, is liable for the proximate results of his failure to any person to whom he owes performance of such duty.'" Leir, 325 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting State v. Ruth, 9 S.D. 84, 90, 68 N.W. 189, 190 (1896)). This Court has previously defined ministerial acts as,

absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed designated facts or the execution of a set task imposed by a law prescribing and defining the time, mode, and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion, being a simple, definite duty arising under and because of stated conditions and imposed by law. A ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result. It is performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the action. In short, once it is determined that the act should be performed, subsequent duties may be considered ministerial. If there is a readily ascertainable standard by which the action of the government servant may be measured, whether that standard is written or the product of experience, it is not within the discretionary function exception.

Hansen, 1998 SD 109, ¶ 23, 584 N.W.2d at 886 (citing 57 Am.Jur.2d Municipal, County, School & State Tort Liability § 120 (1988)) (emphasis in original).

[¶ 14.] In the present case, the trial court held:

I think it's very clear that the jobs of the Secretary of Department of Corrections and the Warden of the Women's Prison are discretionary, are essentially discretionary when it comes to the operation of the prison which, according to the Hansen case, would exempt them from liability for a negligence lawsuit which this is.

If

...