Caschetto v. Silliman & Godfrey Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1939
• Citation: 9 A.2d 286,126 Conn. 22
• Parties: CASCHETTO v. SILLIMAN & GODFREY CO., Inc., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

9 A.2d 286

126 Conn. 22

CASCHETTO v. SILLIMAN & GODFREY CO., Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 8, 1939

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Patrick B O'Sullivan, Judge.

Action by Jennie Caschetto against the Silliman & Godfrey Company incorporated, for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, who was struck by an automobile, as result of the negligence of the defendant, brought to the superior court and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment were for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

Error and new trial ordered.

David Goldstein and Kenneth J. Zarrilli, both of Bridgeport for appellant (plaintiff).

George N. Foster, of Bridgeport, for appellees (defendants).

Argued Before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

BROWN Judge.

In this action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the alleged negligent backing against her of the defendant company's automobile, the jury rendered a verdict for the defendants which the court refused to set aside. The plaintiff's appeal from the judgment is confined to claimed errors in the court's charge to the jury.

On the afternoon of March 21, 1938, the defendant company, referred to below as the defendant, by the other defendant as its agent, drove southerly along Main Street in Bridgeport, and stopped its automobile a short distance north of the intersection of Bank and Main Streets, immediately east of a car also headed south parked along the westerly curb of Main Street. The right door of the defendant's car was opposite the rear bumper of the parked car. Behind this car was room for another car to park. The plaintiff, at a point a few feet back from the defendant's car and some twenty-five feet north of the intersection, stepped off the west curb of Main Street to cross to the east side of the street. The defendant backed its car to park at the curb in the vacant space. As it did so the rear end of the car struck the plaintiff, causing the injuries complained of. The place where the plaintiff was crossing and was hit was not within a regular crosswalk. These facts are undisputed. The plaintiff's claims of proof upon the issue of the defendant's negligence were that it neither blew its horn Before proceeding to back the car, nor gave any other signal of its intention to back it, and that while the car was backing its driver was looking toward the front until after the plaintiff was struck. Those of the defendant were that it signalled to a following car its intention to back into the parking space and waited for this car to pass; that the defendant's driver looked back and saw no one to the rear or on the curb; that it backed in slowly parallel to the curb; and that while doing so its driver continued to look alternately to the rear and to the front until he stopped the car suddenly at the sound of the impact.

The question determinative of this appeal is whether in referring to the defendant's duty the court erred in using these words in the charge: ‘ It is not anticipated that pedestrians will cross at places other than regular crosswalks. And, naturally, drivers of automobiles are not bound to anticipate that they will cross at places other than regular crosswalks.’ The defendant's twofold answer to the plaintiff's claim that this constituted error, is that this is a correct statement of the law, and that even if it is not, when read in connection with the rest of the charge it does not amount to reversible error.

The decisions of this court conclusively refute the first of these contentions. As we have stated: " Sidewalks are for the exclusive use of pedestrians, but the remaining portion of the highway is not for the exclusive use of vehicles. In the absence of statutory or municipal regulations affecting the question, the pedestrian has equal rights in the street with the operator of an automobile.' Cole v. Wilson, 127 Me. 316 [319],143 A. 178, 179; Schmeiske v. Laubin, 109 Conn. 206, 208, 145 A 890.' Peterson v. Meehan, 116 Conn. 150, 154, 163 A. 757, 758. And from this the principle which we went on to state logically follows: ‘ Since * * *the pedestrian on the street is in a position permitted him by law, the driver of an automobile is charge with notice of that right, and he is required to take such precautions, in the exercise of reasonable care, as the possible presence of a pedestrian on the highway may demand under all the circumstances of the case.’ Peterson v. Meehan, supra, 116...