Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State

• Decision Date: 24 June 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 244101.
• Citation: 261 Mich. App. 386,682 N.W.2d 546
• Parties: TOWNSHIP OF CASCO, Township of Columbus, Patricia Iseler, and James P. Holk, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Director of the Bureau of Elections, and City of Richmond, Defendants-Appellees, and Walter Winkle and Patricia Winkle, Intervening Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

682 N.W.2d 546

261 Mich. App. 386

TOWNSHIP OF CASCO, Township of Columbus, Patricia Iseler, and James P. Holk, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Director of the Bureau of Elections, and City of Richmond, Defendants-Appellees, and Walter Winkle and Patricia Winkle, Intervening Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Docket No. 244101.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 7, 2004, at Lansing.

Decided March 25, 2004, at 9:00 am.

Released for Publication June 24, 2004.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by William K. Fahey and Ronald D. Richards Jr.) and James V. Dubay, Lansing, Richmond, for Casco Township, Columbus Township, Patricia Iseler, and James P. Holk.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Katherine C. Galvin, Assistant Attorney General, for the Secretary of State and the Director of the Bureau of Elections.

Kerr Russell and Weber, PLC (by Robert J. Pineau), Detroit, for Walter and Patricia Winkle.

Rex A. Burgess, PLC (by Rex A. Burgess), Clinton Township, for the city of Richmond.

Eric D. Williams, Big Rapids, for the Michigan Municipal League.

Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by James H. Bauckham), Kalamazoo, for Michigan Townships Association.

Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and COOPER, JJ.

COOPER, J.

Plaintiffs Township of Casco, Township of Columbus, Patricia Iseler, and James Holk, appeal as of right the trial court's September 10, 2002, order denying their request for a writ of mandamus compelling defendant Secretary of State to certify their detachment petition and set an election, or, alternatively, to provide declaratory relief interpreting their right to an election on the detachment petition. We affirm.

This case raises a novel question of statutory interpretation concerning whether a single "detachment election"—i.e., a vote on removing land from a city to make it part of a township—can be held to move land from a city to more than one township. The Home Rule City Act (HRCA), MCL 117.1 et seq., does not specify whether a single election for a detachment of land from one city into two townships is permissible. But logic dictates that a township or city should not have voting privileges over matters that involve a different township or city. Accordingly, we find that the HRCA does not unambiguously endorse a single election for multiple detachments of land involving more than two governmental entities.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The HRCA provides for elections on changing boundaries of cities, villages and townships. At least twenty-five people in each local government unit that would gain or lose territory in the change must sign a petition calling for a referendum.¹ If more than one county is affected, the petition goes to the Secretary of State, who decides if the legal requirements for a referendum have been met.² The referendum includes voters from each affected local unit.³

The instant dispute, whose history is recounted in this Court's opinion in Casco Twp. v. State Boundary Comm,⁴ began when defendants Walter and Patricia Winkle petitioned the State Boundary Commission to annex land they owned just outside the boundary of the City of Richmond into the City. Some of the land was in Casco Township and some in Columbus Township.⁵ Because fewer than one hundred persons lived on the land, no referendum on annexation was authorized, and the Boundary Commission approved the annexation without a popular vote.⁶

The Winkles wanted the annexation because they hoped to develop the land commercially, which could not be done without the sewer and water lines that Richmond offered.⁷ The townships challenged the annexation in court after first entering an agreement to transfer the land to another township instead of to Richmond.⁸ The State Boundary Commission, the trial court, and this Court all found that the transfer agreement was a "sham," and allowed the annexation by Richmond to go forward.⁹

The individual plaintiffs, among others, then signed a petition, pursuant to MCL 117.9, to detach the land from Richmond and return it to Columbus and Casco Townships. The petition called for a single election in which votes from Richmond and the two townships would be totaled, and an overall majority would decide the question. Although Casco and Columbus Townships are in St. Clair County, Richmond is partly in St. Clair and partly in Macomb County. Because Richmond straddles the county line, the detachment election petition was sent, pursuant to MCL 117.11, to the Secretary of State to determine whether such a vote was authorized by statute.

The Secretary of State, viewing the question as novel, requested legal advice from the Attorney General. In an informal opinion, the Attorney General advised that despite the absence of controlling case law, the petition's request for a single vote on multiple detachments was not authorized by statute. The Secretary of State agreed with this assessment and informed plaintiffs that the vote could not be scheduled.

Plaintiffs then sued in Ingham Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to authorize the referendum. The trial court denied the writ, ruling that the Secretary of State is only required to certify those petitions that are clearly appropriate. According to the trial court, the Secretary of State's determination that the law did not authorize the type of vote the petition called for was reasonable.

II. Home Rule City Act

Plaintiffs initially contend that the HRCA unambiguously authorizes them to file a single petition and obtain a single election on the detachment question facing the city and the two townships. We disagree. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to review de novo on appeal.¹⁰

The primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.¹¹ When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we must assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and enforce the statute as written.¹² It is only when the statutory language is ambiguous that this Court is permitted to look beyond the statute to determine the Legislature's intent.¹³ Statutory language is considered ambiguous when reasonable minds can differ with respect to its meaning.¹⁴ When construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he court must consider the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the statute's purpose, but should also always use common sense."¹⁵ In this regard, courts should seek to avoid a construction that would produce absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest.¹⁶

The relevant statutory text from MCL 117.11 provides as follows:

When the territory to be affected by any proposed incorporation, consolidation or change is situated in more than 1 county the petition hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and presented to the secretary of state, with 1 or more affidavits attached thereto sworn to by 1 or more of the signers of said petition, showing that the statements contained in said petition are true, that each signature affixed thereto is the genuine signature of a qualified elector residing in a city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of the petition and that not less than 25 of such signers reside in each city, village or township to be affected thereby. The secretary of state shall examine such petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed, and if he shall find that the same conforms to the provisions of this act he shall so certify, and transmit a certified copy of said petition and the accompanying affidavit or affidavits to the clerk of each city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of such petition, together with his certificate as above provided, and a notice directing that at the next general election occurring not less than 40 days thereafter the question of making the incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries petitioned for shall be submitted to the electors of the district to be affected.... The several city, village and township clerks who shall receive from the secretary of state the copies and certificates above provided for shall give notice of the election to be held.... [¹⁷]

Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, we do not find that this language explicitly states that a single election is sufficient to detach territory from a city into more than one township. Nor, however, do we find that that the statute definitively states the opposite. The Legislature's mere use of the phrase "the district" fails to clarify where a vote can be taken, especially when the very controversy is what the Legislature intended "the district" to entail. Similarly, the use of language like "each city, village or township" does not clearly imply that more than one township could be involved in such a vote. It seems equally as likely that the word "each" is used because at least two governmental entities are involved in every detachment vote.

Because reasonable minds can differ with respect to whether a single election is permissible under the instant circumstances, we must consider the object of the statute and apply a reasonable construction that is logical and best accomplishes the HRCA's purpose.¹⁸ The fact that Williamston v. Wheatfield Twp,¹⁹ stated "[t]here is no ambiguity in the detachment procedure provided for by the [HRCA]" is not controlling in this case. The plaintiffs in Williamston relied upon a previously omitted detachment provision that required an affirmative vote for a boundary change from each government unit affected.²⁰ But the Court in Williamston refused to consider this omitted language because there was no ambiguous language to clarify.²¹ Thus, the holding in Williamston does not mean that every clause in the HRCA is...