Case of One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, VIN: JN1C214SFX069854

• Decision Date: 17 November 1989
• Docket Number: 87-3873,Nos. 87-3856,s. 87-3856
• Citation: 109 A.L.R.Fed. 311,889 F.2d 1317
• Parties: In the Case of ONE 1985 NISSAN, 300ZX, VIN: JN1C214SFX069854; In the Case of: One 1985 BMW, 635si, VIN: WBAEC8401F10611263; In the Case of: One 1985 Honda Sabre Motorcycle, VIN: 1HSC1701FA104159; In the Case of: Miscellaneous Jewelry, and Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment From 5319 Old Branch Avenue, Temple Hills, Maryland, Defendants. In the Case of UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin WALKER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dennis White, Claimant-Appellant. In the Case of: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. MISCELLANEOUS JEWELRY and Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment From 5319 Old Branch Avenue, Temple Hills Maryland, Defendants. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin WALKER, Claimant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1317

889 F.2d 1317

109 A.L.R.Fed. 311

In the Case of ONE 1985 NISSAN, 300ZX, VIN:

JN1C214SFX069854; In the Case of: One 1985 BMW, 635si,

VIN: WBAEC8401F10611263; In the Case of: One 1985 Honda

Sabre Motorcycle, VIN: 1HSC1701FA104159; In the Case of:

Miscellaneous Jewelry, and Miscellaneous Electronic

Equipment From 5319 Old Branch Avenue, Temple Hills,

Maryland, Defendants.

In the Case of UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin WALKER, Personal Representative of the Estate of

Dennis White, Claimant-Appellant.

In the Case of: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. MISCELLANEOUS JEWELRY and Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment

From 5319 Old Branch Avenue, Temple Hills

Maryland, Defendants.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin WALKER, Claimant-Appellant.

Nos. 87-3856, 87-3873.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 7, 1989.

Decided Nov. 17, 1989.

David Benjamin Smith (English & Smith, Alexandria, Va., Mitchell Myers, Silver Spring, Md., Dacy, Myers & Suissa, on brief), for claimant-appellant.

Sara Bradkin Criscitelli (Breckinridge L. Willcox, U.S. Atty., Larry D. Adams, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charles B. Cates, Mary B. Troland, James G. Lindsay, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief) for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, SPROUSE, CHAPMAN, WILKINSON, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal comes from a civil forfeiture action brought by the United States under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(6). The government seeks property, primarily cash, with a value in excess of $1.5 million; it includes $1,002,219.48 in cash, $37,086 in checks, two pieces of real estate, 42 pieces of jewelry, 30 pieces of electronic equipment, and five automobiles. The property belongs to the estate of Dennis Constantine White.

On May 5, 1986, the police department of Prince George's County, Maryland, discovered the bodies of Dennis White and his daughter, Donna Marie White, in his residence in Temple Hills, Maryland. The police believe that White and his daughter were murdered. During the homicide investigation, the police discovered the cash, checks, jewelry and electronic equipment in the residence.

White was an alleged drug trafficker, reportedly a key figure in the importation of cocaine into the Washington, D.C. area. On June 26, 1986, the government filed complaints for civil forfeiture in rem against the defendant property, alleging that it constituted drug proceeds and, therefore, was forfeited to the government under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(6). Alvin M. Walker filed claims to the property as personal representative of White's estate and as court-appointed guardian of four Jamaican minors who claim to be White's illegitimate daughters. ¹

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government and ordered the property forfeited. United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F.Supp. 232 (D.Md.1987). Walker filed timely notice of appeal to this court, and the district court granted a motion to stay execution of the judgment pending appeal. We affirm.

On appeal, Walker challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on two grounds. First, Walker contends that civil forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(6) is primarily penal in nature, and, as such, should abate on the death of the wrongdoer. Second, he contends that the interest of the heirs in White's property is protected from forfeiture under what is called the innocent owner provision of Sec. 881(a)(6). Walker also challenges the administrative forfeiture proceedings used against White's automobiles.

We are of opinion that Congress enacted Sec. 881 primarily to serve remedial purposes and thus hold that forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(6) does not abate on the death of the property's owner. Further, we find the relation back doctrine embodied in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(h) applicable, and hold that all right, title and interest in the property vested in the government at the time the proceeds involved or traceable thereto were generated by illegal drug sales. At the time of White's death, therefore, he had no interest in the property to pass to his estate or heirs. We also uphold the government's use of administrative forfeiture proceedings against each of White's automobiles separately.

We can add little to the district court's sound analysis of the abatement issue. See 667 F.Supp. at 241-47. We agree that the decision on whether forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(6) abates on death of the property owner depends on whether the provision is primarily civil or penal in nature. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.1980). And we have only recently stated that the forfeiture provisions in Sec. 881 were enacted by Congress to serve strong remedial purposes in United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir.1989). In Santoro, the claimant of the property raised several constitutional challenges to the forfeiture provision of Sec. 881(a)(7) ² which were dependent on the statute being viewed as a criminal rather than a civil provision. We decided, however, that Congressional intent was clear that Sec. 881(a)(7) be construed as a civil provision. 866 F.2d at 1543-44. See also United States v. $2,500 in U.S. Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir.1982). We agree that Sec. 881(a)(6) is primarily civil in nature. Therefore, we hold that forfeitures under this statute do not abate on the death of the property's owner.

The second issue is with respect to the conflict between two portions of Sec. 881. Under Sec. 881(a)(6), innocent owners are exempted from the operation of the forfeiture statute. The statute states:

(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:

(6) All moneys ... [etc.] except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.

Section 881(h), however, provides that:

All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.

The district court concluded that the government made the requisite showing of probable cause to believe that the seized property was the proceeds of illegal drug sales. Walker does not contest that finding. He contends, however, that as personal representative of the estate and guardian of the children, he is an innocent owner whose interest is exempt from forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(6).

The government, in turn, does not contend that Walker or the children had any knowledge or involvement in White's drug activities. Instead, it relies upon the relation back doctrine, ³ codified at 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(h) and quoted above.

The government's argument is this: Walker does not contest that the seized property is derived from the proceeds of illegal drug sales. At the time White sold the drugs, title in all the proceeds passed directly to the United States. Thus, at the time of his death, White did not own the property here in question to pass to his estate or to his heirs.

In such a case as this, where two parts of a statute may be in conflict, we should give effect, if possible, to each part and interpret them so that they do not conflict. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 22.34 (Sands 4th ed. 1985).

In In Re Metmor Financial, Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.1987), we followed United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 244, 33 L.Ed. 555 (1890), in considering the effect of the relation back doctrine and stated that under that doctrine "... no third party can acquire a legally valid interest in the property, from anyone other than the government after the illegal act takes place. The purpose of this rule was to prevent the offender from alienating the property prior to seizure and condemnation, and thereby escaping some of the consequences of his wrongdoing." 819 F.2d at 448 (italics in original). The holding in Metmor was that the government by forfeiture could not obtain an interest superior to that of a mortgage company which held the mortgage prior to the time the property involved became implicated in the acts concerning illegal drugs. The court did not consider whether the mortgage holder was an innocent owner who acquired his interest subsequent to the time of the illegal act.

White's personal representative and his children rely upon our case of United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233 (4th Cir.1987), for their claims as innocent owners under Sec. 881(a)(6). In that case, a drug dealer, one Terry, had been taken to jail under suspicion of murder. Terry called his attorney, who went to the police station and agreed to represent Terry. Upon discussion of the attorney's fee, Terry told the attorney that he had some $12,000 in cash in his apartment which could be used as a retainer, and he gave the attorney permission to take the money from his apartment. When the attorney went to Terry's apartment, the police were there searching the apartment under a search warrant. The search revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, a customer list, and some $12,000 in cash. The attorney subsequently obtained a written statement from Terry that he had assigned the funds to the attorney, and the district court found that this assignment took place on April 17th, the day the attorney saw Terry at the jail. On these facts, we held that the attorney was an innocent owner under Sec. 881(a)(6) and affirmed the judgment of the district court giving the money to the attorney rather than to the government as a forfeiture. While the relation back doctrine was not discussed in that case, it is implicit in the decision that the money was derived from the illegal...