Case v. Bowles, No. 261

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation66 S.Ct. 438,90 L.Ed. 552,327 U.S. 92
PartiesCASE, Com'rs of Public Lands v. BOWLES, Adm'r, O.P.A
Docket NumberNo. 261
Decision Date04 February 1946

327 U.S. 92
66 S.Ct. 438
90 L.Ed. 552
CASE, Com'rs of Public Lands

v.

BOWLES, Adm'r, O.P.A.

No. 261.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 10, 1946.
Decided Feb. 4, 1946.

An action by Price Administrator to enjoin state commissioner of public lands from completing timber transaction in violation of maximum price regulation, was properly commenced by attorneys employed by Price Administrator, as prescribed by Emergency Price Control Act, and it was not necessary that action be commenced by district attorney or members of department of justice. 28 U.S.C.A. § 485; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 201(a), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 921(a).

[Syllabus from pages 92-94 intentionally omitted]

Page 95

Mr.R. A. Moen, of Seattle, Wash., for petitioner.

Messrs. Robert L. Stern and Abraham Glasser, both of Washington, D.C., for respondent Bowles, Adm'r.

Messrs. W. Z. Kerr and E. S. McCord, both of Seattle, Wash., for respondent Soundview Pulp Co.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Congressional Enabling Act providing for the State of Washington's admission to the Union granted certain lands to that State 'for the support of common schools.' Section 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679. Section 11 of the Enabling Act provided that these lands should 'be disposed of only at public sale, and at a price not less than ten dollars per acre * * *.' The State Constitution, art. 16, §§ 1, 2, provides that these lands shall not be sold except 'at public auction to the highest bidder' at a price which may not be below both the full market value found after appraisal, and 'the price prescribed in the grant' of these lands. In 1943 the State Commissioner of Public Lands held a public auction for the sale of timber on school lands. At that auction the Soundview Pulp Company, one of the respondents, bid $86,335.39 for some of the timber. This amount exceeded by approximately $9,000.00 the ceiling price fixed by Maximum Price Regulation No. 460.1 The Price Administrator advised Soundview that consummation of the sale at the bid price would constitute a violation of the Regula-

Page 96

tion and of the Emergency Price Control Act.2 Thereafter Soundview and the unsuccessful bidder, Coos Bay Pulp Corporation, commenced actions in the State Courts, seeking an adjudication as to the legality of Soundview's bid and of the proposed transfer of timber to Soundview. This resulted in a holding by the State Supreme Court that the Emergency Price Control Act did not bar the sale of school-land timber at prices above the ceiling. Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 21 Wash.2d 261, 150 P.2d 839. When, after this judgment was rendered, the parties were about to complete the sale, the Price Administrator commenced this action in the federal District Court to enjoin the State Commissioner of Public Lands and Soundview from completing the timber transaction at a price above the ceiling fixed by the Regulation. The District Court held that the Emergency Price Control Act did not grant the Price Administrator authority to set maximum prices for school-land timber sold by the State. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 777. Because the Circuit Court's decision conflicted with that of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Twin Falls County v. Hulbert, Idaho, 156 P.2d 319, we granted certiorari in both cases.

Before considering the principal questions raised by the State we shall at the outset briefly dispose of certain procedural contentions. The State urges that the complaint should have been dismissed because it was signed by attorneys employed by the Price Administrator and not by the District Attorney or members of the Department of Justice. True, 28 U.S.C. § 485, 28 U.S.C.A. § 485, makes it the duty of every district attorney to prosecute most civil actions to which the United States is a party. But this section does not prescribe the procedure under the Emergency Price Control Act, for that Act specifically empowers the Administrator to commence actions such as this one and authorizes

Page 97

attorneys employed byhim to represent him in such actions. § 201(a). The State contends further that this case should have been tried by a district court composed of three judges because Section 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 380, requires such a proceeding whenever enforcement of a state statute is sought to be enjoined on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. But here the complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the State statute but alleged merely that its enforcement would violate the Emergency Price Control Act. Consequently a three-judge court is not required. Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 358, 359, 60 S.Ct. 947, 950, 84 L.Ed. 1249; Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486, 488, 489, 62 S.Ct. 1122, 1123, 86 L.Ed. 1616. Another procedural point urged by the State is that since this is in effect a controversy between the United States and the State of Washington, the United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 3, Section 2, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution and the District Court lacked power to try the case. But it is well settled that despite Article 3, Congress can give the district courts jurisdiction to try controversies between a state and the United States.3 Congress has given the district court power to try cases such as this one. While Section 233 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 341, does give this Court exclusive jurisdiction to try cases between a state and the United States, section 205(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act specifically provides that the District Court shall have jurisdiction over all enforcement suits. To that extent section 205(c) of the Price Control Act supersedes section 233 of the Judicial Code. United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567.

The State's principal contention is that sales by a state, such as the one here involved, are not and cannot be made subject to price control. Maximum Price Regulation No. 460 which the State's sale of timber allegedly violated

Page 98

specifically provides that it is applicable to sales by states. The State makes the following contentions: (1) Insofar as the Regulation applies to state sales it is unauthorized by the Emergency Price Control Act, since Congress did not intend that Act to apply to states. (2) Even if the Act was intended to apply to state sales, the Act should not be construed as authorizing the Price Administrator to fix a maximum price at which timber on school-land grants can be sold by states. (3) If the Act is so construed, it violates the Fifth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.

We ordinarily would not pass on the statutory authority of the Administrator to promulgate the Regulation in a proceeding such as this one....

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97 practice notes
  • Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility Division, State of Utah, No. 14
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 26, 1962
    ...a three-judge court applied. Query v. United States and Ex parte Bransford were clearly differentiated from one another in Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552, where, as in Bransford, 'the complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the State statute but alleged......
  • Coan v. State of California
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 19, 1974
    ...congressional intent to regulate internal affairs of the state[11 Cal.3d 294] could be established by implication is Case v. Bowles (1945) 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552, involving a sale of goods by a state in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act. That act expressly applie......
  • Kilroy v. Superior Court, No. B107509
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 1997
    ...et seq. proper under Commerce Clause (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and not violative of the Tenth Amendment]; Case v. Bowles (1946) 327 U.S. 92, 102, 66 S.Ct. 438, 443, 90 L.Ed. 552 [wartime price controls on sale of timber by state government (former 50 U.S.C.Appen. § 901 et seq.) not ......
  • United States v. State of California, Civ. No. 62-521-WM.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
    • September 14, 1962
    ...the ambit of Constitutional power, specifically conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the Federal district courts. Cf.: Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 97, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 187-188, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567 (1936); Alabama v. Unit......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
97 cases
  • Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility Division, State of Utah, No. 14
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 26, 1962
    ...a three-judge court applied. Query v. United States and Ex parte Bransford were clearly differentiated from one another in Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552, where, as in Bransford, 'the complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the State statute but alleged......
  • Coan v. State of California
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 19, 1974
    ...congressional intent to regulate internal affairs of the state[11 Cal.3d 294] could be established by implication is Case v. Bowles (1945) 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552, involving a sale of goods by a state in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act. That act expressly applie......
  • Kilroy v. Superior Court, No. B107509
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 1997
    ...et seq. proper under Commerce Clause (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and not violative of the Tenth Amendment]; Case v. Bowles (1946) 327 U.S. 92, 102, 66 S.Ct. 438, 443, 90 L.Ed. 552 [wartime price controls on sale of timber by state government (former 50 U.S.C.Appen. § 901 et seq.) not ......
  • United States v. State of California, Civ. No. 62-521-WM.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
    • September 14, 1962
    ...the ambit of Constitutional power, specifically conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the Federal district courts. Cf.: Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 97, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 187-188, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567 (1936); Alabama v. Unit......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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