Case v. Case

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Campbell, J.:
• Citation: Case v. Case, 26 Mich. 484 (Mich. 1873)
• Decision Date: 09 April 1873
• Parties: Abraham Case v. Richmond E. Case and others

26 Mich. 484

Abraham Case v. Richmond E. Case and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 9, 1873

Heard January 9, 1873; January 10, 1873.

Appeal in chancery from St. Joseph circuit.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

Subsequently, April 29, 1873, an ex parte motion was made on behalf of the complainant, for a stay of proceedings, to permit an application for a rehearing upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Application denied.

Arthur Brown, for the motion.

O. F Bean and H. H. Riley, for complainant.

R. R Pealer, Arthur Brown and B. F. Blair, for defendants.

Campbell, J. Christiancy, Ch. J., and Graves, J., concurred. Cooley, J. dissenting.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

The object of the bill in this cause, was to have set aside a deed claimed to have been obtained by Richmond E. Case from complainant, when the latter was sick, and did not understand the purport and effect of the transaction. The deed conveyed absolutely, and without condition or reservation, all of the real estate of complainant, consisting of a farm owned and occupied by him, in St. Joseph county, Michigan, and a tract of land in Ohio. The deed was made April 18th, 1867, and signed by complainant and his wife Lydia, who is now deceased, and purported to be in consideration of two thousand dollars. Nothing was paid by way of purchase money, but defendant, Richmond E. Case, executed a bond in penalty of one thousand dollars, running to the grantors, conditioned for their support. Complainant repudiates the bond and deed as invalid, the former as never having been agreed upon, or delivered to, or accepted by him, and the latter as not having been his voluntary intelligent act, as a conveyance. Betsey Bucknell is brought in as mortgagee from Richmond E. Case, and Milligan as a tenant.

There is a good deal of testimony which has no very direct bearing on any material issue; and the most material testimony is not harmonious. On some points it cannot well be reconciled. Upon most of the collateral matters, there is no great disagreement.

Complainant is the uncle of Richmond E. Case, and the latter seems to have been in the family from infancy until he grew up, complainant having no children of his own. In 1856, complainant, who had come into the state about a year before, purchased and went into possession of the farm in St. Joseph county. It had been originally purchased in the name of Richmond E. Case, but was deeded to complainant. Whether the payments all came from him, or from Richmond, in whole, or in part, is disputed, but is not material except possibly as indicating a reason which might have weight in determining the action of complainant afterwards. The parties, before the conveyance, were on very intimate terms, and had never had any formal settlement of accounts. There seems no reason to doubt, that complainant regarded Richmond as his probable heir, and their dealings were no more precise than is customary among near relatives. The evidence shows that complainant had spoken of Richmond as if he would have the farm when complainant had done with it. Defendant claims he had desired, and offered to convey it--he not even desiring security for his support, but his wife objecting, unless security should be given. This is denied by complainant. Defendant swears, as well as other witnesses, that complainant had some time previously contemplated making a will. The conversation in regard to conveying to defendant, in which security was referred to, is stated to have been not very long before the deed was actually made. The previous conversations were sad to have been confined to the Michigan farm. On this occasion, defendant includes the Ohio land in the project. He says one thousand dollars was mentioned in conversation with complainant about the bond. But he does not say that sum was agreed upon, or that any terms were fixed, after the wife insisted on security, or that she, or any one, determined that a personal bond would be security, or what should be its terms. It does not appear, if defendant's account is accepted, that there had been such an arrangement as would enable any one to shape the papers without further instructions. If complainant is correct, there was no arrangement at all. The answer does not aver there had been any previous agreement, or any thing more than an intention, and does not aver, in any way, that the bond had been agreed upon, or thought of, before the time of its execution. The averments are more consistent with the idea that nothing had been previously determined on, and the burden of the answer is chiefly, that the deed was made because defendant was equitably the owner of the Michigan lands, and had in various ways befriended complainant. If any such arrangement had been talked of, it was not as one to be made in case of sickness, or impending death, but was to take effect at all events.

Upon a careful review of this portion of the case, we are satisfied that the complainant never seriously contemplated, or agreed, to make any transfer of his property, to become operative during his life, or came to any definite determination, before the time when the papers were executed, how he would dispose of it at all, beyond the general design of giving defendant the ultimate inheritance. It was a homestead in which the wife had concurrent rights, and it appears plainly that it was not likely any attempt would be made to disregard them. Complainant had never ceased to manage the farm as his own, and nothing had occurred to render it likely that he and his wife would desire to leave home and become inmates of another family. There is no testimony tending to show that their continued occupancy of the land was ever talked of as a part of the arrangement whereby they were to lose the title. The probabilities, and the conduct of all the parties, are decidedly against the idea that such a transaction as took place, had ever been decided upon before.

This is rendered more apparent by the fact that there was a conversation between defendant and Mr. Arnold, the notary, on the way down to complainant's house, or about the time they set out, as to why a will was not to be made, rather than a deed, and defendant referred to the expenses of probate as a reason why a deed was preferred. Mr. Arnold was made to understand, from that and preceding conversations he had with complainant, that the arrangement, whatever form it might take, was essentially testamentary in its purpose.

It would be useless to attempt to reconcile all the testimony concerning the transactions at the house. Arnold, who testifies with much caution, is corroborated in the most important particulars, by circumstances about which there can be no great dispute, and we think there can be no reason to doubt the material facts on which he gives his relation.

The condition of complainant is the first thing to be considered. There is some very positive testimony on the defense which, if true, would tend to show complainant was not, on this occasion, either very sick or very feeble. The conduct of all the parties at the time shows this cannot be true. It appears beyond dispute that complainant had desired Arnold to be the person who should prepare such papers as he should make, and had consulted him before about a will. Whether he at this time sent for him, or whether defendant assumed to do so upon his own motion, is not agreed. Complainant denies it, and defendant claims to have acted on hearsay. But it was evidently understood that Arnold was necessary to satisfy complainant, and that complainant had confidence in him, and that he was needed not merely as an acknowledging officer, but as a draughtsman. No such care in choosing a conveyancer would be needed, if nothing was desired but an ordinary conveyance, and this circumstance is important as bearing upon the real character of the arrangement. But, whatever the papers were to be, if complainant sent for him, Arnold was expected to act for the complainant as his adviser in drawing them.

But Arnold himself understood from defendant that nothing was contemplated but a plain deed on a printed form, to save probate expenses. He was not, therefore, informed that anything was expected of him which would require care or vigilance. When he arrived at the house, although he saw complainant in his bedroom, he remembers no conversation with him about the papers, and thinks there was none. He received all his instructions from defendant, and supposed everything had been arranged beforehand. While defendant testifies there was a conversation as to whether there should be a will or a deed, he does not show any consultation as to its terms, and agrees with Arnold that he himself gave directions as to its tenor. When the deed was drawn up, it was not read or explained to complainant. Defendant says the written part of the deed was read to him, which would embrace nothing material beyond the description and parties, if all read. Arnold's recollection is, that it was not read or explained at all. Complainant signed and acknowledged it, and said it was just as he had always intended it--that he intended Richmond should have his property when he was done with it; that he had long contemplated this and was glad...