Case v. Rewerts
| Decision Date | 19 September 1957 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 11059 |
| Citation | 145 N.E.2d 251,15 Ill.App.2d 1 |
| Parties | Charles Center CASE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred REWERTS and Maybelle Meier Rewerts, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John A. Strom, Belvidere, Case & Canaday, Chicago, for appellant.
Berry & Simmons, Rockford, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone County striking and dismissing plaintiff's complaint under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, and from orders denying plaintiff's motions that the court vacate the judgment and enter declaratory and summary judgments in his favor.
Plaintiff had leased his 190.2-acre dairy farm, known as Intershire, located in the southwest part of Boone County, to the defendants and they had agreed to operate the farm on a 50-50 basis from March 1, 1954 to February 28, 1959. The terms of the tenancy were set forth in a five-page lease and a three-page supplementary agreement.
Disagreements arose between the parties and on December 19, 1955, plaintiff served defendants with a nine-page notice of termination of lease and notice to quit and deliver possession of the farm within 10 days. In the notice plaintiff specified from A to Z the alleged defaults, delinquencies and violations on the part of defendants upon which the termination was based. On the same date plaintiff wrote defendants that Howard Martin was his agent and representative, authorized to act for him in all matters relative to the farm. Defendants' attorney wrote to Martin on December 21 suggesting settlement before the first of the year and again on December 28 proposing a division of chattel property between the parties in contemplation of removal from the farm.
In his unverified complaint captioned action under Ill.Rev.Stat., C. 57, Par. 5, filed on January 17, 1956, plaintiff alleged that he 'is entitled to the possession' of the farm and that defendants 'unlawfully withhold possession thereof' from the plaintiff. The complaint contains no claim for rent or for any relief other than possession. Brown, Connolly & Paddock and Knight, Ingrassia & Bourland appear as plaintiff's attorneys at the bottom of the complaint. On January 23 defendants answered denying plaintiff's allegations and demanded trial by jury.
On the same day defendants also filed a three-page complaint in chancery against the plaintiff for a division of their jointly owned chattels and equipment and for an accounting. In their complaint defendants alleged that for several months they had sought to reach an agreement with plaintiff so that the property could be divided and they could move from the farm, but that plaintiff consistently refused to make a division and forbade defendants to do so and thereby rendered it impossible for defendants to move, although they were willing to do so. On February 2 plaintiff filed a thirteen-page verified answer denying that either Mr. Paddock or Mr. Martin ever had any authority to act for him in compromise or settlement of his claims, counterclaiming for an accounting, and adopting by reference allegations contained in his thirteen-page separate complaint in chancery for an accounting, injunction, receiver, etc., which he had filed on January 24. Knight, Ingrassia & Bourland were named as plaintiff's attorneys on his answer. In his separate action in chancery plaintiff complained of defendants' unlawful detention, misuse and waste of the farm and his share of the chattels after December 19, 1955, and alleged that the account involves numerous transactions and is of such complexity and intricacy that it cannot be taken properly by a court of law. Brown, Connolly & Paddock were named as plaintiff's attorneys on his separate complaint.
On February 24, 1956 the chancery cases were consolidated pursuant to defendants' motion. Attorney Paddock appeared for plaintiff and Attorney Simmons appeared for defendants. Pursuant to their stipulation the court ordered that defendants divide the cattle, hogs, poultry and other equipment into two equal parts and plaintiff have his choice; that defendants take and remove from the premises one-half of the silage, hay, corn and oats; that Howard Martin be appointed special commissioner to make division in case the parties were unable to agree; taht the division be made on February 25 and 27; and that defendants move from the farm by March 1, 1956. Mr. Paddock said that he would like to stipulate that the stipulation have no effect whatever on the datainer suit. Mr. Simmons made no response to this suggestion, and the order provided only that the stipulation was entered without prejudice to the rights of the parties as to the matters set forth in the chancery cases. The parties further agreed that the detainer case be set for trial by jury on April 23, 1956. In his affidavit in support of a motion to strike defendants' answer in one of the chancery cases, plaintiff states taht he notified Martin immediately upon his appointment as commissioner that such appointment disqualified him to act in any way as plaintiff's agent or representative.
In their motion filed on April 4, 1956, to strike the complaint in the forcible detainer action, defendants stated that they had moved from the premises on February 28, 1956; that the farm was in plaintiff's possession; and that there was nothing left to be litigated on the complaint and the question was moot. Notice was given Attorney Paddock that the motion to strike would be presented to the court on April 6. On that day the motion was set for hearing on April 13. According to the abstract, plaintiff's attorney in open court on April 13 admitted that the statements in defendants' motion were true, except that there was nothing left to be litigated between the parties and that the question was moot. An entry was made in the judge's docket as follows: Defendants' Motion to strike complaint heard and granted and said complaint ordered stricken. The clerk's record for April 13 is in accord with the docket entry and refers to an order wherein the court found as of April 13, 1956, that the matters set forth in defendants' motion were true in that they did move from plaintiff's farm on or about February 28, 1956, and did surrender possession thereof to plaintiff at that time; that the question raised by the complaint was then a moot point in that the complaint was a possessory action only and that therefore a trial would settle only abstract propositions of law and adjudicate court costs, and therefore the court ordered and adjudged that the complaint be dismissed and stricken and that plaintiff take nothing by his action. The formal order was submitted to the court and signed on April 20.
In the meantime, on April 18, plaintiff filed a motion On April 20 the Court also granted plaintiff leave to file his motion to vacate instanter, and to file supporting affidavits within 10 days, and granted defendants 10 days in which to reply. Subsequently the parties stipulated that plaintiff's time to file documents in support of his motion be extended to May 4.
On May 4 plaintiff filed an eighteen-page affidavit and forty-two exhibits in support of his motion to vacate. Without obtaining leave he also filed on the same day a motion for summary judgment supported by the affidavit and exhibits, and on June 4 a sixteen-page motion for declaratory judgment.
On September 21 plaintiff's motion to vacate came on for hearing. Plaintiff appeared personally and on his behalf Mr. Paddock made an extensive statement of the entire proceedings. In explanation of his position taken on April 13, the court said: here was a forcible entry and detainer suit that had been filed. The case was set for trial with a jury, which takes time, and the tenant came into open court and stated that he had given up possession of the farm, that he was no longer in possession. Then the court felt there was no issue to be tried, there was no reason to call a jury and go through a jury trial on a moot question where the question of possession was terminated by the tenant voluntarily * * * in consequence of the notice he had received from the landlord. Defendants' attorney Simmons read the order sought to be vacated and stated that the order was drafted so...
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