Cases United States v. Steffens United States v. Wittemann United States v. Johnson

Citation25 L.Ed. 550,100 U.S. 82
Decision Date01 October 1879
Docket NumberTRADE-MARK
PartiesCASES. UNITED STATES v. STEFFENS; UNITED STATES v. WITTEMANN; UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

THE first two cases were brought here on certificates of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The last was brought here on a certificate of division on opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.

Steffens was indicted under the fourth and fifth sections of an act of Congress entitled 'An Act to punish the counterfeiting of trade-marks and the sale or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark goods,' approved Aug. 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 141.

The first count in the indictment charges him with knowingly and wilfully having in his possession counterfeits and colorable imitations of the trade-marks of G. H. Mumm & Co., of Rheims, France, manufacturers and sellers of champagne wine.

The second count charges him with knowingly and wilfully selling counterfeited representations and colorable imitations of the trade-mark of said G. H. Mumm & Co. Wittemann was indicted under the fifth section of that act. The indictment consists of six counts, and they charge: 1st, The counterfeiting and forging; 2d, the having in possession colorable imitations of; 3d, the buying; 4th, the selling; 5th, the offering for sale; and, 6th, the dealing in colorable imitations of the private trade-mark belonging to and used by the firm of Kunkleman & Co., of Rheims, France, manufacturers and dealers in wine known as the 'Piper Heidsick' brand of champagne wine.

Johnson, McNamara, and Reeder were prosecuted under that act by a criminal information containing seven counts, of which the first, fourth, and sixth are founded upon a trade-mark consisting of the letters 'O K,' registered in the United States Patent Office by Charles F. O'Donnell, April 2, 1878, for use upon packages of whiskey, and respectively charge the defendants with counterfeiting, affixing a colorable imitation, and dealing in and selling packages of whiskey to which was attached a colorable imitation of said trade-mark; and the second, third, fifth, and seventh counts are founded upon another trade-mark, consisting of a seal and ribbon, the latter secured by the seal of a package containing whiskey, registered by Charles F. O'Donnell, May 21, 1878, and respectively charge the defendants with counterfeiting, making a colorable imitation, affixing a colorable imitation, and dealing in packages of whiskey to which was attached a colorable imitation of said trade-mark.

Sects. 4 and 5 of the act of 1876 are as follows:——

'SECT. 4. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person or persons, knowingly and wilfully cast, engrave, or manufacture, or have in his, her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any die or dies, plate or plates, brand or brands, engraving or engravings, on wood, stone, metal, or other substance, moulds, or any false representation, likeness, copy, or colorable imitation of any die, plate, brand, engraving, or mould of any private label, brand, stamp, wrapper, engraving on paper or other substance, or trade-mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this act.

'SECT. 5. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person or persons, knowingly and wilfully make forge, or counterfeit, or have in his, her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any representation, likeness, similitude, copy, or colorable imitation of any private label, brand, stamp, wrapper, engraving, mould, or trade-mark, registered pursuant to the Statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this act.'

Sect. 4937, Rev. Stat., is as follows:——

'Any person or firm domiciled in the United States, and any corporation created by the authority of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, and any person, firm, or corporation resident of or located in any foreign country which by treaty or convention affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, and who are entitled to the exclusive use of any lawful trade-mark, or who intend to adopt and use any trade-mark for exclusive use within the United States, may obtain protection for such lawful trade-mark, by complying with the following requirements:——

'First, By causing to be recorded in the Patent Office a statement specifying the names of the parties, and their residences and places of business, who desire the protection of the trade-mark; the class of merchandise, and the particular description of goods comprised in such class, by which the trade-mark has been or is intended to be appropriated; a description of the trade-mark itself, with fac-similes thereof, showing the mode in which it has been or is intended to be applied and used; and the length of time, if any, during which the trade-mark has been in use.

'Second, By making payment of a fee of twenty-five dollars in the same manner and for the same purpose as the fee required for patents.

'Third, By complying with such regulations as may be pre scribed by the Commissioner of Patents.'

To each indictment there was a general demurrer. The judges of the Circuit Court were opposed in opinion upon the following question: 'Can the act of Congress, approved Aug. 14, 1876, entitled 'An Act to punish the counterfeiting of trade-mark goods and the sale or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark goods,' under which this indictment is found, be upheld, wholly or in part, as a law necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers vested in the Congress by the Constitution of the United States?'- To the information against Johnson, McNamara, and Reeder there was a general demurrer, and thereupon a question arose for decision whether the said act of Congress 'is within the constitutional power of Congress, or whether the same is unconstitutional, null, and void;' and the opinions of the judges of the Circuit Court were opposed.

The Attorney-General for the United States.

The validity of the act of July 8, 1870, which provides for the registration of trade-marks, and gives remedies by civil actions for infringing them, was recognized by Mr. Justice Clifford, who delivered the opinion of the court in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245. The first sentence of the opinion is as follows:——

'Protection for lawful trade-marks may be obtained by individuals, firms, or corporations entitled to the same if they comply with the requirements prescribed by the act of Congress; and the provision is, that a trade-mark duly registered as required shall remain in force thirty years from the date of such registration, subject to an exception not necessary to be noticed. 16 Stat. 210; Rev. Stat., sects. 4937, 4941.'

Here it is clearly intimated that protection for trade-marks is rightfully provided by that act. If it is invalid, no such protection could be in that mode obtained; but if protection to trade-marks by civil remedies is within the power of Congress, so also are the statutes punishing as a crime the pirating upon property in them. But in that case, and in several others which are cited on the margin of page 955 of the Revised Statutes, the constitutionality of the act was not discussed. In them and others (Smith v. Reynolds, 10 Blatch. 85; Smith v. Reynolds, 13 id. 458; Osgood v. Rockwood, 11 id. 310; Moorman v. Hodge, 2 Saw. 78) it was assumed rather than directly affirmed.

In the sixth circuit Judge Swing pronounced the law to be constitutional. In the seventh circuit a contrary decision was made. In each case the question was argued and decided upon clause 8 of section 8, article 1, of the Constitution, and the opinion was advanced that it is the only provision by which the authority of Congress on the subject of trade-marks is conferred.

The argument drawn from the likeness which property in the use of trade-marks bears to that in partents and copyrights, and from the fact that Congress, in legislating upon these three matters, has, both in the original act and in the Revised Statutes, classed them together, demands careful consideration. Undoubtedly, in the legislative mind they were kindred subjects, and it was thought that the power of Congress over them might be derived from the same source.

I shall, however, not dwell upon this view of the question.

1. I maintain the constitutionality of the statute upon which the indictments and the information are found, upon the ground that it regulates commerce within the power given to Congress by clause 3 of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, which provides that the Congress shall have power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'

'Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, between the citizens of our country and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of different States. The power to regulate it embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. So far as some of these instruments are concerned, and some subjects which are local in their operation, it has been held that the States may provide regulations until Congress acts with reference to them; but where the subject to which the power applies is national in its character, or of such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of all State authority.' Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. This is a full and clear statement of what is meant by 'commerce,' and of the extent of the power of Congress over it.

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