Casey v. Astrue

Decision Date04 October 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-3841.,06-3841.
Citation503 F.3d 687
PartiesPatricia A. CASEY, Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Gregory W. Peterson, Des Moines, IA, for Appellant.

Jon Burning, AG, and Michael J. Rumbaugh, AAG, Lincoln, NE, for Appellee.

Before BENTON, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Patricia Casey's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits were denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Casey sought review before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who, after conducting a hearing, concluded that Casey was not disabled and denied the benefits. The SSA Appeals Council denied review, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final agency determination. Casey sought review in the District Court,2 which affirmed the decision of the agency. Casey appeals, and we affirm.

I.

Casey's applications for benefits alleged that she became disabled and unable to work on June 11, 2002, due to fibromyalgia, back pain, leg pain, depression, and other impairments. On the alleged onset date, she was 40 years old, had a 12th-grade education, and had completed a secretarial training course. She had previously worked as an administrative assistant, employment clerk, program manager, cashier, and waitress.

The ALJ evaluated Casey's disability claim under the sequential analysis prescribed by the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ found that Casey was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Second, the ALJ concluded that Casey was severely impaired by the combination of "fibromyalgia, status post left knee surgery, back pain secondary to past compression fracture and depression." J.A. at 9. At the third step, the ALJ determined that Casey's impairments did not meet or equal any of the impairment listings that create a presumption of disability. Thus, the ALJ continued to the fourth step, where she considered Casey's residual functional capacity (RFC)3 and past relevant work. The ALJ determined that Casey had the RFC to perform work "with the following limitations: occasionally lift ten pounds, frequently lift less than ten pounds, sit a total of six hours in an eight hour day, stand/walk at least two hours in an eight hour day and occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl." Id. at 13. The ALJ concluded that even with these limitations, Casey could return to her past work as an employment clerk, administrative assistant, or program manager. Id. at 15. Because Casey's impairments did not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Casey was not disabled and, thus, not entitled to benefits. The District Court affirmed that decision.

II.

On appeal, Casey contends that the District Court committed reversible error in affirming the ALJ's decision because the ALJ (1) gave improper weight to medical opinions in the record, (2) improperly discredited Casey's subjective complaints of pain, and (3) erred in determining Casey's RFC. We review de novo the District Court's decision affirming the agency's denial of benefits. Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir.2007). In conducting this review, we consider whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id. "Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion." Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 886 (8th Cir.2007). We will not disturb the denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls within the available "`zone of choice.'" Id. (quoting Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir.2006)). "An ALJ's decision is not outside the `zone of choice' simply because we might have reached a different conclusion had we been the initial finder of fact." Id.

A.

Casey first contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence in determining that she was not disabled. In particular, Casey argues that the ALJ gave too little weight to the opinions of physicians that treated and examined her and too much weight to the opinion of a physician who performed a paper review of the medical records.

The ALJ had a duty to evaluate the medical evidence as a whole. See Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001). While a "`treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to substantial weight[,] . . . such an opinion is not conclusive in determining disability status, and the opinion must be supported by medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic data.'" Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Davis v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1994)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) ("If we find that a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight."). "[A]n ALJ may credit other medical evaluations over that of the treating physician when such other assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence." Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.2000) (quotation and citation omitted). In considering how much weight to give a treating physician's opinion, an ALJ must also consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i).

According to Casey, the ALJ's "most outrageous error" was the failure to credit the testimony of Lawrence Rettenmaier, M.D., the rheumatologist who treated Casey's fibromyalgia. Appellant's Br. at 25. Initially, it is important to note that contrary to Casey's suggestion, the ALJ did not reject all of Dr. Rettenmaier's opinions. The ALJ discussed and gave weight to Dr. Rettenmaier's treatment records of December 2001 to May 2004. The ALJ only refused to give weight to Dr. Rettenmaier's opinion expressed in a Fibromyalgia RFC Questionnaire completed in July 2004. In the RFC Questionnaire, Dr. Rettenmaier simply discussed his ultimate conclusions about Casey's limitations, specifically, that Casey could sit for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, for a total of less than two hours in an eight-hour day; could stand for five to ten minutes at a time, for a total of less than two hours in an eight-hour day; would need unscheduled breaks during the workday; and would miss three or more days of work per month due to the severity of her symptoms. The ALJ characterized this opinion as "quite conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming the opinion as to why the claimant was so limited." J.A. at 12. The ALJ further found that although Dr. Rettenmaier did have a treating relationship with Casey, the record revealed that the actual treatment visits were infrequent.

We will discuss the ALJ's determination of Casey's RFC in Part II.C of this opinion. At this point, however, we note that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's refusal to give the opinion of Dr. Rettenmaier controlling weight. As we have stated, a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight only to the extent that it is consistent with medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic data. See Pena, 76 F.3d at 908; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir.1999). Our review of the medical records convinces us that Dr. Rettenmaier's opinion lacks such consistency. On December 7, 2001, Dr. Rettenmaier saw Casey for the first time in "several years." J.A. at 174. A physical examination on that date indicated that Casey had "widespread soft tissue tender points," id. at 175, but also stated that Casey reported doing "reasonably well in the last several years" with her fibromyalgia, id. at 174. Casey had a "full range of motion of the neck, shoulders, elbows, wrists, and hands," and "no pain with range of motion of the hips." Id. at 175. Casey did not see Dr. Rettenmaier again until January 16, 2003. At that time, Casey's soft-tissue tender points remained and she had crepitus (crackling) at the knee, but her straight leg raise was negative. She had tenderness in her lower back, but her thoracic back pain was stable. Dr. Rettenmaier recommended exercise and a nonsteroidal drug. On February 12 and 20, 2003, Dr. Rettenmaier treated Casey's left knee with an injection of osteoarthritis medication. Casey did not see Dr. Rettenmaier again for over a year. On May 17, 2004, Dr. Rettenmaier conducted a physical examination and noted that Casey had some "almost touch-me-not type pain in the lower extremities about her knees," but that "[s]he does not really have that widespread finding." Id. at 279. His report also noted that Casey had "widespread soft tissue tender points." Id. at 280.

The ALJ discussed the reports of other treating physicians, whose diagnoses of Casey's health were more favorable than that of Dr. Rettenmaier. Casey was treated by Jill Meilahn, D.O., in 2001 and 2002 for back and neck pain. An x-ray taken on February 28, 2001, showed Casey's "old vertical fracture through the T12 centrum" (injured in 1989), but indicated that the "thoracic and lumbar discs are well hydrated," "[n]o disc herniation," "[n]o marrow lesion," and "[n]o facet arthritis." Id. at 137. To treat Casey's pain, Dr. Meilahn recommended physical therapy, exercise, and epidural steroid injections. On September 6, 2002, Dr. Meilahn noted that Casey was "helped substantially" by trigger point injections. Id. at 214. An x-ray taken on December 10, 2002, revealed a "[n]ormal lumbar spine." Id. at 164. On December 16, 2002, a physical therapist noted that Casey suffered from sciatica and lower back pain, but anticipated improvements "with increase in activity and exercise as appropriate." Id. at 165.

Casey began...

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