Casey v. N.H. Sec'y of State
Decision Date | 20 May 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 2019-0693,2019-0693 |
Citation | 239 A.3d 1019,173 N.H. 266 |
Parties | Caroline CASEY & a. v. NEW HAMPSHIRE SECRETARY OF STATE & a. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire Foundation, of Concord (Gilles R. Bissonnette and Henry Klementowicz on the joint brief, and Mr. Klementowicz orally), American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, of New York, New York (Julie A. Ebenstein, Theresa J. Lee, and Dale E. Ho on the joint brief), and Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (William E. Christie, S. Amy Spencer, and James J. Armillay, Jr. on the joint brief), for the plaintiffs.
Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Anthony J. Galdieri, senior assistant attorney general, Seth M. Zoracki, assistant attorney general, and Samuel R.V. Garland, attorney, on the brief, and Mr. Galdieri orally), and Cleveland, Waters and Bass, P.A., of Concord (Bryan K. Gould and Cooley A. Arroyo on the brief), for the defendants.
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (Laplante, J.) certified the following questions of law, see Sup. Ct. R. 34 :
For the reasons that follow, and with the qualifications set forth below, we answer questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 in the affirmative. We exercise our discretion under Rule 34 to decline to answer question 3 because the answer to that question is not "determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court." Sup. Ct. R. 34.
As set forth in the district court's order, the plaintiffs are Caroline Casey, Maggie Flaherty, and the New Hampshire Democratic Party. Casey and Flaherty are Dartmouth College students who wish to vote in New Hampshire while attending college, but who do not intend to remain in New Hampshire after graduation. Both have driver's licenses issued by states other than New Hampshire. In 2018, both registered to vote in New Hampshire. Neither Casey nor Flaherty owns a motor vehicle.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Attorney General, challenging, under the Federal Constitution, the defendants' interpretation and implementation of the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6-a. See Laws 2018, ch. 370; see also RSA 21:6, :6-a (Supp. 2019). Those amendments changed the definitions of "resident" and "residence" in RSA 21:6 and :6-a, respectively, so that they no longer applied only to individuals who intended to remain in New Hampshire "for the indefinite future." See Laws 2018, ch. 370. Before the 2018 amendments, the statutory definitions of "resident" and "residence" in RSA 21:6 and :6-a, respectively, expressly required an intention to remain in New Hampshire indefinitely, while RSA 654:1, I (2016), which defines an eligible voter, did not contain the same language. Rather, RSA 654:1, I, requires the manifestation of a "single, continuous presence for domestic, social, and civil purposes relevant to participating in democratic self-government." The 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6-a are discussed in detail in Opinion of the Justices (Definition of Resident and Residence), 171 N.H. 128, 191 A.3d 1245 (2018). We will not repeat that discussion here.
The plaintiffs allege that the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6-a "burden the right to vote and violate the First, Fourteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments" to the United States Constitution. According to the federal district court, the plaintiffs claim that the 2018 amendments indirectly make voter registration an effective declaration of residency that triggers the obligation to obtain a New Hampshire driver's license and vehicle registration under the motor vehicle code. Casey and Flaherty specifically allege that, if they must obtain New Hampshire driver's licenses as a result of having registered to vote here, they will suffer injury. The New Hampshire Democratic Party alleges that the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6-a have harmed it because voters inclined to support its candidates "will incur onerous fees to register to vote or will be too intimidated to register or vote at all." (Quotation omitted.)
According to the district court, "[t]he plaintiffs' constitutional claims are intertwined with several questions of New Hampshire law upon which [it] has found no controlling precedent," and "[r]esolution of these questions may be determinative." Therefore, the district court is "certifying these necessary questions of New Hampshire law" to us because "answers to these questions could result in one or more interpretations of the that do not implicate the federal constitutional right to vote in any way."
Responding to the certified questions requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721, 82 A.3d 917 (2013). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. segTEL v. City of Nashua, 170 N.H. 118, 120, 166 A.3d 213 (2017).
The first certified question asks whether the definitions of "resident" and "residence" in RSA 21:6 and :6-a, respectively, as amended in 2018, are "effectively the same" as the definition of "domicile" in RSA 654:1 (2016), such that a person with a New Hampshire "domicile" under RSA 654:1 is necessarily a New Hampshire "resident" under RSA 21:6. As explained below, we need not decide whether the definitions are "effectively the same" in order to determine whether a person with a New Hampshire "domicile" under RSA 654:1 is necessarily a "resident" under RSA 21:6. As explained below, we conclude that a person with a New Hampshire "domicile" under RSA 654:1 is necessarily a "resident" under RSA 21:6.
RSA chapter 21 sets forth definitions that apply "[i]n the construction of all statutes ..., unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute." RSA 21:1 (2012). RSA 21:6, defining "resident" and "inhabitant," provides:
A resident or inhabitant or both of this state and of any city, town, or other political subdivision of this state shall be a person who is domiciled or has a place of abode or both in this state and in any city, town, or other political subdivision of this state, and who has, through all of his or her actions, demonstrated a current intent to designate that place of abode as his or her principal place of physical presence to the exclusion of all others.
RSA 21:6-a, defining "residence" or "residency," provides:
Residence or residency shall mean a person's place of abode or domicile. The place of abode or domicile is that designated by a person as his or her principal place of physical presence to the exclusion of all others. Such residence or residency shall not be interrupted or lost by a temporary absence from it, if there is an intent to return to such residence or residency as the principal place of physical presence.
The plain meaning of the words "domiciled" and "abode" is to dwell or live. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 671 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining the word "domicile" as "the place of residence either of an individual or of a family : ABODE"); id. at 4 ( ); id. at 1082 ( ). The plain...
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