Casey v. Odwalla, Inc.

• Citation: 338 F.Supp.3d 284
• Decision Date: 19 September 2018
• Docket Number: 17-CV-2148 (NSR)
• Parties: Tara CASEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ODWALLA, INC. and The Coca-cola Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

338 F.Supp.3d 284

Tara CASEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.ODWALLA, INC. and The Coca-cola Company, Defendants.

17-CV-2148 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 19, 2018

Douglas Gregory Blankinship, Todd Seth Garber, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jason Daniel Gerstein, DLA Piper US LLP, Desiree Marie Ripo, Jessica Lynne Supernaw, Alston & Bird, LLP, New York, NY, Jeffrey A. Rosenfeld, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Tara Casey ("Plaintiff"), instituted this putative class action by filing a federal complaint on March 24, 2017, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. (See Compl. (ECF No. 1).) Plaintiff asserts that defendants Odwalla, Inc. ("Odwalla") and The Coca-Cola Company ("Coca-Cola") (collectively, "Defendants") violated the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1983 (the "FDCA") and the New York General Business Law (the "GBL") §§ 349 and 350 and misled consumers when they labeled certain juice products "100% Juice" with "No Added Sugar." (See Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff also asserts a claim for unjust enrichment. (Id. )

Before the Court is Defendants' motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),¹ or in the alternative for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for dismissal of Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing ("Defendants' Motion"). (See Defendants' Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss ("Defs. Br.") (ECF No. 24) at 1-3.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Complaint; their truth is assumed for purposes of this motion only. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Defendant Odwalla is a subsidiary of Coca-Cola that manufactures "over forty varieties of premium juices, smoothies, protein shakes and snack bars." (See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 16.) Odwalla is a California corporation and Coca-Cola is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Of the various products it produces, Odwalla manufactures and sells premium Odwalla "100% Juice" juices which contain the phrase "No Added Sugar" on the label (the "Juices"). (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the label is correct; as such, Plaintiff concedes that the Juices do not contain added sugar. (Id. ¶ 17 (noting that the label "is technically true".) The labeling on Defendants' Juices appears as follows:

Plaintiff is a health conscious New York resident who purchased the Juices, including Groovin' Greens 100% and Berry Greens 100% Juice. (See Compl. ¶ 8.) In purchasing the Juices, Plaintiff "relied on Defendants' misleading statements that the product contained ‘No Added Sugar.’ " (Id. ) Plaintiff would not have purchased the product in absence of the "No Added Sugar" label. (Id. ) Plaintiff contends that Defendants' inclusion of this phrase is impermissible under the FDCA, because the Juices "do not resemble or substitute for a food that normally contains added sugar because fruit and vegetable juices do not normally contain added sugar." (Id. ¶ 19.) Consequently, Plaintiff contends that the inclusion of "No Sugar Added" on the Juices is misleading, as it makes consumers believe that other 100% Juices without the "No Added Sugar" label contain added sugar and are therefore not as healthy. (Id. ¶¶ 20-24.) As a result of this deceptive labeling, consumers pay a premium for Defendants' products. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Defendants' moved to transfer this matter to the Central District of California, or in the alternative, to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. After the motion was fully submitted, Defendants filed a request asking this Court to take judicial notice of a letter dated August 31, 2017 written by Douglas A. Balentine, Director of the Office of Nutrition and Food Labeling, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, at the United States Food & Drug Administration (the "FDA Letter"). (See Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("Defs. Req.") (ECF No. 31), Ex. A.) The letter was written to the Center for Science in the Public Interest (the "CSPI"), in response to the CSPI's May 24, 2017 letter requesting that "the FDA take action to enforce its regulation" to prohibit companies from labeling 100% juices as "No Added Sugar." (See Defs. Req., Ex. B.) The letter is not published on the FDA's website, but was obtained by Defendants through a Freedom of Information Act request. (See Defs. Req., Ex. A.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must assess whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is " ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ " or to credit "mere conclusory statements", or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pled allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

I. 12(b)(1)

A challenge to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is properly raised by way of a 12(b)(1) motion. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. , 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008), aff'd , 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) ; Alliance for Envt'l Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co. , 436 F.3d 82, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2006). Without jurisdiction, the Court is devoid of the "power to adjudicate the merits of the case." Carter v. HealthPort Tech., LLC , 822 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2016). It is well-settled that the "plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc. , 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Luckett v. Bure , 290 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 2002) ). If an official or entity is entitled to sovereign immunity, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Cooper v. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Health , No. 01-CV-943 (AGS), 2001 WL 456348, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2001) ; see also Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n , 557 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1977).

DISCUSSION

I. Transfer Venue

Defendants first move pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for an order transferring this case to the Central District of California. (See Defs. Br. at 12.)

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that:

[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

On a motion to transfer, a court must consider a two-part inquiry.

Winter v. Am. Institute of Med. Sciences & Educ. , 242 F.Supp.3d 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The court must first determine whether the action could have been brought in the proposed transferee forum. See AEC One Stop Grp. v. CD Listening Bar , 326 F.Supp.2d 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The threshold question of deciding transfer of venue ... is whether the action could have been brought in the transferee forum.").

Assuming the threshold issue is satisfied, a court must consider whether transfer is appropriate. Such a determination is arrived at by weighing a non-exhaustive list of factors, including: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the convenience of the witnesses; (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the locus of operative facts; (6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (7) the relative means of the parties; (8) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice. See e.g. N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc. , 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) ; D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener , 462 F.3d 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Larew v. Larew , No. 11-CV-5771 (BSJ) (GWG), 2012 WL 87616, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012).

"No one factor is dispositive and the relative weight of each factor depends on the particular circumstances of the case." Winter , 242 F.Supp.3d at 213 (quoting Smart Skins v. Microsoft , No. 14-CV-10149, 2015 WL 1499843, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) ). A district court has "broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis." D.H. Blair , 462 F.3d at 106. It is the burden of the moving party "to make a ‘clear and convincing’ showing that transfer" is proper. Atl. Recording v. Project Playlist , 603 F.Supp.2d 690, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

A. Venue in the Central District of California

Plaintiff maintains that this case cannot be transferred to the Central District of California because venue is not proper in that district and California would not...