Casey v. State

Citation116 Fla. 3,156 So. 282
PartiesCASEY v. STATE.
Decision Date27 July 1934
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, Judge.

Clarence D. Casey was convicted of murder in the first degree, and the death penalty was imposed. To review an order denying his motion to set aside judgment and penalty and to permit him to withdraw plea of guilty and enter plea of not guilty and go to trial on the merits, he brings error.

Reversed.

COUNSEL

Herbert S. Sepler and John W. DuBose, both of Miami and T. Frank Wales, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

TERRELL Justice.

On January 12, 1932, the plaintiff in error, Clarence D. Casey was jointly indicted with James Milligan, Frank Moulton, and Cecil James, for murder in the first degree. Frank Moulton and Cecil James turned state's evidence, entered a plea of guilty, and on the recommendation of the state attorney were sentenced to the state penitentiary for life. There was a severance as to Casey and Milligan. Milligan was tried, and the jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree without recommendation. On the day he was indicted, Casey was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Two days later, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty of murder in the first degree. On the 18th of January, 1932, six days after indictment and after conviction of Milligan, the court imposed the death penalty on Casey. On July 16, 1933, Casey filed his motion to set aside the latter judgment and penalty and prayed that he be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty, enter a plea of not guilty in its stead, and go to trial at once on the merits. Affidavits were submitted and other testimony was taken in support of this motion, which was, after full consideration, denied. The instant writ of error was prosecuted to the last-named order.

It is contended here that the plaintiff in error should have been permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty because the plea of guilty was entered under duress, fear, misunderstanding, improper influence, and the assurance that the court would be lenient on him if such a plea was entered.

The motion to set aside the judgment and sentence of death and to withdraw the plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial thereon at once may be treated either as an extraordinary application for new trial or as an application for writ of error coram nobis; our conclusion being that the judgment brought in question was void and could have been reached by either motion.

The evidence as to whether the plea of guilty was entered through fear, duress, misunderstanding, or improper influence is about as conflicting as it is possible for it to be. This court is on record as holding that such a motion is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court but subject to review by the appellate court. Pope v. State, 56 Fla. 81, 47 So. 487, 16 Ann. Cas. 972.

In the last-cited case, we said in substance that the law favors trials on the merits and that a plea of guilty to a serious criminal charge should be freely and voluntarily made and entered by the accused without a semblance of coercion and without fear or duress of any kind. It is possible that the plea of guilty in this case was entered freely and voluntarily and without a semblance of coercion, but, when such a plea is entered as here by an ignorant young man charged with a capital offense and the evidence on that point is in hopeless conflict, it raises a very strong suspicion that some undue influence contributed to the plea. When such a case is duly presented, the better practice is to permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and proceed to trial on a proper plea.

Aside from this consideration, however, the judgment and sentence of death was lacking in the essential requirements of law, and will have to be set aside. The order denying the motion to set aside the judgment and sentence of death and refusing to permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and enter a plea of not guilty discloses that the trial judge misapprehended his function as such and failed to observe the legal requirements to a valid judgment in such a case.

In his order, the court said in part:

'When Casey came up for sentence, it was suggested by his counsel that in view of his plea, he was entitled to and should receive the mercy of the Court. But in view of all facts and circumstances of the case, it seemed otherwise to the presiding Judge, notwithstanding defendant's plea of guilty; it did not seem proper that Milligan, who was an accessory before the fact, should receive the extreme penalty and that Casey, the confessed leader of the party, should escape with a life sentence. * * *
'The Court will state further that in sentencing Casey, Moulton, and James on their pleas of guilty, no additional testimony was taken. The men were jointly indicted with Milligan and all appeared as witnesses at the trial and testified either for the State or for the Defendant. It did not occur to the Court or to the State's Attorney that it was necessary that a separate record should be made in each case when all of the facts relating to the homicide and attempted
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Reddick v. State, 6551
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 10 Agosto 1966
    ...invalidate such a plea; it must be 'without semblance' of such influence. Clay v. State, 1921, 82 Fla. 83, 89 So. 353; Casey v. State, 1934, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282; Nickels v. State, 1923, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 497, 99 So. 121; Brown v. State, 1926, 92 Fla. 592, 109 So. 627. In Jones v. Stat......
  • Chambers v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 3 Marzo 1939
    ...is not properly entered on it where the court does not satisfy itself of the voluntary character of the plea.' And in Casey v. State, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282, this held that: 'Plea of guilty to serious criminal charge should be freely and voluntarily made and entered by accused without semb......
  • Tilghman v. Culver
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 18 Diciembre 1957
    ...or not presents a matter in the sound discretion of the trial court, but subject to review by the appellate court, e.g. Casey v. State, 1934, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282. There is no valid reason for allowing this petitioner to withdraw his plea of guilty; since he raises the question at such a......
  • Rubenstein v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 20 Febrero 1951
    ...Fla. 83, 89 So. 353; Brown v. State, 92 Fla. 592, 109 So. 627; Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 497, 502, 99 So. 121; Casey v. State, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282; Eckles v. State, 132 Fla. 526, 180 So. 764; Sinclari v. State, 133 Fla. 77, 182 So. 637; Artigas v. State, 140 Fla. 671, 192 So......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT