Casey v. State
| Decision Date | 04 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 1945,1945 |
| Citation | 722 A.2d 385,124 Md. App. 331 |
| Parties | Benjamin James CASEY v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Michael R. Braudes, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Thomas K. Clancy, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Joseph I. Cassilly, State's Atty. for Harford County, Bel Air, on the brief), for appellee.
Submitted before MURPHY, C.J., and RICHARD R. BLOXOM (specially assigned) and PAUL E. ALPERT (Ret'd., specially assigned), JJ. MURPHY, Chief Judge.
In the Circuit Court for Harford County, a jury convicted Benjamin James Casey, appellant, of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The State's evidence was sufficient to establish that he committed each of those offenses after he was hired by one Kenneth Daughton to kill the victim. Appellant does not argue to the contrary. He does contend, however, that he is entitled to a new trial and presents the following questions for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence as part of Appellant's statement to police a)his invocation of the right to counsel and b) the opinion of an interrogating officer that Appellant was not telling the truth?
II. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to strike a nonresponsive answer to defense counsel's question, resulting in improper evidence that an alleged co-conspirator of Appellant had entered a plea of guilty?
III. Did the trial court erroneously permit improper prosecutorial closing argument?
IV. Did the trial court err in permitting the State to cross-examine Appellant concerning his hiring of counsel and information that he imparted or chose not to impart to counsel?
V. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence certain aspects of the police investigation relating to William Haynes?
VI. Did the trial court err in refusing to compel the State to turn over statements of Detective Cole for the purposes of cross-examination at the hearing upon Appellant's motions to suppress evidence?
VII. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment?
We answer "yes" to questions I, II, IV, and V, and must therefore reverse the judgments of the circuit court. We shall also address the remaining issues that are certain to arise when this case is tried again.
On October 29, 1994, Michael Corey Allendorf was shot and killed outside his residence in Joppa, Maryland. On March 6, 1996, appellant was charged with Allendorf's murder. Kenneth Daughton, who had entered a guilty plea for his role in the murder, testified that he hired appellant and William Hynes to kill Allendorf for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).1
Daughton's credibility was attacked by several defense witnesses.2 Because Daughton knew many details surrounding the shooting, the defense argued that he may have been the shooter. Appellant testified that, although he did agree at one point to "beat (Allendorf) up," he played no role in the murder.
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred when it admitted the following portion of a February 1, 1996 tape recorded statement he gave to the investigating officers:
Appellant's trial counsel interposed a timely objection to the introduction of this evidence. The circuit court overruled that objection, but did instruct the jurors that they should draw no inference of guilt from appellant's invocation of his right to counsel. We are persuaded that there are two reasons why the evidence at issue should have been excluded.
It is well settled that evidence of an accused's intent to obtain the advice of counsel is inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-401. In Waddell v. State, 85 Md.App. 54, 582 A.2d 260 (1990), this Court reversed a first degree murder conviction because the jury received evidence of appellant's intent to obtain counsel. We rejected the State's argument that the jury would be unlikely to equate a request for counsel with evidence of guilt:
A juror, even without the prosecutor's suggestive comments, easily might infer from the witness's testimony that appellant planned to obtain counsel because he had done something for which he needed a lawyer to defend him. ... As an evidentiary matter, the testimony was irrelevant and should not have been admitted into evidence.
Id. at 65, 582 A.2d 260, citing Hunter v. State, 82 Md.App. 679, 690-691, 573 A.2d 85 (1990). In Hunter, this Court reversed a conviction for negligent homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated because the jury received evidence that appellant contacted his attorney immediately following the fatal accident:
To draw an inference of consciousness of guilt from the seeking of such advice, then, is both illogical and unwarranted; the fact to be inferred—the consciousness of guilt—is not made more probable (or less probable) from the mere seeking of legal advice or representation,and so evidence of the predicate fact is simply irrelevant. On pure evidentiary grounds, it is inadmissable.
It is also well settled that the investigating officers' opinions on the truthfulness of an accused's statement are inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-401. In Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 404 A.2d 244 (1979), the Court of Appeals reversed a first degree murder conviction because the jury heard evidence of a tape recorded interrogation during which police officers expressed disbelief in the defendant's story. The Court held:
The credibility of the accused was all important in the determination by the jury of the validity of her claim throughout the interrogations that she killed in self-defense. There is no doubt that the challenged comments of the police which were heard by the jury, whether in the form of questions, assertions of disbelief, ... tended to seriously prejudice the defense. We think they did so improperly in the circumstances.
Id. at 451, 404 A.2d 244. See also Snyder v. State, 104 Md.App. 533, 554, 657 A.2d 342 (1995) in which this Court reversed a murder conviction because the jurors heard an investigating officer's testimony that "clearly brought out the obvious disbelief of the police in [appellant's] version of what happened." On remand, the above quoted portion of appellant's statement must not be presented to the jury.
The following transpired during defense counsel's cross-examination of Kenneth Daughton:
We are persuaded that defense counsel's motion should have been granted. The State is not entitled to present evidence of an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea. Clemmons v. State, 352 Md. 49, 57-58, 720 A.2d 1170 (1998). "When a factfinder is shown that the conspirator, with whom an accused has been charged with having conspired, has pled guilty, there is more than a `reasonable possibility that the evidence ... may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.'" Carr v. State, 50 Md.App. 209, 211, 437 A.2d 238 (1981). On remand, unless Luana Gill's plea agreement becomes relevant to her credibility as a witness, the circuit court must not admit evidence of that agreement.
Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to express a personal opinion about Daughton's credibility. The following transpired during the prosecutor's closing argument:
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