Cash v. Smith, No. 99-12797

Decision Date01 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-12797,Docket No. 98-01367-VC-P-S
Citation231 F.3d 1301
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) BRENDA CASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SYLVIA SMITH, ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees. D. C
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and SHAPIRO*, District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to determine whether the plaintiff, Brenda Cash, had a medical condition that qualifies as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court, finding that Cash's physical impairments did not rise to the level of a disability under the ADA, granted defendant Alabama Power Company's motion for summary judgment. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Brenda Cash began her association with the Alabama Power Company ("APCO") in 1986, working as an outside contractor who provided typesetting support for the graphics department in APCO's in- house print shop. In 1989, she accepted full-time employment in the print shop, where she continued to do typesetting work for the next four years. In 1993, Cash's duties broadened to include providing administrative support within the print shop, such as handling the billing records and employee time sheets. In 1996, the print shop purchased a computerized tracking system called the "PSI," which was intended to monitor the progress of the shop's orders and automate its billing system. Cash, while still performing her administrative duties, was assigned the responsibility of implementing the new system. To this point in her career at the print shop, Cash had always received positive performance reviews from her supervisor, Marvin Fritz.

Cash had suffered from various medical problems for years, including diagnoses of mitral valve prolapse, migraine headaches, depression, high blood pressure, and the removal of a brain tumor, but there is no evidence that these conditions had any adverse effects on Cash's work performance. In 1997, however, Cash was diagnosed with a seizure disorder in August and adult-onset diabetes in October. These developments roughly coincided with Marvin Fritz retiring and Sylvia Smith replacing him as manager of the print shop in September. Cash claims that she told Smith of her diabetes diagnosis in confidence, and that Smith violated that confidence by telling other print shop employees the nature of her illness.

Cash began missing work with increased frequency after she was diagnosed with the seizure disorder and diabetes. By the end of 1997, she had completely exhausted all of her paid sick leave and vacation time for the year, but Smith permitted Cash to take unpaid leave whenever she requested it. Cash was entitled to a new allotment of vacation time in January 1998, and was frequently absent from work in the early part of that year for both medical and other personal reasons. In response to Cash's absenteeism, Smith contacted APCO's disability management department to find out what was the appropriate course of action. Smith was told to have Cash complete APCO's standard Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork in order to discover the seriousness of Cash's illnesses and determine whether she qualified for disability or FMLA leave. After examining and speaking with Cash, Dr. Beaty, her personal physician, filled out the FMLA forms and indicated that Cash was not disabled and did not require FMLA leave.

From the time she took over as manager in September 1997, Smith had viewed the implementation of the PSI as one of the print shop's main priorities, and to that end relieved Cash of her administrative duties so that she could focus exclusively on getting the PSI up and running. Smith set a target date of January 1998 for Cash to have the PSI fully implemented, which meant having the software installed to the print shop's specifications and the employees trained in its use. The PSI software was installed on time, but Smith was not satisfied that it was tailored to meet the print shop's specific needs, and the employees were not adequately trained in its use. As of the time Cash filed her lawsuit, the PSI was still not operational.

In January 1998, a typesetter in the print shop resigned from her job, and Cash volunteered to assume typesetting duties to compensate for the vacancy until the spot was filled. Rather than hire another typesetter, however, Smith permanently reassigned Cash to typesetting duties. Smith then created and posted a new position, called "print specialist." The primary responsibility of the print specialist was to be the implementation and management of the operations of the PSI, but the position also encompassed other duties, such as handling vendor relationships and providing customer support. Twelve people, including Cash, applied for the print specialist job in April 1998. A hiring committee interviewed the twelve applicants and asked four of them to return for a second interview, but Cash was not one of them. The committee eventually hired Mary Guarino for the position, a woman whom seven of the eight members of the committee had agreed was the most qualified applicant.

Cash continued to perform typesetting duties in the print shop after she was not hired for the print specialist job, but she soon began applying for other positions within APCO. In May 1998, she was given a new job in a new department as a client service representative, for which she received a pay raise. After transferring to her new job, Cash had to be hospitalized for depression in late July 1998, and did not return to work until September. In late September, however, she again underwent in-patient treatment for depression.

On 28 May 1998, Cash brought this lawsuit, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as asserting state law claims for invasion of privacy and interference with business relations. Smith and APCO filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of Cash's complaint, which the district court granted.1

II. DISCUSSION

We review the decision of a district court to grant a summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that were applicable in the trial court. See Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999). "Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1996). While we apply a de novo standard of review to the district court's legal conclusions, we must resolve any factual questions with all reasonable inferences being drawn in favor of the non-movant. See Hilburn, 181 F.3d at 1225.

A. Discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act

The basis of Cash's primary ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims is that Smith discriminated against her based on her medical conditions when she both removed Cash from the task of implementing the PSI and subsequently failed to hire her for the print specialist position. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Cash must demonstrate that she (1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards used in ADA cases, see 29 U.S.C. 794(d), and therefore we will discuss these two claims together.2

Our initial inquiry is whether Cash's various medical problems rose to the level of a disability. The ADA and the regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act both define "disability"3 as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. 12102(2); see 34 C.F.R. 104.3(j)(1). Cash did not clearly articulate which of the three statutory definitions of disability she was proceeding under, so we will examine each in turn.

It is not disputed that Cash suffers from a number of medical conditions that could each be regarded as impairments. The question, however, is whether these impairments substantially limit one or more major life activities. We are guided on this issue by the regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which state that "[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i).

Cash has exhaustively chronicled her many health problems and enumerated their symptoms, but she has failed to specify a major life activity that she is substantially limited in, nor has she provided any evidence of such a limitation. Cash's seizure disorder results in her experiencing "focal" seizures, which can last anywhere from a few seconds to several minutes and result in her feeling numb on the left side of her body. Cash is briefly incapacitated during the short period when she is experiencing a seizure, but she can resume her normal activity after it passes. The seizures occur mainly at night, and Cash testified to having experienced only one seizure at work during 1997. Cash's seizure disorder is a chronic one, but since her diagnosis in August 1997, it has largely been controlled by medication.4

In short, Cash has established that she occasionally suffers from focal seizures, but she has not shown that these seizures have limited any of her major life activities. The same is true of her diabetes, migraines, and depression;5 whi...

To continue reading

Request your trial
358 cases
  • Schobert v. CSX Transp. Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • November 30, 2020
    ...is not settled whether [29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g) ] gives rise to a private right of action for disclosure[.]") (citing Cash v. Smith , 231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) ). Cash , in avoiding the cause of action question, found the employee's "unlawful disclosure" claim failed because "volu......
  • Lange v. Houston County, Georgia, CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-cv-392 (MTT)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • October 30, 2020
    ...same analysis applies to the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. Docs. 62-1 at 17-18, 18 n.16; 74 at 43; see Cash v. Smith , 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards used in ADA cases."). Again, Lang......
  • Mitchell v. Rouse, CASE NO. 2:11-CV-1101-WHA [WO]
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • February 9, 2015
    ...(2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his] disability." Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). This standard derives from the ADA's language, stating that "no [employer] shall discriminate against a quali......
  • D.D.T. v. Rockdale Cnty. Pub. Sch.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • September 30, 2021
    ...985. Discrimination claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards. Id. ; see also Cash v. Smith , 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). To state a claim under either Title II or Section 504, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead "(1) that he is a qualified......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Proving Disability in the Performance of Manual Tasks: the Supreme Court's Latest Ada Decision
    • United States
    • State Bar of Georgia Georgia Bar Journal No. 8-1, August 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...and we have no occasion to decide what level of deference, if any, they are due." Toyota, 122 S. Ct. at 689. 42. Id. at 694. 43. Id. 44. 231 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 45. Id. at 1306. See also Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Shacks Carribean, 265 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee who suff......
  • The Family Medical Leave Act--ten years later.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 77 No. 9, October 2003
    • October 1, 2003
    ...a connection between the protected conduct and the decision to take the adverse employment action. (42) * Brenda Cash v. Sylvia Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. In Cash, an employee sued her employer under the FMLA. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer, and the employ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT