Casiano-Montanez v. State Ins. Fund Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11-1002 (DRD) |
| Parties | Nancy Casiano-Montanez, et al. Plaintiffs v. State Insurance Fund Corporation, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Eleven (11) current and former employees ("Plaintiffs") of the State Insurance Fund Corporation ("SIFC") filed suit against the SIFC, several of its officers, and the conjugal partnerships of each ("Defendants"). Allegedly, Plaintiffs suffered adverse employment actions due to their political affiliations. Defendants moved for summary while Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims against two defendants. The stage is set below.
"We rehearse the facts as they appear in the summary judgment record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the parties opposing summary judgment." Perez v. Lorraine Enterprises, Inc., 769 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., 737 F.3d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 2013)).
Plaintiffs, all members of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), are composed of a group of nine current and two former employees of the SIFC.1 The SIFC is a public corporation and agency of the local executive branch that provides worker compensation and health care for employees injured during the course of their employment.
Between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2008, each plaintiff was appointed to a career position in the SIFC. It should be noted that the PDP had control of the executive branch for this entire eight-year stretch. However, once the newly elected governor from the New Progressive Party ("NPP") came into power on January 1, 2009, Zoimé Álvarez-Rubio was appointed as the new Administrator of the SIFC.
Subsequently, the SIFC audited all personnel transactions from January 1, 2001, to December 31, 2008, to make sure that all of the "regulations and procedures," especially the merit principle, were followed. Docket No. 132-1 at p. 2, ¶ 3. After all 3,835 SIFC employees at the time had their employment files examined, it was discovered that 232 of these appointments—including those of Plaintiffs—were illegal.2 Specifically, these appointments did not comply with the merit principle, as they were not subject to public competition. Without exception, all 232 appointments were nullified. The instant lawsuit ensued.
Plaintiffs brought suit against the SIFC; the Administrator of the SIFC, Zoimé Álvarez-Rubio; the conjugal partnership formed by Zoimé Álvarez-Rubio and her husband; former Director of the SIFC Human Resources Department, Saúl Rivera-Rivera; the conjugal partnership formed by Saúl Rivera-Rivera and his wife; Executive Director of the Industrial Hospital, Jorge García-Ortiz; the conjugal partnership formed by Jorge García-Ortiz and his wife; Administrator of the Industrial Hospital, Ernesto Santiago-Zayas; the conjugal partnership formed by Ernesto Santiago-Zayas and his wife.
Plaintiffs invoked various federal and state law causes of action. First Amendment political discrimination is the sole remaining federal cause of action.3 Plaintiffs essentially contend that the audit was really just a pretext to discriminate against the many PDP members who were appointed during the eight-year PDP regime. With respect to this claim, Defendants moved for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, (2) Defendants prevail on Mt. Healthy grounds, and/or (3) individual capacity Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs responded in unorthodox fashion. On the same date that the opposition to summary judgment was due, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case without prejudice against two defendants (Ernesto Santiago-Zayas and Jorge García-Ortiz) and opposed the summary judgment of the remaining defendants.4 See Docket No. 141 at p. 2, footnote 1 ( ). Not surprisingly, Defendants opposed this dismissal request. The Court will have to deem the summary judgment motion unopposed against these two defendantsunless Plaintiffs are allowed to voluntarily dismiss the claims against them. Plaintiffs have taken that risk by ignoring the opposition deadline.
The Court turns to the relevant legal framework, saving a more in-depth factual discussion for the analysis.
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute is 'genuine' if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party." See Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013); Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-250 (1986); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The analysis with respect to whether or not a "genuine" issue exists correlates with the burden of proof that a non-movant would have in trial. "[T]he determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. (applying the summary judgment standard while taking into account a higher burden of proof for defamation cases brought by public figures). In order for a disputed fact to be considered "material" it must have the potential "to affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-661(1st Cir. 2000) (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-248); and Prescott, 538 F.3d at 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The objective of the summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997) (). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact on the record. Shalala, 124 F.3d at 306. Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably find in his favor. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The non-movant may not defeat a "properly focused motion for summary judgment by relying upon mere allegations," but rather through definite and competent evidence. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The non-movant's burden thus encompasses a showing of "at least one fact issue which is both 'genuine' and 'material.'" Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000) (). As a result, the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-248. Similarly, summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party rests solely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 1996); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
However, an unopposed motion for summary judgment should only be granted "if the motion and supporting materials--including the facts considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); see also Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) () (citing Mullen v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir. 1992) and López v. Corporación Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir. 1991)); Fontanez-Nunez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must, at the expense of repetition, "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 76 (1st Cir. 2013) (reiterating Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) . Moreover, "we afford no evidentiary weight to conclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative." Tropigas De P.R. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as...
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