Cason v. Cason, 20767

Citation271 S.C. 393,247 S.E.2d 673
Decision Date18 September 1978
Docket NumberNo. 20767,20767
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesJames Trenton CASON, Respondent, v. Miriam Crutchfield CASON, Appellant.

Julius B. Aiken, Greenville, for appellant.

Carter, Philpot, Johnson & Smith, Greenville, for respondent.

LEWIS, Chief Justice:

This action involves the obligation of the respondent-husband to pay alimony and support to his wife and children.

Appellant and respondent, formerly husband and wife, were divorced in 1969. Four children were born to the marriage. The divorce decree granted custody of the minor children to the appellant-wife, and awarded support for her and the children in the amount of $300.00 every four weeks, $250.00 of which was child support and $50.00 alimony. A previous petition by respondent for a reduction in the amount of child support, because of the emancipation of one of the children by marriage, was denied, thereby effecting an increase from $62.50 to $83.33 in the proportionate amount of child support for each of the three remaining minor children.

Respondent brought this action seeking a termination of his obligation to continue support payments for a son, who had been killed in an automobile accident, and another son, Phillip, who had attained the age of eighteen (18) years. The answer and counterclaim of appellant admitted that one son had died and that the other, Phillip, had reached the age of eighteen (18) years; but denied that Phillip was emancipated by reason of his age, and additionally alleged that Phillip was physically disabled. Appellant also sought an increase in alimony and child support and an award of counsel fees.

The order of the lower court denied the request for an increase in alimony; terminated support payments for the deceased son and the son who had reached the age of eighteen (18) years; increased the support payments for the remaining child to the amount of $93.36 each four weeks; and denied the request for counsel fees. The appellant (wife) challenges in this appeal, basically, all of the material findings of the lower court, including those relating to the adequacy of alimony and child support, the disallowance of counsel fees, and the termination of support payments for the son, Phillip, who had reached the age of eighteen.

Most of the issues involve review of factual findings by the lower court which were resolved upon conflicting testimony. These factual findings involve no novel issues and a review here of the testimony would serve no useful purpose. We are convinced that there is ample support to sustain the conclusions of the trial judge relative to the amount of alimony and support for the remaining child under eighteen (18) years, and that there is no evidence to sustain the contention that the eighteen (18) year old son is physically disabled.

The decision of the lower court to terminate support payments to the son, Phillip, was based upon the conclusion that he, having attained the age of eighteen (18) is now emancipated, with no legal obligation on the part of respondent, the father, to further provide for his support. A review of this holding requires consideration of the recent change in the age of majority in this State and its effect upon the right of appellant to insist upon a continuation of the support payments provided under a prior court order.

By Act No. 15 of the Acts of 1975, the General Assembly ratified a constitutional amendment lowering the age of majority in this State from 21 to 18 years. This amendment is now Section 14 of Article 17 of the Constitution and is as follows Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law, shall be deemed sui juris and endowed with full legal rights and responsibilities, provided, that the General Assembly may restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons until age twenty-one.

After the adoption of the foregoing constitutional provision, the General Assembly enacted in 1976 what is now Code Section 15-1-320 (Supp.) relative to the meaning of the word "minors". The pertinent portion of this statute is found in paragraph (a) thereof and is as follows:

(a) All references to minors in the law of this State shall after February 6, 1975, be deemed to mean persons under the age of eighteen years except in laws relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages; provided, however, that any person performing any act or receiving any property, rights or responsibilities pursuant to an instrument executed prior to February 6, 1975, shall have his majority or minority determined by the law relating to majority or minority in existence at the time of the execution of such instrument.

Appellant argues that, under the quoted language of Section 15-1-320, she and her son, Phillip, obtained vested rights in and to the continuance of the support payments by respondent, which the 1969 divorce decree directed him to make. The relevant language from the decree states:

It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant (respondent) be and he is hereby directed to pay direct to the plaintiff, by way of check, the sum of two hundred and fifty ($250.00) dollars every fourth week for the support and maintenance of the four minor, dependent children of the marriage, such payments to...

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12 cases
  • Bornemann v. Bornemann
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 12, 2007
    ...vest any rights. Minority status is both defined by the legislature and is subject to change by the legislature."); Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1978)("The fact that the age of majority was twenty-one (21) at the time of the decree and the determination of the liabilit......
  • Petition of White
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1989
    ...We hold such an agreement is not modifiable by the court without the consent of the parties. 2 See, Stanaland, supra; Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978); Schadel v. Schadel, 268 S.C. 50, 232 S.E.2d 17 (1977); Shaffner, supra. The court may order specific performance of such......
  • Smith v. Smith, 21347
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1980
    ...modifiable upon proper showing of a change in either the child's needs or the supporting parents financial ability. Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977). The amount awarded is within the sound discretion of the trial......
  • Katz v. Katz
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • January 11, 1979
    ...liability for their support. (Emphasis added.) 216 Va. at 638, 222 S.E.2d at 512. In a subsequent North Carolina case, Cason v. Cason, N.C., 247 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1978), (which is relevant because of the approval which the Virginia Court had expressed of the North Carolina approach in Shoaf,......
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