Cason v. Miller (Ex parte Rock Wool Mfg. Co.)
Decision Date | 18 March 2016 |
Docket Number | 1141252. |
Citation | 202 So.3d 669 |
Parties | Ex parte ROCK WOOL MANUFACTURING COMPANY. (In re Palmer CASON and Jessie M. Cason v. Gerald W. Miller et al.). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Michael I. Fish, Mary Stewart Nelson, and Charley M. Drummond of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, Birmingham, for petitioner.
H. Gregory Harp of Harp Law, LLC, Trussville; and Moses O. Stone, Birmingham, for respondents.
Rock Wool Manufacturing Company (“Rock Wool”) petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) to vacate its order denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss a complaint filed against it by Palmer Cason and Jessie M. Cason and to enter a new order dismissing the Casons' complaint. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
At all times relevant to this matter, Palmer Cason (“Palmer”) was an employee of Rock Wool. On July 16, 2014, Palmer was working as a furnace operator for Rock Wool when he suffered an injury caused by a furnace explosion. At some point before the explosion, Rock Wool had caused certain safety equipment called “explosion doors” to be removed from the furnace Palmer was operating. The “explosion doors” had the capacity at least to mitigate injury to the operator in the event of an explosion.
On October 22, 2014, the Casons sued several of Palmer's coworkers, alleging various claims in regard to the injuries Palmer suffered as a result of the furnace explosion. On January 27, 2015, the Casons filed an amended complaint adding Rock Wool as a defendant and asserting claims of wantonness, the tort of outrage, and negligence against Rock Wool.
On February 27, 2015, Rock Wool filed a motion to dismiss the Casons' amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In that motion, Rock Wool argued that the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25–5–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, provides the exclusive remedy for employees who are injured during the course of their employment. Specifically, Rock Wool argued that §§ 25–5–52 and –53, Ala.Code 1975, which are commonly referred to as the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, prevented the Casons from being able to recover against Rock Wool in tort for the injuries Palmer incurred during the course of his employment with Rock Wool. The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act provide, in relevant part:
“Except as provided in this chapter, no employee of any employer subject to this chapter ... shall have a right to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and from a cause originating in such employment or determination thereof.”
§ 25–5–53. Further, § 25–5–14, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
On May 1, 2015, the Casons filed a second amended complaint asserting a claim against Rock Wool under the Alabama Employer's Liability Act, § 25–6–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. On June 2, 2015, Rock Wool filed a motion to dismiss the Casons' second amended complaint. Rock Wool's arguments largely mirrored those in its first motion to dismiss, with the additional argument that there could be no recovery under the Employer's Liability Act in a case where the alleged injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Casons filed a response to this motion on July 23, 2015. On July 24, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on Rock Wool's motions to dismiss. On July 29, 2015, the circuit court entered an order denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss. This petition for mandamus relief followed.
Standard of Review
Ex parte MERSCORP, Inc., 141 So.3d 984, 990 (Ala.2013). One of the exceptions to the general rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by mandamus is where the motion to dismiss asserts a defense of immunity. See Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 n. 2 (Ala.2003) . See also Ex parte McCartney Constr. Co., 720 So.2d 910, 911 (Ala.1998) ( ); Ex parte Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 869 So.2d 459, 473 (Ala.2003) (ruling “consistent with McCartney ”); and Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So.3d 1224, 1228 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) ( ).
In its motions to dismiss, Rock Wool cited Progress Rail and argued that it was immune from the Casons' action based on the exclusive-remedy provisions set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, Rock Wool, having asserted a defense of immunity, has properly petitioned this Court for mandamus review of the circuit court's denial of Rock Wool's motions to dismiss.
Rock Wool argues that all of the Casons' claims are barred, in one way or another, by the Workers' Compensation Act. First, Rock Wool argues that the Casons' Employer's Liability Act claim is barred because, it says, the claim does not fall within an exception to coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act. Second, Rock Wool argues that the Casons' tort claims are barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, Rock Wool argues, the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss.
Rock Wool argues that the Casons' claim against it premised on the Employer's Liability Act is barred because the Workers' Compensation Act is presumed to apply in this situation and the Employer's Liability Act and the Workers' Compensation Act are mutually exclusive. The Casons' only argument in response is that their claim is proper under the Employer's Liability Act because they allege intentional tortious conduct on the part of Rock Wool. The Casons do not in any way address Rock Wool's argument that the Workers' Compensation Act and the Employer's Liability Act are mutually exclusive, nor do they address the following holding of this Court in Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 7320 v. Sheffield, 398 So.2d 262, 263 (Ala.1981) :
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