Cason v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth.
| Decision Date | 04 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–2354.,12–2354. |
| Citation | 770 F.3d 971 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
| Parties | Marisol CASON; Patricia Benavides, Plaintiffs–Appellants, Daisy Aguayo Cuevas, individually and on behalf of her Minor Children, E.A.T.A.; T.M.T.A.; J.M.T.A.; and A.J.T.A., Plaintiffs, v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY; ACE Insurance Company; Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc.; Triple–S Propiedad, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs–Appellees, JAF Communications, Inc.; Universal Insurance Company, Third Party Defendants–Appellees, ETL Contractors, Inc.; Insurance Company “Z”, Third Party Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hatuey Infante–Castellanos, with whom Toby B. Fullmer and Matthews & Fullmer, L.L.C., were on brief, for appellants Cason and Benavides.
´Angel A. Valencia–Aponte, was on brief, for of appellee Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority.
Before TORRUELLA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and GELPÍ, * District Judge.
Plaintiffs–Appellants, Marisol Cason and Patricia Benavides (“Cason and Benavides”), filed a wrongful death suit against Defendants in the United States District Court in Puerto Rico. The Defendant–Appellee, Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), challenged the District Court's jurisdiction, arguing that an additional, non-diverse member of the decedent's estate who was not made a party to the action, was indispensable, and that, in turn, his joinder destroyed the parties' complete diversity.
The District Court agreed that the presence of this nondiverse absent heir was required to adjudicate the suit. The court thus dismissed the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This included the decedent's estate survivorship action, as well as individual damages actions by estate members, the decedent's consensual partner, and two sisters, Cason and Benavides, who are not his heirs.
In this appeal, Cason and Benavides argue that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety, including their personal claims, which were separate and distinct from those of the estate and its members. They also posit that the court erred in its determination that the missing heir was a necessary and indispensable party to the federal action. More so, given that the plaintiffs who asserted the survivorship action requested dismissal voluntarily, Cason and Benavides note that only their individual claims remained before the District Court. Thus, they argue that they are, always have been, and will remain diverse in any federal action brought against the defendants.
We conclude that the dismissal of Cason and Benavides's personal actions was unwarranted. The non-diverse absent party was, in any event, not required to adjudicate the action because the members of the estate requested voluntary dismissal of their claims. The voluntary dismissal eliminated the survivorship action and with it any concern as to the indispensability and joinder issue raised by PREPA. The only claims that remained were those of Cason and Benavides, which were jurisdictionally sound. Without question, the District Court had jurisdiction over said claims.
I. BackgroundA. The Accident
Edwin Torres–López (“Torres–López” or “the decedent”), died from electrocution on September 20, 2010, at age thirty-three. At that time, he owned and operated a company which performed subcontract work for telecommunications companies in Puerto Rico, including, the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (“PRTC”). He was electrocuted by a “down-guy” wire connected to a utility pole which was improperly energized while he was removing and installing telecommunications cables. PREPA and the PRTC are purportedly responsible for the utility pole in question.
B. Procedural Background1. The Resulting Litigation in the District Court
Daisy Aguayo–Cuevas, the decedent's consensual partner, individually and on behalf of her and Torres–López's four minor children (the “Torres–Aguayo heirs,” and together with their mother the “Aguayo plaintiffs”) filed a wrongful death complaintin the United States District Court on September 15, 2011. Cason and Benavides, the decedent's sisters, also joined the action as named plaintiffs. The named defendants were PREPA, the PRTC, and their insurance companies (collectively “Defendants”). All plaintiffs sought relief for their own pain and suffering resulting from the illegal death of Torres–López.1 In addition, the Torres–Aguayo heirs sought to recover for the damages their father suffered prior to his death via a survivorship action.2
The District Court's jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship; at the time the complaint was filed, all named plaintiffs were domiciled in San Antonio, Texas, and all named defendants were domiciled in Puerto Rico.
On November 10, 2011, PREPA filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7), for failure to join a necessary party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. Therein, PREPA contended that the survivorship cause of action should be dismissed pursuant to Cruz–Gascot v. HIMA–San Pablo Hosp. Bayamón, 728 F.Supp.2d 14 (D.P.R.2010), which held that all members of an estate must be named as parties to a survivorship action brought under Puerto Rico law. PREPA averred that a fifth member of Torres–López's estate was missing from the action, to wit, a child from a previous relationship (hereinafter the “fifth minor child”). PREPA argued that this additional heir was a necessary and indispensable party, and thus, the case could not proceed without him. However, because this child was domiciled in Puerto Rico, joining him would vitiate the court's diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, PREPA argued that the personal actions for damages brought by Cason and Benavides should also be dismissed in “equity and good conscience” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b) because dismissal would allow said plaintiffs to initiate a suit in the Commonwealth court of Puerto Rico.
On January 9, 2012, the Aguayo plaintiffs voluntarily moved to dismiss without prejudice of all their personal damages claims, as well as the estate's survivorship action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). They informed the court that they no longer resided in Texas having moved to Puerto Rico. They also stated that they intended to pursue all their claims in Commonwealth court along with the fifth minor child.3 However, they noted that Cason and Benavides, who remained Texas citizens, would continue to assert their personal claims in federal court. The Defendants did not file any opposition to the voluntary dismissal request. On January 9, 2012, all plaintiffs opposed PREPA's motion to dismiss noting that the same became moot upon the Aguayo plaintiffs' request for voluntary dismissal, as Cason and Benavides were now the only remaining plaintiffs.
On January 31, 2012, PREPA replied to plaintiffs' opposition to dismissal. It did not challenge Cason and Benavides's Texas domicile and solely argued that the District Court should nonetheless abstain from adjudicating Cason and Benavides's personal actions under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). PREPA posited that, regardless of the sisters' diverse status, they should be required to join the other plaintiffs' state action and litigate in Commonwealth court.
On May 2, 2012, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on PREPA's motion to dismiss suggesting that the District Court grant the Aguayo plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal motion. The report and recommendation further suggested that the District Court deny the motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party because the heirs who brought the survivorship action were no longer parties. The magistrate judge noted that there was no concern for the failure to join an indispensable party, as articulated in Cruz–Gascot. More so, she noted that Cason and Benavides, who are not estate members, only claimed individual damages for the pain and suffering their brother's untimely death personally caused them. Said claims were the only ones left and thus, were jurisdictionally sound. Regarding Colorado River, the magistrate judge noted that abstention under said doctrine required exceptional circumstances and was improper because Cason and Benavides were not heirs of the decedent. Contrary to PREPA's assertion, there was no parallel state court action for them to join.
On May 16, 2012, PREPA objected to the report and recommendation. Thereafter, on September 28, 2012, the District Court issued a memorandum and order rejecting the same. The court held that the non-diverse fifth minor child was indispensable and his presence was required to adjudicate the suit. However, his joinder would destroy the parties' complete diversity. The District Court thus dismissed the entire action, including Cason and Benavides's individual claims, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, it relied exclusively on Cruz–Gascot.4
II. DiscussionA. The Tort of Wrongful Death
In Puerto Rico, the tort of wrongful death gives rise to two separate causes of action recognized under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. SeeP.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141.5 The first is the victim's personal action for damages experienced by him or her prior to death and caused by the negligent or intentional act or omission of another person. See Montalvo, 587 F.3d at 46; Widow of Delgado, 1 P.R. Offic. Trans. 823, 825 (1973). This action is known as a “survivorship action.”
The second type of tort action recognized under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code is the personal action that corresponds exclusively and by own right to the decedent's relatives or any individual who personally suffers damages by virtue of the decedent's death, regardless of status as an heir. Widow of Delgado, 1 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 825; see Montalvo, 587 F.3d at 47; Hernández, 80 P.R. Dec. at 98–99.
In the present case,...
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